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Preface 
Music education has traditionally been very practical in orientation. It is 
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ideas and suggestions, and his catching enthusiasm and optimism, the pre-
sent result would have been unthinkable. In the second place, I owe very 
much to my parents who have always stimulated me in my studies and my 
work. In particular, I thank them for their practical, mental, and material 
support during the past five years. 
I also wish to thank those who have commented on parts of my disserta-
tion: my colleagues in the Nijmegen Institute of Philosophy and History 
of Education, professor Th. Wren (Chicago), professor R. Jonathan (Edin-
burgh), professor P. Duker (Nijmegen), professor R. de Groot (Amsterdam), 
professor J. D. Imelman (Utrecht), and Ellis van Dam (Amsterdam). Further-
more, I owe much to discussions with doctor Gy. Véber (Malden) and pro-
fessor K. Swanwick (London). 
Last, but not least, I want to thank Jethro Zevenbergen for taking care of 
the lay-out of this book. 
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Introduction 
Philosophy of music education is a very young discipline. Surely, there have 
been theorists in the past who have reflected upon philosophical questions 
in relation to music education. Plato, Aristotle, Comenius, Rousseau, and 
Pestalozzi are among the most prominent. However, the subject of music 
education only held a marginal position in their writings, and they were 
individuals rather than exponents of a continuing tradition of systematic 
reflection. 
The most important event in the rise of philosophy of music education as 
an independent subject was the appearance of Bennett Reimer's A Philosophy 
of Music Education (1970). Reimer was preceded by a number of theorists 
who had reflected on philosophical issues. For instance, James Mursell 
(1893-1963) tried to elucidate in numerous publications what, in his view, 
were the nature and value of music education (e.g., Mursell, 1927, 1934). 
Likewise, in Charles Leonhard & Robert House's Foundations and Principles of 
Music Education (1959) philosophical questions also played a significant part. 
Furthermore, Basic Concepts in Music Education (Henry, 1958), an important 
publication in which various theoretical approaches to music education 
were taken, featured two important philosophical essays: Foster McMur-
ray's "Pragmatism in Music Education" and Harry Broudy's "A Realistic 
Philosophy of Music Education". Starting from divergent philosophical po-
sitions, these two studies explore a number of questions in the field. How-
ever, being the first one to write an entire volume on the philosophical 
foundations of music education, Reimer developed a scope of the subject 
that was without precedent. He embarked upon investigations into basic 
concepts in aesthetics and elaborated a specific aesthetic position. 
Reimer's premise was that "the essential nature and value of music edu-
cation are determined by the nature and value of the art of music" (1970, 
p. 1). Hence, he devotes the major part of his book to elaborating a distinct 
view of the nature and value of music. Reimer calls the position he takes 
Absolute Expressionism (1970, chap. 1). It is absolutist in that it holds that the 
meaning and value of musical works can be grasped only by attending to 
the qualities of the work as such, that is, to the aesthetic qualities of the 
sound configurations. Contrary to what Referentialists hold, according to this 
view the meaning of a work of art does not exist in ideas, emotions, events, 
et cetera outside the art work but is inherent to the art work itself. Reimer 
also opposes to the Absolute Formalists whom he takes to consider music 
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merely as the intellectual exercise of contemplating form. Music has a deep­
er meaning in that it gives us a deeper sense of human life. Reimer's view is 
inspired by the aesthetic position of Susanne К. Langer. He adopts her view 
that "[bjecause the forms of human feeling are much more congruent with 
musical forms than with the forms of language, music can reveal the nature 
of feelings with a detail and truth that language cannot approach" (Langer 
cited in Reimer, 1970, p. 38). In his book Reimer elaborates his aesthetic 
position by discussing a number of key concepts in music: feeling, meaning, 
experience, creation. The tenor, however, remains the same throughout his 
book: the value of music derives from aesthetic experience, that is, from 
experiencing the "conditions of livingness" the artist has captured in musi­
cal form. 
According to Reimer (1970), the major task of music education is to 
influence people's aesthetic sensitivity, that is, their ability to have aesthetic 
experiences (p. 82). Teaching and learning should be arranged so that aes­
thetic experiencing is central and all other matters play a supporting role. 
Musical works employed in music education are, in Reimer's view, to be 
selected for their capability of being aesthetically perceived and aesthetically 
reacted to. The study of music ought to concentrate on the qualities of sound 
that make music expressive (p. 84). That is, teaching should be directed at 
enhancing the objective part of aesthetic experience — aesthetic perception. 
Aesthetic reaction, on the other hand, belongs to the domain of subjectivity 
and teachers should not try to influence this (pp. 79-81). 
For some two decades Reimer's philosophy completely dominated the 
field. In this period innovative philosophical studies in music education re­
mained scarce and the aesthetic conception of music education held the mo­
nopoly. It was only after 1989, when the second edition of Reimer's A Philos­
ophy of Music Education appeared — revised, but unaltered in its basic pre­
mises and its outline — that opposing voices began to become prominent. 
Wayne Bowman and David Elliott put forward serious criticism against 
Reimer's position and against aesthetic approaches to music education in 
general (Bowman, 1991a; Elliott, 1991a, 1991b). So did Philip Alperson when 
he tried to answer the question "What would one expect from a philosophy 
of music education?" (Alperson, 1991). He argues that music education 
should be based on a view of music as a practice. Whereas the aesthetic 
"formalism" only yields a limited insight in music, the praxial view allows 
us to "understand music in terms of the variety of meanings and values 
evidenced in actual practice in particular cultures" (p. 233). 
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A new milestone in the philosophy of music education was the appear-
ance of David Elliott's Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education 
(1995). Elliott takes up and radicalizes Alpersons views. He works out a 
praxial conception of music as well as of music education. Whereas Alper-
son in his explorations of a praxial philosophy of music education still as-
signs an important — though no longer privileged — position to aesthetic 
considerations, Elliott presents his philosophy as completely overcoming 
what he calls "music education as aesthetic education". Instead of being 
seen as a collection of aesthetic objects, music should be conceived as an 
activity, as something people do. In Elliott's view, the value of musical prac-
tices is to be found in making music — "musicing" — rather than in listen-
ing. Hence, attaining musicianship should be the goal of music education. 
Elliott argues that musicianship is essentially a matter of procedural knowl-
edge, knowledge that is manifested in the activities of musicing and listen-
ing. The only way to acquire this knowledge is to engage in these very ac-
tivities. According to Elliott, music education should have the form of re-
flective musical practicums in which the actions pupils engage in closely 
parallel those of real music cultures. 
Within a few years, philosophy of music education has become a lively 
discipline in which new subjects are explored and alternative positions are 
defended with respect to traditional issues. More and more studies are 
appearing in journals like the Journal of Aesthetic Education and the Quarterly 
Journal of Music Teaching and Learning and since 1993 the discipline even has 
its own periodical: The Philosophy of Music Education Review. However, at the 
present the study of the discipline is almost exclusively restricted to 
Northern America, that is, The United States and Canada. In Great Britain 
and Germany, for example, philosophy of music education does not exist as 
an independent specialization, even though there have been major contri-
butions made by Keith Swanwick (1979,1988,1994) in the United Kingdom 
and Sigrid Abel-Struth (1985) in Germany. 
Up to now, the approach that has dominated philosophy of music education 
is that of developing substantial views of music and music education. In this 
conception, the task of philosophy of music education is to provide music 
educators with ideas about the nature and value of music, the aims of music 
education, and about what, accordingly, practices of music education should 
look like. Philosophers taking this approach tend to head for straight an-
swers to philosophical questions. Rather than thoroughly elucidating vari-
ous alternative positions and assessing their pros and cons, they try to 
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demonstrate the superiority of one view and to investigate its consequences 
for music education. 
The dominance of this substantive approach can easily be explained in 
view of how philosophy of music education came into being. It originated 
from the idea that music educators and those being trained for the pro-
fession need a clear conception of what their subject is and what it is good 
for. But now that music education philosophy becomes a more mature and 
independent discipline, we may raise the question whether this heavy em-
phasis on substantive approaches should not be complemented by a more 
analytical approach. According to an analytical conception of the discipline, 
the aim of philosophy of music education is to clarify philosophical issues 
emerging in music education, rather than to argue for one specific sub-
stantial vision of the field.1 
Bowman (1992) argues for a similar approach. In his view, philosophy of 
music education yields the impression of a body of doctrine. He rejects such 
a conception of the discipline; rather than a commodity providing clearcut 
answers to fundamental questions, philosophy, as he sees it, is a process of 
systematic exploration or inquiry into the grounds for human beliefs and 
practices. Central to philosophy is the activity of uncovering underlying 
assumptions, of rendering explicit the implicit, with the intent of enriching 
understanding and perception (1992, pp. 3-4). 
Bowman's conception is in line with the approach I take in this book. 
However, we can refine this approach by distinguishing several levels and 
steps in philosophical investigation.2 
1. The content level. A first level of inquiry concerns the content of music 
education theories and practices. Besides all sorts of practices of music edu-
cation, the philosopher can examine various types of theoretical contri-
butions: 
* practical theories of music education: theories offering concrete 
directions for organizing educational practices (e.g., methods); 
* scientific theories of music education: theories conveying factual 
knowledge about music education. 
* substantive philosophies of music education. 
I.e. Analysis. As a first step, the philosopher describes and analyzes the 
beliefs, claims, arguments, and discussions in music education theories and 
substantive philosophies of music education, or in practices of music edu-
cation. Implicit beliefs are rendered explicit, arguments and patterns of 
argumentation are analyzed, different claims and viewpoints are carefully 
distinguished. If discourse is obscure or equivocal, the philosopher can 
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elucidate why they are so: he may point out that terms are ambiguous, that 
aspects of a subject matter fail to be distinguished and thus get confused, 
that arguments can be interpreted in different ways, and so on. 
l.b. Evaluation. After positions have been clearly analyzed, the next step 
is evaluation. The question now is whether the arguments given are sound. 
Have claims been sufficiently substantiated? Are the patterns of argumen-
tation used and the concrete arguments given valid? Fallacies may be traced 
and the absence of arguments necessary for demonstrating particular pro-
positions may be pointed out. 
I.e. Improvement. As a third step, the philosopher can make proposals 
for strengthening our thinking about music education. For example, he can 
make suggestions for using terms more consistently or for better structuring 
discussions. He can also point to arguments that can make the author's case 
stronger or to related claims that can be substantiated more easily. 
2. The foundational level. At a deeper level the philosopher can examine 
the conceptual frameworks underlying theories and practices of music edu-
cation and the fundamental presuppositions expressed in these frameworks. 
Concepts never occur in isolation; rather, they always belong to conceptual 
frameworks in which they are connected with other concepts in specific 
ways. For example, aesthetic theories of music (in the narrow sense) rest on 
frameworks in which concepts like those of the work, aesthetic perception, 
aesthetic experience, aesthetic value, and disinterested involvement take an 
important place. Conceptual frameworks are constitutive of the way we 
experience the world and the way we think about it. On the one hand, they 
open up the space of possible experience and thinking; without certain con-
ceptual frameworks any coherent experience of reality would be impossible. 
On the other hand, however, a conceptual framework also restricts our view 
of reality, because our experience is structured by this rather than that 
conceptual constellation. 
The notion of foundations is closely connected to that of conceptual 
frameworks. Foundations are the fundamental presuppositions characteris-
tic of a particular framework. We may find them expressed in metaphors 
(music as a universal language), slogans ("Music is for all!"), and — most 
clearly — in emphatic statements in substantive philosophies ("what music 
is, at root, is a human activity" — Elliott, 1995, p. 39). But they can also be 
deduced from the specific way central concepts in theories are being under-
stood. 
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At this more fundamental level the philosopher can take three steps 
parallel to those distinguished with respect to the level of investigating the 
content of discourse and practices. 
2.Я. Analysis. First, he can analyze the key concepts of a framework and 
the way they cohere. He can also clarify the relations between competing 
frameworks. For instance, it may be explained that the concept of musical 
experience is not as central to Elliott's praxial philosophy of music education 
as it is in Reimer's aesthetic philosophy. It may also be pointed out how this 
concept gets a different interpretation in the two philosophies because of the 
different ways it is connected with other concepts. 
Besides clarifying concepts and conceptual relations, the analytic philoso­
pher can concentrate on the philosophical foundations, that is, the funda­
mental ideas that guide music educators, educational theorists, or philoso­
phers of music education in their actions, their thinking and their judg­
ments. For instance, he can analyze the anthropological or ethical presup­
positions that underlie the Suzuki method. 
2.b. Evaluation. The analysis of conceptual frameworks and philosophical 
foundations may be followed by critique. It may be concluded that the do­
main in question has been conceptualized in a satisfying way. However, 
evaluation may also lead to the judgment that a conceptual framework in 
certain respects offers too limited a perspective of the domain. It may be 
found that phenomena that in fact are essential to the domain are not 
adquately taken into account or even obscured by a certain framework; or 
that the conceptual framework hinders our understanding of crucial mat­
ters. For instance, Elliott criticizes the aesthetic framework for impeding 
insight into the processes of making music (see chapter 4). Worse still, criti­
cal evaluation may lead the philosopher to conclude that the conceptual 
system is inadequate because of serious internal or external contradictions. 
Internal contradictions occur if some of its foundations turn out to be logical­
ly incompatible. External contradictions occur if the conceptual system is in­
consistent with data from experience, intuitions, or generally shared con­
victions (e.g., democratic ideals). 
2.C. Improvement. Negative evaluations may in rum be followed by a next, 
constructive step: making proposals for adjusting conceptual systems. Con­
ceptualizations may be improved by introducing new concepts or rearrang­
ing conceptual relations in order to overcome the failures of the original 
conceptual systems. Furthermore, as far as possible, integration of compet­
ing conceptual frameworks may be proposed. 
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To be sure, the various steps of analytical inquiry presented here do 
not present a program the analytic philosopher will systematically work 
through every time he studies a subject. Rather, they present a survey of the 
various ways he can proceed. The philosopher may limit himself, for 
instance, to clarifying arguments given in a certain context; or he may con-
centrate on analysis, rather than evaluation. On the other hand, the various 
steps do suggest a logical order: before we can reasonably evaluate a certain 
claim, argument, or conceptual framework, it will have to be carefully ana-
lyzed; and before we can study the foundations of a practice, we win have to 
analyze it at surface level. 
In summary, philosophers can clarify various aspects of music education: 
practices of music education, practical theories of music education, scientific 
theories of music education, and substantive philosophies of music 
education. They can do their clarifying work at two levels: (1) the content 
level of the concrete beliefs, claims, arguments, et cetera current in theory 
and practice; and (2) the foundational level of the conceptual frameworks 
and the fundamental presuppositions that underlie these. And clarification 
can proceed in the forms of (a) analysis, (b) evaluation, and (c) proposals for 
improvement. 
It is not my purpose to argue that substantive approaches to music 
education should completely give way to analytical approaches. I agree with 
Reimer that the music education profession needs clear conceptions of what 
music is, what its value is, and how music education should be organized 
accordingly. They can have an important inspiring function in helping mu-
sic educators and theorists of music education to develop a view of the field 
they operate in. My point is rather that substantive approaches should be 
better balanced by analytical approaches. We need the latter for several rea-
sons. 
First, we should take very seriously the body of ideas current in the 
various regions of music education. By analyzing and evaluating the beliefs, 
claims, and arguments put forward in theories of music education or in-
herent in practices of music education we can greatly enrich our under-
standing of the field. Second, substantive philosophies offer a limited view 
of the domain. Because the phenomena of music and music education are 
very complex and our understanding of them is limited at present, one the-
ory cannot pretend to give an all-embracing treatment of the field. 
We need metatheoretic approaches that transcend the closed views pre-
sented by substantive philosophies. Thus we can put substantive views into 
perspective: we can examine their strengths and weaknesses, present alter-
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natives that are suppressed, relate competing substantial views to each oth-
er, trace the pivots of the discussions and controversies involved, and so on. 
A host of topics in the philosophy of music education are waiting for further 
clarification. The purpose of this dissertation is to address a number of ba-
sic issues in the field. In doing so I have tried to strike a balance between 
breadth and depth. In view of the immature state of the discipline, I have 
found it more fruitful to address various topics rather than to go for an 
extensive treatment of one limited subject. On the other hand, I have at-
tempted to dig more deeply into the issues I raise than has been done before. 
In view of this twofold aim, the five articles presented here can not pretend 
to be comprehensive studies providing definitive answers. Rather, they are 
explorations into philosophical questions that have remained largely beyond 
the scope of the philosophy of music education so far. 
In my first study I consider the issue oí justification of music in school 
curricula. Traditionally music does have its place in general education but 
can we argue that it should really be that way? This is a classical question 
which has led to a huge amount of statements about the value of music 
education. Describing and evaluating all these statements would by far ex-
ceed the scope of the study undertaken here. Apart from this, the desirabi-
lity of doing so can be doubted, since the majority of these statements do not 
amount to solid arguments in favor of music education. I decided to con-
centrate on three serious types of argument which have not always been 
sufficiently kept apart. According the first type, music education contributes 
to the development of the whole person. The second states that musical 
experience involves a special kind of knowledge. According to the third type 
of argument, the value of music lies in the richness of musical experience 
itself. These three positions are analyzed and evaluated. I conclude that, 
though none of them succeeds in justifying music education conclusively, 
the third argument can provide a ground for a consensus that music should 
be taught at school. 
In this first study I argue that no convincing arguments have been given 
to demonstrate that music yields deeper insight into the nature of human 
feeling. The significance of music appears to be largely internal to the mu-
sical domain. However, though they use expressions like formal meaning, 
formal significance, musical sense, and intrinsic meaning, musicologists and 
philosophers have given remarkably little attention to explaining this type of 
meaning. The purpose of the second study, written in collaboration with 
Wouter van Haaften, is to make a contribution to this difficult task. In a 
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number of ways we try to elucidate intrinsic musical meaning, as we call it. 
We explain and elaborate the distinction between extrinsic meaning and 
intrinsic meaning. Then, we compare intrinsic meaning with related notions 
of form-bound musical meaning put forward by other theorists. Further-
more, we consider the relations between intrinsic meaning and musical 
experience and the problem of the ineffability of intrinsic meaning. 
There is no doubt that what music can mean for someone changes during 
the course of life. People's musical understanding develops with age and 
together with this the way they can experience music. But is musical devel-
opment different for every individual or can we reconstruct developmental 
patterns characteristic for all (or nearly all) people? In my third study I in-
vestigate three theories of musical development that take musical development 
to proceed in a number of stages. After having outlined a theoretical frame-
work for the analysis of developmental theories, I critically examine each of 
these theories. Subsequently, I look at the conceptual relations between the 
theories. Next, I argue that evaluative claims that later stages are better than 
the ones preceding them can be justified with respect to each of the three 
theories. Finally, the relevance of theories of musical development for music 
education is discussed. 
The fourth study is devoted to the subject matter of aims in music educa-
tion. Instead of taking a prescriptive approach, I focus on the concept of aims, 
I start with outlining the views of two leading philosophers of education on 
the issue. After this orientation on aims I concentrate on two topics. The first 
topic concerns the distinction between internal and external aims in music 
education. Analysis of the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott shows that 
each of them present both internal as well as external conceptions of aims. I 
argue that the distinction between internal and external aims is obscured in 
their writings and that, hence, they fail to give a clear picture of the relation 
between these two types of aims. The second topic features another distinc-
tion: the one between conceptual and empirical aspects of aims. Departing 
from a schema presented by Reimer, I point out how empirical questions of 
means and ends on the one hand and logical questions of the conceptual 
connections between various activities on the other hand can easily get 
mixed up and how this can lead to confusions. In this second part of this 
study I also try to clarify the conceptual relations between the various as-
pects of musical activities Reimer refers to in his survey. 
My fifth article — Music Education: Aesthetic or Praxial — deals with the 
controversy that has emerged with the appearance of David Elliott's Music 
Matters. Elliott does not content himself with presenting his philosophy as a 
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fresh approach to the field. Rather, he intends it to replace the traditional 
aesthetic approach to music education. Throughout his book he attacks 
"music education as aesthetic education", contrasting its obsolete tenets (as 
he sees it) with the promising viewpoints of a praxial philosophy. The 
purpose of my study is to strike a balance between these competing views. 
After having outlined Elliott's main objections to the aesthetic view, I give a 
critical evaluation of these. Next, Elliott's own praxial view is examined. My 
conclusion is that Elliott's new philosophy does not defeat the aesthetic view 
of music education. Furthermore, I argue that — contrary to what Elliott 
suggests — aesthetic and praxial views of music education are in principle 
compatible. Music educators need not make a radical choice between the 
two perspectives; rather, they are well advised to combine the valuable 
insights from both. 
Except for a few minor corrections, the studies are presented in the form in 
which they have been published or submitted. However, for the sake of 
uniformity the format of all articles has been adapted to ΑΡΑ-standards. The 
publication data are as follows: 
Koopman, С. (1995). Stage theories of musical development. Journal of Aes­
thetic Education, 29 (2), 49-66. (Copyright © 1995 Board of Trustees of the 
University of Illinois). 
Koopman, С. (1996). Why teach music at school. Oxford Review of Education, 
22 (4), 483-194. (Copyright © 1996 Carfax Publishing Ltd.). 
Koopman, С. (1997, in press). Aims in music education: A conceptual study. 
Philosophy of Music Education Review, 5. 
Koopman, С. (in press). Music education: Aesthetic or praxial? Journal of 
Aesthetic Education. (Copyright © 1995 Board of Trustees of the Univer­
sity of Illinois). 
The paper "Intrinsic meaning in music" has been submitted. 
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Notes 
1. As becomes clear from the following outline, what I call an analytical approach 
here is not restricted to the once favored linguistic analysis approach. 
2. The following outline of analytical inquiry derives from: Snik, G., Haaften, W. 
van, & Tellings, A. (1994). Pedagogisch grondslagenonderzoek [Investigating the 
foundations of education]. Pedagogisch Tijdschrifi, 19 (4), 287-303. 

1. Why teach music at school? 
In most countries of the Western world music is a compulsory subject in 
general education at the primary and secondary levels. There are large 
differences between various countries as to the amount of time spent on 
music at school and the contents of the curriculum, but the idea is widely 
accepted that music education should have a place in general education. 
The question I would like to raise in this study is whether this common 
sense view can be validated in a rigorous discursive demonstration. The case 
for reserving a place for music in the curriculum of primary or secondary 
schools is not as self-evident as it might seem at first sight.1 Music may be an 
important feature of Western society, but there are many other activities that 
play a vital role in our lives and that are, nevertheless, excluded from 
general education. Which specific arguments, then, can be given in favor of 
requiring music education? Up to now numerous reasons have been pro-
posed, but most of these cannot bear scrutiny. 
If a place for music in general education is to be justified three things 
should be demonstrated: (a) the value of music is such that everyone should 
have the opportunity to engage in musical activities; (b) musical abilities are 
capable of being cultivated; and (c) the school is the appropriate place for 
cultivating musical capabilities. So far, literature addressing the issue of 
validating music education has focused on the first of these three issues. 
The purpose of the present study is to elucidate a number of the most 
serious positions with regard to the first issue, that is, with regard of the 
value of music. Preceding this I shall make a distinction between arguments 
that are based on the nature of music itself and arguments that rely merely 
on nonmusical outcomes of music education. After having dismissed the 
latter category, I shall investigate three types of argument belonging to the 
former category. The first type appeals to the ideal of the completely devel-
oped person. According to the second type, music involves a special kind of 
insight. The third type of argument is based on the intrinsic value of musical 
experience. 
1.1 Musical and nonmusical arguments 
The arguments that have been advanced in favor of music education can be 
divided in two groups. Arguments belonging to the first group are based on 
aspects considered to be constitutive of music; they link the value of en-
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gaging in music to the nature of music itself. Arguments of this group rest 
(either implicitly or explicitly) on a definite position with regard to musical 
aesthetics. 
The second group of arguments appeals to the positive nonmusical out-
comes of musical activities. These arguments are not concerned with the 
nature of music, but it is simply claimed that particular desirable effects are 
related to engaging in musical activities. For the sake of simplicity I shall re-
fer to this second group of arguments as nonmusical arguments and to the 
first group as musical. 
With respect to the nonmusical arguments many positive effects have 
been claimed: music education would, for instance, contribute positively to 
the development of mathematical insight, learning to read, concentration, 
creativity, the development of general intelligence, the formation of a pos-
itive self-image, the acquisition of social skills, the channelling of emotion, 
and physical health. In a survey of research on the outcomes of arts edu-
cation Haanstra and Van Oijen (1985) distinguish five categories of such 
effects: (a) cognition; (b) sensorimotor capacities; (c) personality, behavior, 
attitude; (d) other fields of learning; and (e) other effects — principally 
physical abilities. 
Despite all claims about positive side effects of music it should be stated 
that none of these have been demonstrated convincingly. Some purported 
effects simply have not been investigated seriously up to now; and with 
those effects that have been examined the issues turn out to be too complex 
to justify rapid conclusions. Problems arise, for example, in designing suffi-
ciently sensitive measures, in controlling for confounding variables, and in 
dealing in a satisfying way with variables like intelligence, creativity, and 
personality (Haanstra & Van Oijen, 1985; Peery & Peery, 1987). Not surpris-
ingly, conclusions of experiments are often at variance. Univocal results 
have not been found for any effect of the five categories. 
Apart from this, in order to justify a place for music in the curriculum it 
is not sufficient to demonstrate that musical activities have positive effects. 
We should also be able tö demonstrate that teaching music is an efficient 
way of bringing about these effects. For example, it seems likely that a few 
extra exercises in reading can improve children's reading abilities more than 
many hours of music education. If so, we cannot claim that music education 
is desirable because of its stimulating effects on children's reading abilities. 
Partly because of the problem of demonstrating positive effects at all, 
virtually no attention has been paid to the question of efficiency up to now. 
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A more fundamental problem of arguments that refer to nonmusical out-
comes of music education is that they can at best justify only those musical 
activities that are directly related to the effect claimed. For example, if we 
could prove that music contributes to the improvement of social skills, this 
result would justify only those musical activies in which pupils do actually 
cooperate. And if we could demonstrate that musical activities advance 
children's motor development, this result would entitle us solely to include 
those types of music in the curriculum that strongly stimulate motor sys-
tems. Thus the scope of music education would be seriously restricted. The 
problem of justifying a place for music education at school on nonmusical 
grounds is, therefore, that along these lines one cannot defend a curriculum 
that is balanced from a musical point of view. If we wish to plead for a fully 
fledged music education, we need to rely on arguments according to which 
music is valuable in itself; that is, arguments that belong to the group of 
arguments that I have called musical at the beginning of this section. 
My point is not that we should exclude all nonmusical considerations 
from music education: there is nothing wrong with relating music to other 
subjects, such as mathematics, literature, or history. Nor am I denying that if 
research were to vindicate some of the nonmusical arguments this would 
constitute a welcome support for teaching music at school. However, one or 
two valid nonmusical arguments are not sufficient to justify a full music 
program. They justify only particular aspects of it. Of course we cannot 
exclude the possibility that so many nonmusical arguments might prove to 
be valid that by additive reasoning one might make a plausible case for a 
comprehensive music curriculum. What I intend to do here, however, is to 
examine whether there are arguments that constitute in themselves suffi-
cient reasons for including music in the school curriculum. 
In the following I shall discuss three types of argument that relate the 
value of engaging in musical activities to the nature of music itself. First, I 
wish to make a preliminary remark about the scope of the arguments to be 
discussed. The majority of these are not specifically aimed at music but at 
the arts in general or at the even larger domain of aesthetics. Therefore, 
these arguments can demonstrate at best the importance of music as one of 
the arts (or as a part of the aesthetic domain). In order to justify the situation 
prevalent in Western countries, in which music is a separate subject at 
school and is given preference above several other arts, we need an 
additional argument.2 
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1.2 Music as contributing to the completely developed person 
The first type of argumentation appeals to the ideal of the completely devel-
oped person. Music — or, more generally, the aesthetic domain — is con-
ceived as a part of reality that entails a specific approach. According to this 
position, if education pays no attention to this specific realm, important 
capacities of the individual will remain unemployed. Education aiming at 
the complete development of individuals should, therefore, also be directed 
at developing their aesthetic capacities. 
Within this type of argumentation we can distinguish four versions de-
pending on what one considers to be constitutive of music. Some authors 
(e.g., Reid, 1969; Reimer, 1989) defend more than one of these versions. Ac-
cording to the first version, the specificity of the aesthethic domain is con-
stituted by the attitude a person takes in dealing with phenomena in the 
world. If we approach phenomena with an aesthetic attitude, we contem-
plate them for their own sake. No utilitarian purpose is served when we are 
engaged in aesthetic perception. The aesthetic attitude may therefore be 
characterized as one of disinterested interest. Aesthetic experience is self-
sufficient; it is complete by itself. According to this position, the arts are pre-
eminently the field in which the aesthetic attitude dominates and the 
aesthetic experience yielded by the aesthetic attitude is cultivated. Among 
the authors who try to justify music education at school on these grounds 
are Osborne (1985) and Simpson (1985). 
In a second version of the argument from development the specificity of 
the musical domain is conceived as a unique form of cognition rather than a 
particular attitude. The psychologist Howard Gardner (1983) believes that 
the human mind is best understood as consisting of several intellectual 
competences ("intelligences") that are relatively autonomous. He distin-
guishes linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, 
and personal intelligences. Interestingly, Gardner views music as a separate 
intelligence. In this respect his theory is at variance with the views of many 
philosophers who treat the arts together. 
Hirst (1974), for example, argues that the arts involve a unique form of 
knowledge. According to him, the arts exhibit a logical structure equivalent to 
the structure of language. The physically observable features of art works 
(forms, colors, sounds, etc.) "are used as symbols, have meaning, can be seen 
as making artistic statements and judged true or false just as words and sen-
tences can be used to make scientific statements" (p. 152). Thus, art can be 
viewed as a language that involves a specific kind of propositional knowl-
edge. However, Hirst position remains rudimentary; he does not explain 
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what entities in the arts function as symbols or statements. In the end he 
must leave open the question whether the arts do indeed entail a typical 
form of knowledge. 
Other philosophers hold that meaning in the arts is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the meaning contained in propositions. According to Phénix 
(1964, p. 141 ff.), the domain of aesthetics constitutes one of the nine realms of 
meaning that should be included in general education. Phénix considers the 
aesthetic realm as being characterized by its focus on the specific form of 
individual objects. Each work of art contains its own unique meaning and 
speaks for itself. This meaning is inalienable from the art work and cannot 
be expressed in propositions. We can grasp aesthetic meaning only in the 
direct perception of phenomena in their wholeness. 
Reid takes a similar though more elaborated position (Reid, 1969, 1980, 
1985,1986). He also states that the meaning of art works can be expressed 
neither in language nor in any other symbol system. A unique meaning is 
contained in each art work and can be experienced only in direct engage-
ment with it. Reid (1980) refers to the meaning of art as meaning-embodied: 
...we know art not through symbols that refer to anything else, but by direct 
cognitively felt acquaintance with meaning: meaning-embodied. This is a way 
of knowing which...is unique. And anyone who has no experience of this way 
of knowing has missed out on a major factor of his education as a human 
being, (p. 14) 
Understanding meaning-embodied is not a purely intellectual act. Reid 
(1980, p. 10) believes that the division between feeling on the one hand and 
thinking and knowing (or cognizing) on the other hand has had disastrous 
consequences for the understanding of the functioning of the human mind. 
In aesthetic experience feeling is inseparable from cognition; the two have 
become one. Reid calls the fusion of knowing and feeling cognitively feeling. 
Feeling is taken as active: 
...feeling has a positive, active function; it reinforces (conative) interest and 
sharpens attention. Partly by doing this, it illuminates what we cognitively 
see or hear. We may know the notes, understand intellectually the structure 
of, say, a piece of music as performer or listener; but unless we discrimina-
tingly feel the flow and progress of it directly and intuitively, we are still 
mainly knowing about it in a detached way. (Reid, 1980, p. 12) 
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According to this position, feeling is not just the subjective part of con-
sciousness accompanying aesthetic cognition, but it plays a crucial role in 
apprehending the meaning-embodied. 
The important role Reid assigns to feeling leads us to the third version of 
the argument from development: the arts as cultivating feeling. Reimer 
(1989) states: "The arts are the means by which humans can actively explore 
and experience the unbounded richness of human subjective possibilities" 
(p. 50). Although the claim that arts are pre-eminently suitable for cultivat-
ing the life of feeling is often put forward in defence of arts education, it is 
rarely elaborated. Reimer is one of the few authors who attempts to do so. 
He tries to demonstrate that "[c]reating art, and experiencing art, do precise-
ly and exactly for feeling what writing and reading do for reasoning" (p. 33). 
According to Reimer, our inner life is characterized by a jumble of feelings 
that come and go without any logical organization. The arts enable us to get 
more hold on our feelings. With the assistance of an artistic medium (e.g., 
sound) we may objectify a feeling that has impinged on us. Once we have 
captured this feeling in a melody we can "improve the feeling itself by improv-
ing the melody" (p. 35). Reimer distinguishes several ways of improving a 
feeling embodied in a melody: for example, a feeling may be clarified, orga-
nized, broadened, deepened, concentrated, or refined. 
Reimer's analogy between thinking and feeling raises some urgent ques-
tions. Can feelings really be controlled in the same way as thoughts can? Is it 
possible to abstract life-feelings from the context in which they occur and 
transfer them to artistic media? If this is possible, is this really a procedure 
an artists normally follow? Is the musical medium rightly pictured as a neu-
tral device for moulding feelings that originate from an nonmusical context? 
Do feelings that are embodied in music derive from pre-existent extramusi-
cal feelings or do they rather take shape only in the process of musical com-
position? I shall not pursue these questions further here but it seems clear 
that Reimer's theory cannot be accepted right away. 
According to the fourth and last version of the present argument, the 
specific character of the arts is constituted by the holistic experience they 
bring about. We may approach aesthetic experience from several perspec-
tives (e.g., cognition, feeling, sensuous engagement, motor responses) but 
limiting ourselves to one of these results in a distorted picture. Aesthetic 
experience cannot be reduced to one of these aspects; it is neither purely 
cognitive, nor purely emotional, nor purely physical. Neither would it be 
correct to consider aesthetic experience as a sum of various components. 
Although we can conceptually distinguish the various aspects of the aes-
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thetic encounter, in actual experience they are completely merged. Pheno-
menologically there is one total and indivisible response. Thus, engagement 
in the arts involves the whole person — the senses, the intellect, the emo-
tions, and the motor system. However, the contemplation of multifaceted art 
works does not result in a gamut of separate responses but in one single 
experience that is total and unified. 
The view that the arts occupy the whole person can be found in Reid's 
work (Reid, 1969,1985,1986). As we have seen, he holds that cognition and 
feeling are fused in aesthetic experience. Although he emphasizes these two 
aspects, he also indicates that, in fact, aesthetic experience is even more 
encompassing. 
The four characterizations of music emerging from the above versions of 
the argument discussed here are in principle compatible. If one wishes to do 
justice to the full scope of musical experience, one can emphasize its holistic 
character. If, however, one wishes to discuss the matter more thoroughly, 
one cannot avoid choosing a particular perspective from which this total 
experience can be elucidated. The aspects of attitude, cognition, and feeling 
then suggest themselves. 
In addition to being compatible at least three of the four characterizations 
of the specific nature of music are plausible as well. It seems that no serious 
objections can be raised against the last of the four characterizations — 
music as a holistic experience. Major controversies in the field of aesthetics 
are associated with the second and the third characterizations: the issue how 
the concepts of knowledge and meaning can be applied to music and the 
issue how musical feelings relate to life-feelings. However, it seems likely 
that music involves a specific form of cognition. And the idea that music 
cultivates feeling in a specific way is beyond doubt.3 Of the four characteri-
zations the first one seems to be the most problematic. During the last 
decades the time-honored idea that the arts involve a specific attitude has 
come under attack (cf. Hospers, 1982, p. 335 ff.). However, the question has 
not yet been decided and the idea is still present in much theorizing about 
the arts. 
Suppose that one or several of the four characterizations of the specific 
nature of music can be maintained, can we then justify the inclusion of 
music in general education? I suggest we cannot. There may be general 
agreement that individuals should be developed broadly rather than one-
sidedly, but the simple fact that a domain occupies a special place in human 
existence can never be a sufficient reason for cultivating it. For example, if it 
were shown that alchemy or astrology involved a special kind of associative 
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thinking we would not incorporate them in education for this reason. Devel-
oping a particular domain is desirable only if some good is inherent in it. We 
do not cultivate some domain for the sheer sake of cultivating it, but because 
by doing so we can share in particular values. Several authors (e.g., Phénix, 
1964; Reimer, 1989) incorrectly suggest that music education at school could 
be justified by arguing merely that music entails a specific kind of cognition. 
If the claim that music education should have a place in the curriculum is to 
be founded, however, we must demonstrate that one or more major positive 
values are inherent in musical activities that cannot (to the same extent) be 
obtained through other means. 
The characterizations of music given in the context of the argument from 
development are relevant to the extent that they indicate where the value of 
music might reside. The argument by itself, however, is insufficient because 
it fails to take the crucial step, that is, identifying the specific value of music. 
In the next sections I shall discuss two claims about the value of music, 
which to my opinion, are the most serious ones that have been raised so far. 
1.3 Music as a specific form of knowledge 
Knowledge is generally considered to be one of the most important goods in 
life. Promoting knowledge is consequently a major aim of general education. 
When looking for arguments in favor of music education it is, therefore, 
natural to examine whether music can convey knowledge of a specific na-
ture. If we follow this path, we can distinguish two types of knowledge: 
(a) knowledge of music that is vital to the engagement with music itself; and 
(b) knowledge of music that has significance beyond the musical domain. 
With respect to the first type of knowledge there are numerous aspects of 
music we can acquire knowledge about: its forms, its social and historical 
background, the way it should be performed, and so on. As we have seen in 
the previous section, one cannot, however, argue in favor of music edu-
cation merely by appealing to the fact that music entails a specific kind of 
knowledge. One should be able to indicate what the particular value of 
acquiring musical knowledge is. The most obvious answer to this question is 
that knowledge of music enhances musical experience. Subsequently, one 
should demonstrate that musical experience represents a substantial value. 
If we pursue this line, we no longer appeal primarily to the value of knowl-
edge but to the intrinsic value of musical experience. I shall deal with this 
type of argumentation in the next section. 
Regarding the second type of knowledge, does music entail knowledge 
that plays a vital role beyond musical experience itself? Obviously it does 
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not in the sense that music makes a significant contribution to the knowl-
edge individuals needs to ensure physical survival. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that unmusical persons fail to adapt to the demands of society. 
Arguments suggesting that music education is not only desirable but also 
necessary, then, cannot be uphold without seriously inflating the notion of 
necessity. However, we need not demonstrate that music is an absolute 
necessity for survival. In Western society individuals need not continually 
struggle for their bare existence. They have the opportunity to satisfy other 
needs. An important need of humans is to have insight in the existence they 
lead. According to several authors (e.g., Aspin, 1982; Ross, 1984; Osborne, 
1985) music can satisfy this desire. Claims are made in terms of enlarging 
one's self-knowledge, making the world more comprehensible, and eluci-
dating one's individual existence. However, a thorough exposition of these 
claims is rarely given. 
The most elaborated and influential position in this respect is Langer's 
(1953,1957a, 1957b). Although she has not applied her ideas directly to the 
field of education, Reimer (1989) bases his view of music education as an 
indispensible part of the curriculum largely on Langer's theory. Langer ar-
gues that music is able to clarify the nature of feeling more adequately than 
language: "Because the forms of human feeling are much more congruent 
with musical forms than with the forms of language, music can reveal the 
nature of feelings with a detail and truth that language cannot approach" 
(1957a, p. 235). Langer refers to music as a presentational symbol: through its 
dynamic structures it shows us feeling in a direct way. Such a presentation 
of feeling is not a neutral reflection. Langer uses several terms to indicate 
that music does more with feelings; music is able formulate, to express, to 
articulate, to reveal them. Music, then, is a source of insight in the life of 
feeling. 
A problem of Langer's theory is that it does not tell us precisely what 
music reveals: human feeling in general or specific feelings. Langer often 
speaks in general terms like felt life, sentient responsive life, sentience, subjective 
experience, or, simply, feeling. However, she also remarks that every work of 
art may have a single reference, that is, that a work of art expresses a parti-
cular feeling (1953, p. 373-374). Furthermore, Langer's formulations often 
seem to indicate that the specific insights art works offer us concern general 
principles that can be found in the dynamics of many feelings. She implies 
this, for example, when she relates music to "forms of growth and attenu-
ation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific 
excitement, calm, or subtle activation and dreamy lapses" (1953, p. 27). 
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If we put this lack of clarity aside and focus on Langer's central thesis 
that music reveals the forms of feeling, several objections can be raised against 
her position. First, Langer does not tell us how the purported correspon-
dences between the forms of musical works and those of feelings should be 
conceived. She fails to explain at which level musical structures correspond 
to the forms of feeling. Which musical units match specific forms of feeling: 
complete works, movements, themes, or motifs? How do these forms of 
feeling relate to apparently autonomous musical principles like those of 
thematic development and to the various types of musical form? Langer 
does not even provide us a clue to answer these questions. 
Second, one might wonder whether one can attain deeper insight into 
the nature of feelings, if one is confronted with their dynamic forms only. 
Langer stresses that music does not represent the full range of feelings but 
only their formal aspects. Some musical forms can bear various interpreta-
tions, for example, a happy as well as a sad one. Budd (1985b, p. 114) objects 
against Langer's view that feelings have no special forms that distinguish 
them from other phenomena. The dynamic patterns that characterize feel-
ings can also be found in numerous natural and artificial processes. 
This leads me to my principal objection. Langer's argumentation is based 
on an unwarranted move: the one from the assertion that there is a similarity 
between forms of musical works and forms of feeling to the assertion that 
the former elucidate the latter. No arguments whatsoever are given for this 
crucial move. Reimer (1989) also makes this transition tacitly when suggest-
ing that propositions like "art has the same patterns as (is a semblance of, 
corresponds to, is analogous to) the life of feeling" do not differ considerably 
from propositions like "art gives insights (understanding, revelations) of the 
life of feeling" (Reimer, 1989, p. 52). It is clear, however, that two completely 
different types of claims are involved. Langer and Reimer should demon-
strate that musical forms do not only correspond to forms of feeling but that 
they also can lead to a deeper understanding of the nature of human feel-
ings. They fail to accomplish this task. 
In summary: notwithstanding her elaborate expositions, Langer's argu-
ment remains unclear in important respects. Furthermore, serious objections 
can be raised against her position. Therefore, Langer's theory does not con-
stitute an adequate basis for justifying music education by means of knowl-
edge claims. 
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1.4 Musical experience as valuable in itself 
The last type of argumentation to be discussed here appeals to the intrinsic 
value of musical experience. According to this position, dealing with music 
is not a means to attain some further good but musical experience is an aim 
in itself. 
The view that music is an intrinsically valuable experience provides a 
natural argument in favor of music education. It seems to receive support 
from the great popularity of music in Western society: people spend much 
time and money on music, and they do this not because they think that 
music furthers their insight into their existence, but because they feel that 
music as such, that is without being functional to other things, enriches their 
lives. In spite of this plausibility at first sight the argument is seldomly 
treated seriously in literature on the value of music education. Therefore, I 
want to examine the prospects of this argument here. 
Several authors (e.g., Kivy, 1991) try to dismiss the argument by stating 
that there are numerous other activities that make a positive contribution to 
the lives of many persons: baseball, computer games, good cooking, and so 
forth. It is impossible to include all pleasurable activities that are capable of 
being cultivated through general education. Why, then, include especially 
music into the curriculum instead of one of those other activities? 
We can object to this counterargument that it places the value of musical 
experience into the context of a shallow form of hedonism. It is incorrectly 
assumed that if different activities can be related to the same type of con-
cepts — pleasure, joy, amusement, etc. — they are all equally valuable. A 
hedonistic theory of value, however, does not exclude the possibility of 
ranking some pleasures higher than others.4 
Moreover, appealing to the intrinsic value of musical experience does not 
necessarily imply one's endorsing a hedonistic point of view. The argument 
discussed here also accords to other conceptions of the good: the good as 
happiness, and the good as self-realization. In addition to theories that sub-
sume the good under one concept (pleasure, happines, or self-realization), 
there are also pluralistic conceptions of the good. Some of these rank beauty, 
aesthetic experience, harmony, and self-expression among the highest values 
(Frankena, 1963). These ideals point even more specifically into the direction 
of musk. 
Willem Gehreis, the principal Dutch music educator of this century, 
appeals to several of these conceptions of the good, when he discusses the 
importance of music education: pleasure, happiness, harmony, self-expres-
sion, and aesthetic experience (Gehrels, 1931,1956). Reimer's (1989) eloquent 
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plea for the intrinsic value of musical experience, on the other hand, accords 
with the ideal of self-realization: 
...if any experience in human life can be valued intrinsically — for the sheer, 
sweet sake of the experience itself and our unique capacity to be aware that 
we can experience our aliveness — then surely artistic experience is of this 
sort. In this sense to ask what the value of such experience might be is like 
asking what the value of the experience of love might be. To experience love 
is to be profoundly what we as humans are capable of being. That is a value 
requiring no other to justify or explain it. It is the same with artistic expe-
riencing, which raises to the highest possible levels our capacity to experience 
for the sheer sake of being experiencing creatures. To require other justifica-
tions is, in a way, to demean the very nature of the human condition, (pp. 52-
53) 
The argument that music education is justified because of the intrinsic value 
of musical experience can therefore not be dismissed by objecting that there 
are so many other nice things that qualify just as well for being included into 
the curriculum of general education. But the counter-argument of Kivy does 
make clear that, if we refer to the intrinsic value of musical experience, the 
question arises to what extent we can demonstrate that this value is superior 
to the intrinsic value of many other practices. Here we already reach the 
limits of the present argument for it is in principle impossible to argue for 
the claimed value of musical experience in a discursive way. The value of 
musical experience is given only in musical experience itself; there is no way 
of isolating essences from the total musical experience that would constitute 
in themselves the value of music. Authors who refer to the specific value of 
musical experience try to approach this value by using terms like refined 
(Broudy, 1976, p. 96), sacred, numinous (Ross, 1984, p. ix, p. 14) dignity, glory, 
grandeur and sublimity (Aspin, 1982, p. 51). But the richness of musical ex-
perience cannot be reduced to general characterizations like these. More-
over, these metaphorical characterizations are convincing only to those who 
have experienced music themselves as refined, sacred, numinous, et cetera. 
For people who have not had such sweeping experiences the characteri-
zations mentioned have no power of persuasion at all. The intrinsic value of 
musical experience is not unique in its being ineffable, however. The value 
of many other things cannot be verbalized adequately either, for example, 
the value of friendship, faithfulness, and security. Everyone agrees on the 
importance of these values in human life. The question whether something 
has value is, in other words, not tantamount to the question whether its 
value can be argued for discursively. 
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The issue whether the intrinsic value of musical experience is of such 
stature that music qualifies for being included into the curriculum of general 
education cannot be settled by means of conclusive argumentation. The 
desirability of music education seems to be something about which we can 
attain only intersubjective consensus on the basis of our experiences (both 
individual and collective) with music. The issue here is not whether musical 
experience is equally valued by everyone — neither in the sense that every-
one relates music to the same conception of the good, nor in the sense that 
music is equally appreciated by all; rather the issue is whether we can agree 
that musical experience is an important value in the lives of many people. 
The "value-in-itself" argument has an interesting implication. The argu-
ment as such assigns an important role to music education. We can come to 
know the value of musical experience only if we are sufficiently initiated 
into music, for the intrinsic value of music cannot be demonstrated by 
words — it must be experienced. Good teaching of music can stimulate the 
broadening and deepening of this experience. This means that good teach-
ing of music contributes to its own legitimization. We can see now that not 
only does the value-in-itself argument support teaching music, but also 
conversely that teaching music enlarges the chances of the argument being 
successful. On the one hand, the following holds: if music represents an 
exceptional value that is capable of being experienced rather than of being 
put into words, then everything that furthers this experience (e.g., music 
education) is not only desirable but also defensible solely by appealing to 
this experience. On the other hand, the question whether people can endorse 
the view that music represents an exceptional value is determined largely by 
the extent to which they have had extraordinary musical experiences of their 
own. And it is to furthering this kind of experiences that teaching music can 
make a positive contribution. 
1.5 Conclusion 
In the preceding sections I have discussed three types of argument that at-
tempt to identify the value of music. According to the first type of argument, 
music — in its own or together with other arts — constitutes a specific do-
main of reality. The cultivation of this domain is taken to contribute to the 
ideal of the completely developed person. I have dismissed this argument 
because it is insufficient. The mere fact that some domain involves a specific 
type of attitude, knowledge, or experience is by itself no reason for develop-
ing it. Cultivating a domain is worthwhile only if some substantial value is 
inherent in the domain as such. 
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According to the second type of argument, music enlarges our knowl-
edge of human existence. The most elaborated position is Langer's. She 
holds the view that music offers insight in the life of feeling by showing us 
the forms of feeling. Apart from the fact that the precise nature of her claim 
is not entirely clear, her position is contestable in several respects. Langer 
does not indicate how musical forms correspond to the forms of feeling. Nor 
does she justify the crucial move in her exposition, namely the one from the 
thesis that there are similarities between forms of music and those of feel-
ings to the thesis that musical forms yield some deeper understanding of the 
nature of feeling. 
The third type of argument states that musical experience itself has an 
exceptional value. I have argued that this type of argument does not lend 
itself to further elaboration. If one appeals to the intrinsic value of musical 
experience one has given a plausible argument in favor of music education, 
but by doing so one has exhausted the possibilities of argumentation. The 
value of musical experience can be experienced only; it cannot be conveyed 
with words. 
The three types of argument all fail to argue conclusively that music 
should be included in general education but each one fails for a different 
reason. The first type of argument fails to identify and to elucidate the spe-
cific value of music. The second type of argument is unsuccessful because 
the claim that music is capable of providing deeper insights into human 
existence has not been convincingly substantiated. The third type of argu-
ment fails because the intrinsic value of musical experience by its nature 
cannot be expressed in words. 
It must be emphasized that the failure of the first and the second types of 
argument is not on a par with the failure of the third argument. Arguments 
appealing to the ideal of development, and Langer's argument that music 
clarifies feeling, suffer from faulty argumentation: from the fact that music 
constitutes a specific domain it does not follow that cultivating the musical 
domain is desirable; and from the fact that there are similarities between the 
forms of feeling and the forms of music it cannot be concluded that music 
yields deeper insight into the life of feeling. In the case of the third type of 
argument, however, there is no question of inaccurate reasoning. The prob-
lem here is that there is no way of demonstrating that musical experience 
has an exceptional value by way of discursive argumentation. Whether 
music is actually something special we can only decide on the basis of our 
experience. 
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We may, then, conclude that all three types of argument fail to argue 
conclusively that music represents an important value in human life. But 
from the viewpoint of careful argumentation it is a correct procedure to let 
the issue whether the intrinsic value of musical experience justifies a place 
for music in general education depend on intersubjective consensus. This 
consideration does not equally apply to the argument from knowledge: the 
question whether music entails a specific form of knowledge must be de-
cided on the basis of discursive argumentation and does not depend on 
whether people believe this to be the case. Nor is this consideration relevant 
for the argument from development. This argument as such relies on a 
faulty supposition and is, therefore, bound to fail as an independent argu-
ment in favor of music education. 
Notes 
1. Readers may make their own application of these remarks to college-level liberal 
arts curricula. 
2. This additional argument need not necessarily demonstrate that music is of 
greater value than the other arts. One might also try to argue that musical 
abilities are capable of being cultivated better than other artistic abilities, or that 
music lends itself better for education at school than other arts (cf. the three 
conditions mentioned in the introduction). 
3. The point here is not that music can express life-feelings that cannot be expressed 
by other means but that music appeals to our faculty of feeling in a very special 
way. 
4. A classical case for the view that "some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and 
more valuable than others" can be found J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism (1874, p. 11 ff.). 

2. Intrinsic meaning in music 
Does music have meaning? If so, what is its nature? Many authors have sug-
gested that music's primary function is the expression of feelings. Through 
music we can communicate our deepest emotions (see, for example, Cooke, 
1959; Tolstoy, 1960; Ferguson, 1960). Others take the view that basically 
music has no meaning at all. Music involves pure sound structures which, 
though being quasi-syntactical, lack semantic content. Therefore, music fails 
to meet a crucial requirement for being meaningful. Thus Kivy (1990) con-
cludes that "although musical meaning may exist as a theory, it does not 
exist as a reality of listening" (pp. 8-9). 
In our view, neither standpoint is correct. For all their differences, both 
answers to the question what musical meaning consists in are inspired by a 
linguistic or referential model of meaning. This, however, is a misleading 
model as far as music is concerned. Surely, language is our most appropriate 
and most generally used medium for communicating. Moreover, language is 
by far the best researched medium. Nevertheless, we will argue, the analogy 
with language has led to an inadequate conceptualization of musical mean-
ing. The main reason is that linguistic communication is usually about extra-
linguistic reality, whereas in music reference to extramusical reality plays 
only a secondary role. 
The critique that musical meaning has been erroneously modeled after 
linguistic meaning is not new. For instance, Davies (1995, chap. 1) and Nat-
tiez (1990, pp. 115-116) have emphasized the crucial differences between 
meaning in language and meaning in music. Nevertheless, these authors are 
themselves caught in the paradigm of linguistic meaning at a more funda-
mental level; they hold on to the view that a bearer of meaning (the signifier) 
directs our attention to something beyond itself (the signified). It is precisely 
this focus on extrinsic meaning that leads discussions about musical mean-
ing on the wrong track. In our view the type of meaning most typical of 
music is fundamentally different: it is intrinsic. 
In this article we will try carefully to delineate this aspect of musical 
meaning, which we will call intrinsic, from extrinsic meaning and other 
types of meaning which also play a role in music but should not be confused 
with it. When discussing intrinsic musical meaning, we are faced with the 
difficulty that it resists exact reproduction by other means. Intrinsic meaning 
is a phenomenon sui generis which cannot be reduced to, or adequately ren-
dered by anything else. However, this can be no reason for neglecting this 
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type of meaning, which is crucial in music. It only means that we will 
sometimes have to use a negative strategy in explaining its nature, carving 
out intrinsic meaning by clarifying what it is not. The ineffability of musical 
meaning also poses special problems for music education, as one of its major 
aims is to convey the meaning of music (rather than, e.g., merely teaching 
music history). We will come back to these issues at the end of this paper. 
In section 1 we begin by discussing various forms of meaning, concen-
trating on the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic meaning. In sec-
tion 2 we elaborate this distinction with regard to music, referring to the 
work of L.A. Reid in particular. Next, in section 3, we further elucidate the 
notion of intrinsic musical meaning by contrasting it with diverse notions of 
internal meaning that several authors have proposed to account for intra-
musical relations. In section 4 we discuss the differences, and the relations, 
between musical meaning and musical experience. Finally, in section 5, we 
will briefly go into the problem of the ineffability of intrinsic musical 
meaning and make some suggestions for music education. 
2.1 Different types of meaning 
The word meaning has many meanings only some of which are relevant 
here.1 First, we can say that music means a lot to us. By this we mean that 
music is important to us, that it is of great value. However, the question how 
much music means to us is different from the question what its meaning is or 
what it means to us. Whether or not a piece of music means much to us 
largely depends on what its meaning is. In the following, we will only deal 
with the latter, qualitative, meaning of meaning. 
That music has meaning in this sense is apparent from all sorts of dis-
course about musical works. As Davies (1983, p. 222) observes, music is gen-
erally considered as something that can or cannot be understood correctly. 
The use of the verb understand in this context indeed shows that music is a 
bearer of meaning — somehow. But what does this meaning consist in? To 
answer this question the most important distinction we need to make is 
between intrinsic and extrinsic meaning. Many authors have used these 
terms with different meanings, however. Therefore, we will take the follow-
ing steps: first we will briefly define these terms in general, giving examples 
of each of them; next, we relate the distinction between intrinsic and extrin-
sic meaning to music in particular; and thereupon, we extend our analysis to 
a number of connected distinctions made in the philosophy of music in 
order to elucidate their similarities and differences. 
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Briefly, extrinsic meaning (1) results from the meaning-bearer's signifying 
something outside the bearer; and (2) does not depend on the specific form 
of the meaning-bearer. Intrinsic meaning, on the other hand, (1) is inherent to 
the bearer of meaning; and (2) is crucially dependent on its form. 
The meaning of words can be taken as prototypical of extrinsic meaning. 
For example, we can use the word building to refer to some building and 
Empire State Building to refer to the Empire State Building in New York. In 
communication these words are used, they are employed in order to direct 
someone's attention to something beyond the words themselves. By speak-
ing of the referential use of words we are not wedded to any specific theory 
of meaning. Terms like reference and denotation are central to the so-called 
referential theory which identifies the meaning of signs with the objects they 
refer to, or at least more generally identifies meaning with reference. This 
theory has been rightly criticized (see Alston, 1964, pp. 11 ff.; Nöth, 1990, p. 
97). Many words, such as and, although, adjectives like good, or even concrete 
verbs like run, do not refer to concrete objects at all, so that the referential 
use of words cannot be the sole paradigm of meaning. Other theories stress 
different aspects that are relevant to the notion of meaning, for instance that 
which is constituted by the mind (the idea, the concept), or the pragmatic 
context in which words function (meaning as a function of their use). How-
ever, the differences between these diverse views about the precise nature of 
the meaning of words are not relevant here. All of them agree that the mean-
ing of words depends on their being connected somehow with reality out-
side the words themselves. In using language our attention is drawn nor-
mally not to the words but through them to something else. 
The specific form of the word is not decisive for its meaning. Changing 
the form of the word table to TABLE does not make a difference in this re-
spect. Other combinations of letters, such as taleb or, in a different language, 
Tisch, could or do have the same meaning. Words are conventional means 
for communicating meanings that are independent of the signs used, and in 
cases of referring use (with the exception of self-reference) their referents are 
extralinguistic matters. Usually, the conventional form of the word is arbi-
trary. Although the form is sometimes motivated by the meaning (as in so-
called onomatopoeia such as cudcoo, hissing), extrinsic meaning is never uni-
quely and completely determined by the form as such. Because of the con-
ventional character of language, any form could in principle have any 
meaning. 
With intrinsic meaning things are fundamentally different. This type of 
meaning, by contrast, is precisely constituted by the specific nature of the 
32 Keynotes in music education 
bearer of the meaning. The meaning of a work of art can be taken as proto-
typical of intrinsic meaning (even though this is not the only kind of mean-
ing a work of art can have). Whereas the phrase Empire State Building has a 
specific meaning because these words refer (or: we can use these words to 
refer) to a building in New York while the specific form of these words does 
not add anything to this meaning, a painting can have a very specific mean-
ing without referring to anything else at all while its specific form is pre-
cisely decisive for that meaning. For instance, the paintings by Mark Rothko 
have meaning though not through their referring to anything outside. 
Neither does this meaning coincide with their being meaningful in the sense 
of important or valuable to us (the meaning of meaning we distinguished at 
the beginning of this section), for two paintings of Rothko can be very dif-
ferent in meaning yet equally valuable to us. With this type of meaning, 
which we call intrinsic meaning, everything crucially depends on the fea-
tures of the art work itself. Design, choice of materials, proportions, color 
contrasts, they are determining for the meaning of the painting. Surely, 
many paintings, and art in general, can also refer to external reality, but that 
is a different kind of meaning. The intrinsic meaning of a work of art is 
directly and immediately given in the aesthetic experience. Whereas in the 
case of extrinsic meaning the bearer functions as a medium calling attention 
to something else, outside the medium, in the case of intrinsic meaning our 
attention is first and foremost directed at the meaning bearer itself and as 
such. Our point is that these two notions of meaning should not be conflated. 
The specific form of a work of art is constitutive of its intrinsic meaning. 
Any change in form involves a change in meaning. As we will explain more 
fully later on, the intrinsic meaning of an art work is determined by how we 
can cognitively and feelingfully experience its form. Although form and 
intrinsic meaning are thus closely connected, they should not be identified. 
(In section 4, we will show how easily discourse about form gets confused 
with discourse about meaning.) With a term borrowed from R. M. Hare 
(1952, pp. 80-81,130-131), intrinsic meaning is supervenient on the form of 
the meaning bearer: the art work has its specific intrinsic meaning in virtue 
of its specific form. This is the reason why form per se is so important in the 
arts and why intrinsic meaning can often be elucidated to a large extent by 
pointing to the formal characteristics of the meaning bearer. 
2.2 Musical meaning: primarily intrinsic 
With the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic meaning in mind we can 
now see that the two viewpoints mentioned at the beginning of this paper 
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give an inadequate account of musical meaning, and we can now make clear 
why this is so. Both views depart from the notion of extrinsic meaning. 
According to the first, the meaning of music is based on its conveying feel-
ings and emotions. This is an overrating of the communicative function of 
music at the expense of its intrinsic meaning. According to the latter view, 
musical works are self-contained formal entities without external reference. 
When it is recognized that music often does not refer to extramusical enti-
ties, but at the same time meaning is identified with (external) reference, 
then the conclusion seems inevitable indeed that music cannot be said to 
have any meaning. This conclusion is unwarranted, however, because it 
derives from too narrow a definition of the general notion of meaning. Only 
on presupposition of this restricted definition the counterintuitive conclu-
sion would follow that it makes no sense to talk about musical meaning at 
all. 
In our view, music does have meaning, but a central part of it is intrinsic 
meaning. Musical works have meaning in themselves, not merely or even 
primarily as a result of their drawing our attention to some extramusical 
reality. Even in clearly referring pieces (e.g., vocal music, program music) 
music is not just a means for communicating about extramusical matters. 
Any extrinsic meaning will always depend on a limited number of charac-
teristics of the musical theme or composition. There will always be many 
aspects besides that are not referential. It is the work in its entirety that we 
experience as meaningful in the first place. This meaning is immediate: it is 
imparted on us when we experience the work as a whole. By using the word 
immediate we do not want to suggest that musical meaning is independent of 
learning processes or musical conventions. It is a truism that music is medi-
ated by numerous conventions. However, this does not affect the question 
as to whether music is primarily extrinsically or intrinsically meaningful. 
Here we take the word im-mediate in the literal sense that music is not mere-
ly and even hardly ever primarily used as a medium to simply communicate 
something which is entirely beyond itself. 
Musical form in all its aspects and details is constitutive of the intrinsic 
meaning of musical works. Changing two notes of a theme usually means 
totally modifying its character. A few subtle alterations of the form of a 
composition yields a different musical experience, as a consequence of 
which the meaning we attribute to the composition will change as well. 
In brief, musical meaning is primarily intrinsic and form-bound. In 
addition to this, a musical work may have extrinsic meaning. Features such 
as the melody, rhythm, or harmonic progression of the work may establish 
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associations with extramusical reality (feelings, objects, situations, etc.). 
However, extrinsic meaning may just as well be absent. Even Karbusicky, 
whose Grundriß der musifalischen Semantik (1986) focuses exclusively on 
extrinsic meaning, repeatedly emphasizes that this function is not constitu-
tive of music. He approvingly quotes Mukaïovskp· who refers to the potential 
semiological character of the formal elements ("potentiellen semiologischen 
Charakter der 'formalen' Elemente"; p. 31). 
Whether or not a piece of music has meaning is not dependent on its 
serving some semiological or sign function. There need be no extramusical 
reference for it to have meaning. Its meaning is primarily determined by the 
way we can immediately experience its autonomous form. Although intrin-
sic meaning is so central to music, it has received relatively little attention 
from both philosophers and musicologists. Many authors totally and exclu-
sively focus on extrinsic meaning. Authors who acknowledge that musical 
forms have meaning in themselves generally do not elucidate this type of 
meaning, and their spare remarks on intrinsic meaning are often completely 
overshadowed by extensive discussions of extrinsic forms of meaning.2 
Stephen Davies' recent Musical Meaning and Expression (1994) unfortuna-
tely fits entirely into this picture. In this book the question of musical mean-
ing is addressed exclusively from the framework of extrinsic meaning. Ac-
cording to Davies (1994), "Meaning involves a directional (usually nonreci-
procal) relation between two things, signifier and signified" (p. 29). Davies 
suggests that all relevant types of musical meaning conform to this defini-
tion. He devotes over 300 pages to various kinds of extrinsic meaning. Only 
in one passage of a few lines Davies acknowledges that there is also another 
type of meaning, namely, formal meaning. Moreover, he notices that accord-
ing to many this is the most important type of meaning. Davies also men-
tions the analogy with language: 
If the significance of musical ideas were exclusively formal, there would be 
no temptation to argue that music is a language. To understand a musical 
work would be to understand how it is put together; musical meaning would 
consist in the coherence of the structure of the work, and the significance of 
elements would derive from their contribution to the creation of this struc-
ture. Most theorists hold that, mostly, musical significance is 'internal' and 
formal in this way, but they also hold that music refers to, or denotes, or 
brings to mind nonmusical ideas, events, or things — in particular, that music 
expresses emotion. (1994, p. 48) 
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Surprisingly, in spite of the fact that most theorists are said to give priority 
to formal meaning, Davies does not discuss its nature. By ignoring this type 
of meaning and presenting a purely extrinsic concept of meaning, Davies' 
book, however impressive for its many detailed discussions, contributes to 
preserving and furthering the one-sided linguistic approach. 
German musicologists generally have given more attention to intrinsic 
musical meaning. In German the term mus^lischer Sinn (musical sense) has 
come to be used for meaning as contained in the form of musical works. 
However, although authors like Dahlhaus and Eggebrecht offer some in-
sight into the idea of intrinsic musical meaning, they do not aim at clarifying 
it systematically (Eggebrecht, 1973, pp. 48 ff.; Dahlhaus & Eggebrecht, 1991, 
pp. 139 ff.). 
It is surprising to find that the philosopher who, as far as we can see, has 
shed the clearest light on musical meaning does not write about music but 
about the arts in general. When speaking about meaning in the arts, L. A. 
Reid (1969,1980) uses the term meaning-embodied. He writes: 
When I apprehend a work of art which is worth attending to...and do so with 
all my attention, discrimination, feeling, alive, I find that there is something 
immediate, of intrinsic significance and importance there. It is different in 
each work, and it is so embodied in what I perceive that I can never say, never 
translate exactly into terms other than what is before me what the meaning-
embodied is. (1980, p. 3) 
Reid's meaning-embodied comes close to what we have called intrinsic mean-
ing. It is immediately apprehended: "The meaning-embodied is directly 
presented to us: we are not referred away to something else [italics added]" (1980, 
p. 6). The difference between extrinsic and intrinsic meaning is reflected in 
Reid's comparison of language and the arts. In spoken or written language, 
Reid (1969) says, the sensuously perceived structure of a message is merely 
instrumental to the grasp of its meaning. The individual forms of sounds or 
written marks are not constitutive of the meaning of sentences. 
In aesthetic embodiment, on the other hand, perceived sounds, shapes, 
rhythms, etc., are not only instrumental to the grasp of aesthetic meaning; the 
experience of attentive perception to them is an essential part of the appre-
hension of the meaning. The attention to perceived forms is both instrumental 
and intrinsic to the grasp of aesthetic meaning, (p. 76) 
Our emphasis on the relevance of the specific form of the musical work is in 
conformity with Reid's contention that each work of art has a unified single 
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meaning which it alone can possess. The meaning of a work of art cannot be 
transferred to any other object. It is intrinsic to, or embodied in, its unique 
structure. Because of its being bound to its specific structure, the meaning of 
a work of art cannot be adequately expressed in words. 
Although every work of art includes being an instance of many concepts...its 
aesthetic value as a work of art is never exhaustively assessed in this way; it is 
an individual rather than merely a particular, or complex of particulars, and an 
individual rather than an instance. (1969, p. 299) 
Reid's position is also interesting because of the role he assigns to feeling in 
grasping musical meaning: 
Although in looking at a picture or listening to music with great care, atten-
tion and discrimination, we are perceiving a complexity of formed content, 
up to a point (but never, never completely) describable in factual terms — yet 
we are perceiving it in a feelingful way. We are cognising it with intense 
feelingful interest; we are apprehending it with what can fairly be called 
'cognitive feeling'. We are cognitívely feeling, or feeling cognitively, the art as 
yielding valuable meaning. (1980, p. 11) 
This characterization is very helpful in clarifying the concept of intrinsic 
meaning in music. As we have argued above, the form of the musical work 
is crucial to its intrinsic meaning. However, intrinsic meaning is not identical 
to musical form. Rather, it is supervenient on the form. Reid (1969) argues 
that the form of the aesthetic perceptuum can always be distinguished ana-
lytically from what it means, but also that in the actual experience of the 
work of art, in "the perceptuum...aesthetically apprehended" this distinction 
cannot be made (p. 199). The intrinsic meaning of a musical work is deter-
mined by the way its form can be experienced. This experience has been 
very aptly characterized by Reid as cognitively feeling. Apprehension of 
musical form is not a matter of mere cognition. We have to feel the flow and 
progression of the work. In musical experience cognition and feeling are 
fused. Therefore, the apprehension of musical form should be conceptual-
ized neither as a simple cognitive act nor as cognition plus feeling but as 
cognitively feeling or feeling cognitively. 
In sum, following Reid we propose to conceptualize the intrinsic mean-
ing of a musical work as determined by the way we can cognitively and feel-
ingfully experience its form. However, although Reid's theory of artistic 
meaning is very valuable for clarifying a number of characteristics of intrin-
sic musical meaning, we should also recognize now that his meaning-em-
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bodied is in an important respect crucially different from what we mean by 
intrinsic meaning. In Reid's view artistic meaning always starts from extrin-
sic meaning. Form is not as such constitutive of meaning, but always as 
taking up and transforming meanings from life outside: "Art draws from an 
unlimited source of meanings from life outside art, but it takes them up into 
itself, transforms, transmutes, transsubstantiates them and presents us with 
complex and utterly irreducible and indivisible meaning-embodied" (1980, 
p. 10). 
It may be agreed with Reid that this picture holds for literature, figura-
tive art, and also for art forms like film and dance. However, it does not hold 
for pure music. Music does not have to look outside for its subject matter, it 
can stay with its own. What we call subjects or ideas in music are themselves 
musical entities: motifs, themes, and so on. Musical composition departs 
from small-scale sound structures that are already inherently meaningful 
and develops these into large wholes in which intrinsic meaning is vastly 
accumulated. We see, then, that — in contrast to Reid's meaning-embodied 
— intrinsic musical meaning does not or does not necessarily depend on 
extramusical subject matter for its being meaningful. It can derive from the 
autonomous form of the musical work. 
In the next section, we will discuss some related but different theories 
that try to account for musical meaning that is internal to the musical 
domain. As we hope to show, they fail to offer a convincing picture by their 
adhering to concepts that belong to the model of extrinsic meaning. 
2.3 Related but different notions of internal meaning 
Several influential authors make distinctions between external and internal 
notions of meaning that at first sight resemble our contrast between extrinsic 
and intrinsic meaning but that are quite different nevertheless. External 
musical meaning mostly corresponds with what we have called extrinsic 
meaning: a composition as a whole, or parts of it, can refer to extramusical 
objects, actions, feelings, and so on. Internal musical meaning, by contrast, is 
taken to be a form of referring to something within the musical context itself. 
For example, some part of a musical work may refer to another part of the 
same piece, or to another work, or to a particular style. This distinction 
between external and internal forms of meaning should not be identified 
with what we have distinguished as extrinsic and intrinsic meaning. For 
both internal and external musical meaning are extrinsic in the sense defined 
in the above. Both are forms of referring to something else, the difference 
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being that internal meaning involves reference to something within the mu-
sical domain. 
The distinction between internal and external meaning in music (both 
extrinsic) has been made in various terms. For instance, Meyer (1956) speaks 
of embodied versus designative meaning, Coker (1972) distinguishes conge-
neric and extrageneric meaning, and Nattiez (1990) contrasts intrinsic with 
extrinsic referring. Similar distinctions have been made by other theorists: 
Jakobson (1971) uses the terms introversive semiosis and extroversive semiosis, 
Green (1988) uses inherent meaning versus delineated meaning, and Nöth 
(1990) makes a distinction between endosemantics and exosemantics. We will 
discuss the first three of these authors. Although their conceptual pairs 
differ in several respects, the theories of Meyer, Coker, and Nattiez agree in 
their being guided by the model of extrinsic meaning. 
W. Coker's Music and Meaning (1972) is one of the few studies dealing 
with the issue of musical meaning at length. At the basis of his distinction 
between internal and external meaning lies the notion of musical icons 
derived from Peirce's theory of semiotics: "The iconic sign (or... the icon) has 
a property or properties in common with whatever it denotes; hence, an 
iconic sign in some respects resembles the object it denotes" (p. 30). The 
distinction between internal and external meaning, in his terms congeneric 
versus extrageneric musical meaning, is made as follows: 
Congeneric musical meanings are those resultants of a dominantly iconic sign 
situation in which someone interprets one part of a musical work as a sign of 
another part of that same work or a diverse musical work. ... Extrageneric 
musical meanings are those resultants of the iconic sign situation in which 
someone interprets a musical work or some portion of it as a sign of some 
non-musical object, including sounds not then organized as parts of the 
musical work. (p. 61) 
Clearly, in both congeneric and extrageneric meaning the music in question 
is a sign of something else, and in that sense extrinsically meaningful. 
However, Coker's notion of congeneric meaning is dubious. It serves to pick 
out correspondences between parts of a composition (themes, motifs, etc.). 
But Coker fails to make a clear case for his use of the term icon. For some-
thing to be an icon it is not sufficient that it resembles another entity. A car 
cannot be said to be an icon of another specimen in the same series; nor are 
similar windows in a building icons of each other. By the same token, 
variants of musical themes are not icons of one another. Icons are signs of 
something else, their function is to refer to whatever they stand for. Musical 
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themes do not refer to other parts of the music in this way. Thematic vari-
ants constitute parts of the total musical structure. On the one hand, they 
derive their meaning from their specific position within the structure as a 
whole. On the other hand, thematic variants are significant because of their 
specific form; it is on the basis of their individual qualities that they con-
tribute to the meaning of the work. Thematic variants may call the original 
shape of the theme to our mind, but they are not a sign or an icon of the ori-
ginal theme. It would be odd to say that the meaning of a thematic variant is 
the original theme. 
When Coker purports to deal with icons, in fact he simply describes 
formal connections between themes and their variants. His use of semiotic 
terms like reference and signification is misleading, because he does not dis-
cuss the meaning of themes, motifs (etc.) but structural relations of musical 
forms. Coker's concept of meaning is confused, because characteristics of 
meaning and characteristics of form have not been adequately distinguish-
ed. 
Coker's view is a drop-back as compared to the position of Leonard B. 
Meyer, whose Emotion and Meaning in Music (1956) has been more influential 
in theorizing about musical meaning than any other work. Meyer does not 
aim at imposing on music the moulds of icons or of any other type of sign. 
Yet, like Coker, he draws on an extrinsic model of meaning, and he too 
tends to conflate meaning and form. Meyer adopts Cohen's view, that "any-
thing acquires meaning if it is connected with, or indicates, or refers to, 
something beyond itself, so that its full nature points to and is revealed in 
that connection" (1956, p. 34). Meaning is the resultant of a trilateral relation-
ship: 
Meaning, then, is not either the stimulus, or what it points to, or the observer. 
Rather it arises out of what both Cohen and Mead have called the 'triadic' 
relationship between (1) an object stimulus; (2) that to which the stimulus 
points — that which is its consequent; and (3) the conscious observer, (p. 34) 
Starting from this definition of meaning, Meyer arrives at the distinction 
between external and internal meaning, or, in his terms, designative and em-
bodied meaning. 
A stimulus may indicate events or consequences which are different from 
itself in kind, as when a word designates or points to an object or action 
which is not itself a word. Or a stimulus may indicate or imply events or 
consequences which are of the same kind as the stimulus itself, as when a dim 
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light on the eastern horizon heralds the coming of day. The former type of 
meaning may be called designative, the latter embodied, (p. 35) 
Meyer says that numerous theorists conceptualize musical meaning exclu-
sively as designative meaning, thereby disregarding the much more impor-
tant aspect of embodied meaning. According to Meyer, embodied musical 
meaning occurs when parts of a musical work indicate or point to other parts. 
Thus, music has autonomous meaning, that is, meaning that is purely musi-
cal and does not depend on any reference to extramusical reality. Never-
theless, Meyer's embodied meaning clearly differs from Reid's notion of meani-
ng-embodied. Both emphasize that music has meaning in itself, but Meyer's 
internal meaning cannot be called intrinsic in the way Reid's meaning-em-
bodied can. According to Meyer, constituents of a piece of music point to 
something beyond themselves, namely, to other parts of the work. 
Thus, also Meyer fails to see that a piece of music, or a part of it, can be 
meaningful in itself. According to Meyer, embodied musical meaning always 
involves two parts of a composition: the one that points and the one pointed 
at. This implies that meaning can be attributed to the whole work only in an 
indirect way, namely, by virtue of its parts' referring to other parts. This 
account ignores the properties of the work as a whole, such as its har-
monious quality and its form as a totality (cf. Ingarden, 1962, p. 57). Such 
overall qualities are constitutive not only of the meaning of the musical 
composition as a whole, but also of its constituent themes and motifs. Meyer 
(1956, pp. 83 ff.) gives much attention to Gestalt laws, but only in relation to 
the role of expectation in musical experience. His extrinsic conception of 
meaning ignores the significance of musical Gestalts as such. A classic ex-
ample is the opening motif of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. It is precisely 
because of its forceful, inherently meaningful Gestalt that this motif can 
dominate the whole work. 
Apart from Gestalt qualities, musical forms have many other properties 
contributing to their meaning. Melodic curve, rhythmic flow, harmonic pro-
gression, timbres, textures: all of them are constitutive of musical meaning, 
not only because of their pointing to something else but primarily in that 
they-can as such be experienced as meaningful. By focusing exclusively on 
the constituents' pointing to other parts of the composition, Meyer fails to 
account for the fact that musical forms can have meaning on the basis of 
their direct perceptual effect. Here we see again the distracting influence of 
the linguistic model. The sensuous qualities of musical works are not con-
sidered relevant by themselves. In language the specific form of the verbal 
signs is not per se constitutive of their meaning. The intrinsic meaning of 
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music, by contrast, arises from the specific qualities of its constituents. An 
extrinsic conception is unsuitable to account for the full range of musical 
meaning. 
Meyer's discussion of constituents pointing to other musical parts seems 
to be concerned with relations of musical forms rather than with meaning 
relations between signifiers and signifieds. For the rest, his theory of mean-
ing is more about psychological processes in hearers, centered around the 
notion of expectation. We will come back to Meyer's psychological ideas in 
section 4. 
The leading semiologist J.-J. Nattiez (1990) defends a position largely 
similar to Meyer's (pp. 102 ff.). He also takes the referential function of 
musical items to be constitutive of musical meaning. Whereas Meyer uses 
diverse terms such as point to, indicate, and imply to describe the relations 
between musical elements, Nattiez invariably speaks of referring (being the 
translation of the French renvoi). His main distinction is between extrinsic 
referring and intrinsic referring. The first has to do with extramusical phe-
nomena, corresponding with what Meyer calls designative meaning. Intrinsic 
referring, on the other hand, is to phenomena within the domain of music, 
roughly comparable to Meyer's notion of embodied meaning, however with a 
somewhat broader denotation. Following Coker's Music and Meaning, Nat-
tiez makes a further distinction here between two kinds of internal refer-
ence: intra musical referring is used for musical elements referring to other 
elements within the same composition. In addition, inter musical referring 
is used for musical elements referring not to constituents of the same work 
but to the "larger musical universe to which it belongs". For example, 
musical elements can refer to the style they belong to or to other works in 
which similar elements occur (1990, pp. 116-117). 
In our view, this again is rather confusing. The relation between a musi-
cal work and the style it belongs to is not usually characterized as reference 
(or referring), because it is fundamentally different from the relation be-
tween a sign and its referent. Compositions normally do not function as a 
means to direct one's attention to a particular style. Musical works are 
meant to be listened to for their own sake. Surely understanding different 
styles is important to playing, writing, and listening to music, but the notion 
of stylistic reference is only appropriate in the exceptional case when a 
composer deliberately cites or paraphrases a particular style. Similarly, re-
lations between musical compositions can only be seen as referential in 
general at the cost of an entirely watered-down notion of reference. When 
composers use préexistent materials in their compositions, they do not usu-
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ally refer to the music the material is taken from. The term reference seems 
apposite only if the materials used clearly serve the function of pointing to 
the original context. 
As compared to Meyer's theory of meaning in music, Nattiez's position 
does not present major new insights. His notion of intramusical referring 
corresponds to Meyer's meaning embodied; his added notion of intermusical 
referring concerns a rather peripheral type of musical meaning. In general, 
the meaning of a musical work is determined only to a limited extent by its 
relations of reference to other phenomena in the musical domain, and the 
relations of a musical work to its style can only rarely be regarded as refer-
ential. 
In order to arrive at a more precise delineation of our notion of intrinsic 
meaning, we discussed three influential authors, all of whom view (part of) 
the meaning of a musical work as somehow internal in character. However, 
according to our definitions, all three of them use an extrinsic concept of 
musical meaning. While Coker's treatment of musical elements as icons is 
without foundation, the theories of Meyer and Nattiez present interesting 
attempts to bring internal musical relations to the fore. Nevertheless, the 
views of Meyer and Nattiez do not provide real alternatives to the concept 
of intrinsic meaning. Because they concentrate on relations — either between 
particular parts within a musical work or between a musical work and other 
musical phenomena — they fail to do justice to qualities that are inherent in 
the musical items as such which typically contribute to their intrinsic musi-
cal meaning. In brief, the conception of musical meaning as music-internal 
reference threatens to put us on the wrong track in three ways. First, rela-
tions between musical forms and characteristics of musical meaning are not 
always sufficiently distinguished. Second, important aspects of meaning, 
notably intrinsic musical meaning, are systematically neglected. Third, the 
linguistic model of meaning tends to force a limited and sometimes even 
misleading set of concepts upon music. 
It is clear that the musical structure, characterized by all its specific 
relations, is crucial to its meaning. However, it is not the only determinant of 
musical meaning. Musical meaning is determined by the way we can cog-
nitively and feelingfully experience the musical form in all its aspects. We 
will now turn to the relation of meaning and experience. 
2.4 Musical meaning and musical experience 
Musical meaning originates in musical experience, that is, in the act of listen-
ing to music (including in performing music, composing, or reading a score). 
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Therefore, musical meaning and musical experience are closely related. 
However, although music has intrinsic meaning due to its being experienced 
by us in a cognitive and feelingful way, the meaning of a musical work 
should not be identified with the psychological processes we go through 
when listening to it or imagining it. Meaning and psychological processes 
belong to different categorical frameworks. Psychological processes are 
causally connected events, while meanings, strictly speaking, are not events 
at all. Psychological processes occur at a certain moment and they take a 
certain amount of time. We can differentiate them according to time and 
place. For instance, when two persons listen to a piece of music, there will be 
different psychological processes going on in both of them. Meaning cannot 
be conceptualized along the same lines. It is difficult to define meaning, 
especially intrinsic musical meaning, but it is clear that we do not think of 
(musical) meaning as something typically occurring at a certain moment or 
at a certain place. Meanings cannot be said to require a certain amount of 
time. When I hear a composition twice within one day and I do not find the 
piece changed (i.e., the second time I do not experience the piece as different 
from the first time), then again two different psychological processes are 
involved, at different times, but its meaning is one and the same. Of course, 
what a composition means to me may change in the course of time, but the 
meaning as such is not dependent on the evolving time. Meaning is of a 
different nature, perhaps we may say it is sui generis, or at least it cannot be 
reduced to other phenomena, even if they are its necessary conditions. 
In order to get a clear conception of musical meaning, we carefully have 
to distinguish it from the psychological processes that occur when we are 
engaged in musical activities. These notions are often insufficiently kept 
apart. It is not uncommon to find them simply equated, as, for example, in 
Coker's Music and Meaning: "If he [the interpreter] experiences the musical 
gesture in an unself-conscious way and responds instinctually, the meaning of 
the gesture will be what he feels and undergoes; it will be his instinctual, affective 
response [italics added]" (1972, pp. 151-152). 
In Meyer's Emotion and Meaning in Music the relation between meaning 
and the psychological processes of listening plays an important role. Some-
times he seems to replace terms from his definition of meaning with psycho-
logical terms. Regarding the bearer of meaning the word object tends to give 
way to stimulus, while his notion of embodied meaning gets a psychological 
overtone: 
From this point of view what a musical stimulus or a series of stimuli indicate 
and point to are not extramusical concepts and objects but other musical 
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events which are about to happen. That is, one musical event...has meaning 
because it points to and makes us expect another event.... Embodied musical 
meaning is, in short, a product [italics added] of expectation. If, on the basis of 
past experience, a present stimulus leads us to expect a more or less definite 
consequent musical event, then that stimulus has meaning. (1956, p. 35) 
However, as we can see, Meyer is careful not to equate meaning and psycho-
logical processes. Rather, he explains the one in terms of the other, with the 
effect that the question what the meaning is is answered by how it is effected, 
that is, a description of the psychological processes that cause us to expe-
rience music as meaningful: "As the later stages of the musical process estab-
lish new relationships with the stimulus, new meanings arise. These later 
meanings coexist in memory with the earlier ones and, combining with 
them, constitute the meaning of the work as a total experience" (pp. 36-37). 
In principle, there is nothing wrong with this shift, provided that we keep in 
mind the difference between the two questions of what the meaning is and 
how it is brought about and provided that we realize that expectation is not 
the only determinant of musical meaning. Perhaps this is about as close as 
we can come, considering that intrinsic musical meaning per se cannot be 
verbalized. 
Defining musical meaning as determined by how we can experience a 
musical work, implies ascribing a crucial role to the subject, as well as 
allowing for subjective differences. However, as we cannot describe what 
this meaning is, we will not be able to establish exactly how it differs for 
various persons either. In other words, we may have good psychological 
reasons to expect that the intrinsic meaning attributed to a musical work will 
vary more or less between different persons, or also in one person at differ-
ent times, even though we are unable to say precisely what these differences 
consist in. 
Do we have to give up any claim to objectivity of musical meaning by 
thus emphasizing the subjective aspects of musical experience? Can we still 
speak of the meaning of a musical work when it may be experienced dif-
ferently by every individual? On closer examination it will be clear that 
these interpersonal differences, for example in listening, can only be part of 
the picture. For, on the other hand, we can only understand the practices of 
composing, performing, listening, and criticizing at all on the supposition 
that there are also essential similarities in the musical experiences of dif-
ferent persons. The composer creating a composition has a clear conception 
of what he wants to convey to the audience. A competent performer is able 
to pass the essence of this conception on to the listener. However many pos-
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sibilities there may be for an interpreter to put his own mark on the work, he 
can only succeed if he sufficiently complies with the composer's intentions. 
Moreover, there is substantial agreement, especially among experts, about 
the characteristics of specific genres and about the qualities of particular 
works. If this were not the case, then every discourse on music would 
amount to the mere expression of subjective opinions. In actual fact, we turn 
out to concur on many points. 
This shared understanding of musical meaning can be accounted for by 
two facts. First, our musical experience is largely determined by the specific 
form of the musical composition in question. The character of its themes, its 
melodic and dynamic development, the patterns of tension and release, the 
rhythmic pulse, the timbres, the overall structure of the piece: all these and 
many other features guide the listener's experience. In other words, our 
musical experience is structured to a large degree by the form of the musical 
work. Secondly, many subtle musical norms have been learned and are 
shared by the members of a social group or society, governing their inter-
pretations of music. For instance, even though within the limits set by the 
musical form myriads of quite diverging interpretations are still possible, 
there are often certain specific interpretations that count as authoritative. 
Shared systems of norms can change in the course of time. Nevertheless, to 
the extent that the composer, the performer, and the listener are guided by 
such norms, it is reasonable to accept the possibility of a considerable degree 
of intersubjectively shared meaning (cf. Van Haaften, 1995). 
So far, we have been concentrating on intrinsic musical meaning, first 
because in our opinion intrinsic meaning is the heart of musical meaning, 
and second because, surprisingly in view of this, it has received so little 
attention in the philosophy of music. However, at this point we should add 
a few remarks concerning the complex nature extrinsic meaning. The dis-
tinction we made between intrinsic and extrinsic meaning is a fundamental 
one, but that does not imply that all extrinsic meaning is just of one and the 
same kind. On the contrary, it appears that a considerable number of forms 
and subforms of extrinsic meaning can be distinguished. Theorists from sev-
eral disciplines have investigated various kinds of meaning contained in the 
general notion of extrinsic meaning. For instance, analytic philosophers like 
Kivy (1980,1984), Levinson (1990,1996), Goodman (1976), and Davies (1994) 
have investigated the concepts of expression (or expressiveness), represen-
tation, and imitation. Semioticians have examined the role of various types 
of signs (icon, index, symbol, etc.) in music in a number of studies, the most 
notable of which is Karbusicky's (1986) book on musical semantics. Further-
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more, extrinsic meaning is the focus of musicologists who study program 
music and other music with — in Finscher's words — transmusical contents 
(Finscher, 1979; Petersen, 1983; Newcomb, 1984). 
By concentrating on intrinsic musical meaning we do not want to under-
estimate the importance nor the potentially intense character of the various 
kinds of extrinsic meaning that may be attached to music. However, in this 
article our first aim is to disentangle the different notions of meaning in-
volved in music and to stress the role of intrinsic meaning even though this 
notion could only be partly clarified by differentiating it from types of mean-
ing that are often more easily recognized. 
2.5 The ineffability of intrinsic musical meaning 
One of the most problematic characteristics of intrinsic musical meaning is 
its ineffability. In the above we have seen that the concept of intrinsic 
meaning is hard to define, but it is even more difficult, if not impossible at 
all, to describe the intrinsic meaning of concrete musical compositions or of 
parts of them such as their principal themes or motifs. For example, how 
could we express in words the intrinsic meaning of Brahms's Fourth Sym-
phony? How could we describe the meaning of the opening motif of Beet-
hoven's Fifth? Intrinsic meaning resists the so-called Principle of Expressibility 
according to which "whatever can be meant, can be said" (cf. Searle, 1969, 
pp. 19-21,88; Katz, 1972, pp. 18-24). Or, in a more precise formulation: "for 
any meaning X and any speaker S whenever S means (intends to convey, 
wishes to communicate in an utterance, etc.) X then it is possible that there is 
some expression E such that E is an exact expression of or formulation of X" 
(Searle, 1969, p. 20). 
If this were true, an argument against intrinsic meaning could run as 
follows: according to the Principle of Expressibility, it is possible to tell pre-
cisely what the intrinsic meaning of every composition is; this is clearly not 
possible; therefore, it cannot be maintained that there is such a thing as 
intrinsic musical meaning. However, it should first be noted that Searle and 
other proponents of the principle have failed to provide convincing argu-
ments for it. Secondly, the principle runs counter to both common-sense 
considerations and basic assumptions of current cognitive-psychological in-
formation processing theories. Our knowledge comprises more than what 
we have expressions for. And insofar as we do have words to express what 
we might like to communicate, the contents of knowledge that others con-
nect to these expressions most likely will correspond sufficiently but not 
exactly to what we have in mind ourselves — think for example only of 
2. Intrinsic meaning in music 47 
feelings, of indelible memories, of specific odors, and of particular sound 
qualities (cf. Van Haaften, 1975). 
Intrinsic musical meaning is largely ineffable and unverbalizable. This is 
problematic in several respects, but it can be no reason to deny this type of 
meaning altogether. On the other hand, an extrinsic approach to musical 
meaning based on a linguistic or referential model is undoubtedly easier to 
deal with, but such an approach is not more suitable for that reason. On the 
contrary, as we hope to have made clear, it may easily lead to a limited and 
impoverished view of musical meaning. 
The foregoing implies that comparative research in the field of intrinsic 
musical meaning is hardly possible. However, musical analysis can provide 
an important indirect contribution to our understanding of the intrinsic 
meaning of musical works, namely, to the extent that it can elucidate their 
musical form (in the broadest sense of the word) which is to a large degree 
constitutive of their intrinsic meaning. Therefore, we think the dominant 
approach to musical analysis, which concentrates on explaining the musical 
form, is right. 
It is also because intrinsic musical meaning resists the Principle of Ex-
pressibility, that listening to music, performing music, and composing or im-
provising should constitute the core of the curriculum in music education. 
Only through these forms of musical experience can the full richness of the 
cognitive and feeling aspects of intrinsic musical meaning become manifest 
to the pupil. Extrinsic meanings surely may add to this experience, even if 
only as an incentive to attend to the music. Analysis of the multifarious 
musical forms and of their typical differences surely will support the dis-
covery of musical meaning as well. However, even this type of analysis is 
subordinate to active listening, performing, and composing, because the 
intrinsic musical meaning cannot really be grasped through verbal discourse 
but only in the direct engagement with the music itself. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this article we have tried to clarify a central aspect of meaning in music — 
intrinsic meaning. We have suggested that the meaning of (a part of) a musi-
cal work is primarily constituted by the musical form, which has meaning as 
such. Intrinsic meaning should be clearly distinguished from various types 
of extrinsic meaning, which consists in reference to a reality outside the 
musical form itself, including "internal" reference to other parts of the same 
composition or to other musical works. For that reason, the linguistic model 
is not suitable to clarify the notion of intrinsic meaning; the linguistic model 
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is rather liable to mislead us when we try to understand the nature of in-
trinsic musical meaning. On the other hand, we have argued that intrinsic 
meaning should not be identified with the musical form which is its bearer: 
intrinsic meaning is supervenient on the musical form. It is what the form 
means to us in experiencing it. Furthermore, we should also clearly distin-
guish intrinsic meaning from the psychological processes involved in expe-
riencing the musical form. 
The most prominent characteristics of intrinsic musical meaning are the 
following: It is attributed to the musical object, which can either be a musical 
work as a whole, or a part of it, such as a theme or a motif. Intrinsic musical 
meaning is im-mediate: it is not derived from any mediating or referential 
function of the musical form relating it to something else, whether within 
the same piece of music (intramusical reference) or in another musical work 
(intermusical reference) or outside of music (extramusical reference). Intrin-
sic meaning is uniquely constituted by the specific form of the musical object 
as it can be experienced. It is determined by the way we can at once cogniti-
vely and feelingfully experience the musical form. 
Notes 
1. A discussion of the diverse meanings of meaning can be found in Alston (1964, 
pp.lOff.), 
2. Examples of this one-sided treatment can be found in Karbusicky (1986) and 
Nattiez (1990, chap. 5). 
3. Stage theories of musical development 
Musical development is a major issue in music education. Music educators' 
actions are based on ideas about the musical capabilities children possess at 
various ages and the way these capabilities change. These ideas rest largely 
on intuition, personal experience, and tradition, and while they should not 
be dismissed, they are clearly capable of improvement and refinement. It is 
important, therefore, that music educators inform themselves of the results 
of research on the musical development of the child. However, the music 
educator searching for an overall view of the course of musical development 
will find that theories in this area are scarce. Most researchers limit them-
selves to collecting data about musical abilities of children at particular 
moments in childhood. Only a few researchers (e.g., Bamberger, Pflederer, 
Dowling, Davidson, and Serafine) have until now focused on major qualita-
tive changes.1 But again, their work concentrates on a limited aspect and a 
limited period of musical development. 
The only comprehensive view is offered by Keith Swanwick and June 
Tillman's theory in which several stages are distinguished (Swanwick & 
Tillman, 1986; Swanwick 1988). At this time it is the only substantial stage 
theory dealing exclusively with music. In addition, two stage theories by 
Howard Gardner, though covering a broader field, are relevant to musical 
development (Gardner, 1973; Gardner, Phelps & Wolf, 1990). 
The purpose of this article is to elucidate and evaluate these three stage 
theories. I shall first present a theoretical framework for the analysis of 
developmental theories (section 1), for any adequate comparison of theories 
requires a theoretical framework or metatheory that provides relevant 
criteria for analysis and assessment. After this preparatory work I shall 
discuss the three theories in sections 2 to 4 and criticize them on a number of 
points. I shall propose an amended stage model on the basis of Gardner's 
1973 theory. In section 51 shall examine the relations among the theories and 
after that, in section 6, investigate the possibility of justifying evaluative 
claims — claims according to which later stages are better than the ones 
preceding them. Finally, the relevance of the three theories of musical 
development for music education will be examined. 
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3.1 The concept of development 
The theoretical framework presented in this section is based on the work of 
Van Haaften (Van Haaften et al, 1986; Van Haaften, 1990; Van Haaften et al., 
1997). The word development is related to change, of which two types can be 
differentiated: quantitative change and qualitative change. In everyday lan-
guage, development can refer to quantitative change as well; but here the term 
is used in a more restricted sense: development as involving qualitative 
change. The notion of stages is closely linked to this view of development. 
If essential differences can be observed in a developmental process, this 
amounts to distinguishing two or more stages. We may, then, accept as 
definitive for development that it (1) involves a process of change which (2) 
occurs over a certain period of time and in which (3) two or more qualita-
tively different stages occur, (4) each stage being a precondition for its 
successor. All three developmental theories discussed here appear to meet 
the conditions mentioned.2 
Development always occurs within a specific domain. The term domain 
refers to a clearly circumscribed part of reality, for example, science, moral-
ity, religion. Domains may vary with regard to their inclusiveness. It is pos-
sible that one domain be included another. Music, for instance, constitutes a 
part of the aesthetic domain. 
Within a domain a number of aspects can be distinguished with respect 
to which development occurs. In this context, I shall speak of developmental 
dimensions, or briefly dimensions. Examples of developmental dimensions 
within the musical domain are musical production (composing, improvis-
ing) and musical reception (listening). 
The dimension most central to the musical domain is the dimension of 
musical experience. In the aesthetic domain — and hence in music — it is 
aesthetic experience itself that we pursue. Aesthetic operations do not serve 
any practical purpose like understanding and controlling the world outside 
the arts. Although musical experience occupies a central place within the 
musical domain, no developmental theory has thus far been proposed that 
concentrates on the dimension of musical experience. The reason for this 
seems to be the elusiveness of the concept of musical experience, for it is so 
general a concept that it can be related to many different types of experience 
— intellectual, affective, motor, synaesthetic, and so forth. One dimension 
that is easier to pin down and that plays an important part in this paper is 
the dimension of musical understanding. Musical understanding is closely 
related to musical experience, because the latter depends to a large extent on 
the level of musical understanding one has reached. 
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The concept of musical understanding refers to the insight people have 
into the various aspects of music. The concept accords with the intuitive 
realization that certain insights are relevant to various modes of dealing 
with music. Composing, listening, interpreting, judging: all these actions 
depend upon musical understanding, which thus overarches several more 
specific dimensions. 
Musical understanding is often implicit. Most people are not aware of 
their having internalized many properties of the musical system dominant 
in their culture. Nevertheless, this unconscious understanding underpins all 
musical operations. Consider, for example, tonality. Anyone who has been 
surrounded by Western music since his early days and who is not tone-deaf 
knows from a certain age on how a tonal melody should end. Few persons 
know explicitly that such a melody should finish with the tonic. However, if 
they hear a melody that concludes on another tone than the tonic, they will 
feel that the ending lacks a sense of resolution. And if they improvise a 
melody, they will automatically end with the tonic. 
The concept of dimension helps us to clarify why it is often difficult to 
relate various results of research in the field of musical development to one 
another: they deal with different developmental dimensions. Theorists who 
survey the field generally give the impression that they deal with musical 
development as a whole; but in fact they are either concentrating on a single 
dimension or are investigating different dimensions simultaneously. The 
latter approach often yields an unclear and misleading picture: the author 
simply sums up a number of phenomena belonging to different dimensions 
in the belief of having given an adequate account of musical development. 
He ignores the fact that various aspects of the musical domain often have 
different courses of development. 
To obtain a clear view of musical development, we must make careful 
distinctions among varying aspects of musical development, a task that 
involves horizontal reconstruction. In horizontal reconstruction the domain is 
defined and developmental dimensions within this domain are traced. In the 
subsequent vertical reconstruction developmental stages within a dimension 
are reconstructed. 
Logic and dynamic are two complementary parts of developmental the-
ory. Logic, which subsumes horizontal and vertical reconstruction, is con-
cerned with the reconstruction of sequential stages of a developmental 
process. In addition, it examines relations between various dimensions and 
various stages. The objective of logic is not to trace the actual course of dev-
elopmental processes but to investigate the characteristics and the sequence 
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of constitutive aspects of development. Dynamic deals with the actual pro-
cesses of development as well as with principles that can explain these pro-
cesses. In this article I shall concentrate on the logical aspects of develop-
mental theories. 
The stages reconstructed in the logic part of developmental theory are 
abstract in nature. They are not necessarily found in concrete form in em-
pirical reality, and they need not correspond to specific ages in human life. 
Nor does the precise differentiation of one stage from another imply that the 
actual process of development displays abrupt transitions. A stage indicates 
a number of characteristics which are essential to a particular kind of devel-
opment at a certain moment. 
Developmental theory allows for several different ways in which stages 
are related to one another, two common types of which are referred to here. 
The first one is inclusion; if a new stage encompasses its predecessor their 
relation is one of inclusion. Substitution is the opposite of this, that is, major 
characteristics of a preceding stage are not preserved in the new stage. 
Developmental claims are statements based, explicitly or implicitly, on a 
cohering set of criteria for development. Developmental claims always refer 
to some developmental pattern. Two types of developmental claims can be dis-
tinguished. A descriptive developmental claim is made when the person 
asserting it refers, implicitly or explicitly, to certain developmental stages. If, 
moreover, a certain appraisal is attached to this form of development, an 
evaluative developmental claim is made. Many writers on musical develop-
ment assume tacitly that later stages are always to be preferred to earlier 
ones. Theoretically, however, there is no reason whatever to take this for 
granted. Until now, the problem of justifying evaluative claims about musi-
cal development has been underestimated. I shall deal with this issue in 
section 7. 
3.2 Gardner's theory of aesthetic development 
Horizontal Reconstruction 
In his book The Arts and Human Development (1973) the American psychol-
ogist Howard Gardner puts forward an ambitious theory of the individual's 
development in the aesthetic domain. Besides music, his theory covers the 
visual and the literary arts. Gardner understands the arts as forms of 
communication. Through the effective manipulation of his artistic medium, 
the artist conveys a subjective message (about feelings, beliefs, thoughts) to 
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an audience. An art work thus serves a symbolic function: it refers to the 
artist's subjective experiences. 
Gardner does not focus on one specific developmental dimension. Al-
though he deals with creation as well as reception, performance, and criti-
cism, his developmental theory is not primarily about these aspects. Gardner 
is primarily interested in the development of the three systems he defines at 
the beginning of his book, the making, perceiving, and feeling systems, 
which constitute the core of a theoretical framework he designed. He claims 
this framework enables him to treat aesthetic development more adequately 
than before. However, since Gardner does not consistently approach artistic 
development in terms of his conceptual framework and most descriptions 
dispense with theoretical terms, I shall not concentrate on his theoretical 
framework. In section 6 I shall argue that Gardner's account of musical 
development may be understood as referring to the developmental di-
mension of musical understanding. For the time being it is important to 
keep in mind that Gardner intends his theory to bear primarily on the mak-
ing, perceiving, and feeling systems and their interactions. 
Vertical Reconstruction 
Gardner distinguishes two stages in aesthetic development, a presymbolic • 
stage and a stage of symbol use. In the first stage the three developing 
systems unfold. Differentiation takes place, and the systems begin to inter-
act. In the second stage the child discovers the symbolic function of the arts. 
Arbitrary elements become symbols as they are linked to content, and the 
child learns to use these art symbols properly, that is, in accordance with 
cultural norms and aesthetic codes. 
Surprisingly, Gardner's separate treatment of musical development does 
not not accord with his developmental model. He does not focus at all on 
the symbolic function of the musical medium. There is no account of the 
way children discover the opportunities the musical medium offers them to 
communicate subjective experiences. At the beginning of the section on 
musical development Gardner reviews research done in this area. After 
having noted important convergences among researchers, he summarizes 
the results: 
During the first years of childhood, the child acquires a general familiarity 
with music and begins to experiment with perceiving and making, imitating 
songs he has heard, elaborating them, and recognizing pieces and motifs, for 
instance. By the age of 6 he has already achieved a working relationship with 
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musical symbols, playing and performing and perceiving with some accu-
racy. (1973, p. 196) 
About the competence which allow six- or seven-year-old children to have 
this working relationship, Gardner writes: 
...a reasonably competent 7-year-old should understand the basic metrical 
properties of his musical system and the appropriate scales, harmonies, ca-
dences, and groupings, even as he should be able, given some motifs, to com-
bine them into a musical unit that is appropriate for his culture, but not a 
complete copy of a work previously known. (1973, p. 197) 
Gardner portrays musical development as learning to understand and use 
the dominant musical code. He deals with musical structure only and does 
not tell anything about the development of music's symbolic function in the 
child. Therefore, the two stages are more correctly reformulated in terms 
that reflect their real content: the appropriation of the dominant musical 
system. The stages may thus be described as (1) exploration of the musical 
medium: listening, reacting, imitating, babbling, humming, singing; and (2) 
internalization of the musical system: dealing with music in accordance with 
the musical code. 
Gardner believes aesthetic development is best viewed as encompassing 
only two stages. As far as major qualitative changes are concerned, aesthetic 
development ends at about the age of about seven. Although the child can 
make a lot of progress after that, the changes will be quantitative only. In a 
strict sense, development is completed. However, Gardner himself supplies 
us with evidence that undermines this position. In his section on musical 
development he summarizes reseach done by himself and Donna Bridge-
man: 
The pre-adolescents were immersing themselves in the musical selections, 
noting their affective and kinesthetic effects, making free associations to 
previous experiences... They were proceeding from the musical event to a 
final decision. In contrast, the adolescent subjects appeared to approach the 
task from the perspective of their musical knowledge. They had some 
familiarity with musical history and terminology, and they looked for 
examples of prior categories in the music they heard. ...they were proceeding 
from a structure to the particular musical event being evaluated. These 
different approaches to music seem consistent with other findings and 
provide evidence that, with the advent of formal operations and an "abstract 
attitude", subjects assume a new kind of "distanced" relationship to aesthetic 
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works, one which may be less effective in revealing the work than the un-
mediated relationship younger children have. (1973, p. 195) 
Gardner describes two qualitatively different approaches to music which may 
be generalized. According to the first approach, the listener has a direct 
relationship to the music which is not mediated by thoughts about certain 
aspects of music. According to the second approach, the listener takes a 
distanced and abstracted stance to music, which has a significant influence 
on musical experience. 
Composition is similarly affected by a distanced relationship. Gardner 
writes: 
With the passing of adolescence, the individual who has continued to master 
his symbolic medium becomes an artist in the full sense — he has become 
familiar with and is now able to appreciate and to contribute to the tradition 
in his art form. Earlier, he knew the art as a single form, and such invention as 
he had done had usually been in one style at a time. Now he becomes in-
timately aware of the variety of artists and styles that preceeded him.... With 
increasing understanding of the world of persons, artists of the past emerge 
as individuals like himself who responded to the challenges, motifs, and 
feelings of their epochs and captured information about such elements and 
about themselves in their own art work. Only at this point does the artist 
achieve sufficient distance — adequate decentration — so that he can perceive 
himself as engaged in the same kind of activity as his predecessors and can 
begin to contribute to the tradition. (1973, p. 263) 
This passage shows that a distanced and reflective attitude is not just some-
thing added to immersion in the art work but that this attitude leads to a 
fundamentally different relationship with the arts. 
Gardners descriptions lead me to distinguish two qualitatively different 
ways of relating to music in the second stage, which now splits into two new 
stages: one in which the individual internalizes the musical code in an un-
reflective way, and a subsequent one in which he has a more distanced re-
lationship to music. This results in a three-stage developmental model: 
1. Exploration of the musical medium: listening, reacting, imitating, 
babbling, humming, singing; 
2. Internalization of the musical system: dealing with music in accor-
dance with the musical code; 
3. Distanced and abstracted attitude, growing consciousness of musical 
experience, reflection. 
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The relation between stage 1 and 2 is best characterized as inclusion: the sec-
ond stage builds on the experiences with music the individual had in the 
preceding stage. The same is the case with stages 2 and 3; stage 3 entirely 
includes the knowledge of the musical code acquired in stage 2. 
3.3 The developmental theory of Gardner, Phelps and Wolf 
Horizontal Reconstruction 
In a 1990 publication in cooperation with Erin Phelps and Dennie Wolf, 
Gardner presents a developmental model which bears some resemblance to 
the three-stage model proposed above. The domain and the dimension, 
however, are different from those examined in The Arts and Human Develop-
ment. 
The domain is even more encompassing than in the earlier theory: it 
encompasses not only the arts, but all symbolic domains, including mathe-
matics and the symbol systems used in science. Although the domain is very 
large, Gardner et al. pay special attention to music and the other arts in their 
examples. The dimension on which the authors concentrate is the dimension 
of creativity. As will be seen, the stages put forward have a broader signifi-
cance than the aspect of creative production within the various symbolic 
systems. 
Vertical Reconstruction 
Gardner et al. (1990) outline a developmental model which contains three 
phases. In terminology borrowed from Kohlberg's theory of moral develop-
ment, they call them the preconventional, the conventional, and the postcon-
ventional stages (p. 93). 
In the preconventional stage creativity is independent of the culture in 
which the child grows up. The child explores the symbolic medium in his 
own way. When he encounters problems, he tries to find solutions on his 
own (p. 91). 
In the conventional stage the child becomes sensitive to "cultural dic-
tates", as Gardner et al. call them. His aim now is to produce symbolic prod-
ucts in just the way adults do and to conform to dominant conventions as 
much as he can (pp. 90-92). 
The postconventional stage is characterized by a critical attitude toward 
conventions. The creative person no longer contents himself with imitating 
the products of his culture but pursues his own ends, and if he feels imped-
ed by conventions he puts them aside. As a result of this critical attitude, 
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many adolescents give up creative work which they feel unable to produce 
at an acceptable level. They therefore concentrate on reception (pp. 90,92). 
As Gardner et al. show, it is useful to distinguish a preconventional, a 
conventional, and a postconventional attitude in areas other than morality. 
Because they have chosen a vast domain — symbol systems — they cannot 
help talking about conventions in only a very general sense. We may, 
however, elaborate the idea for the case of music. I propose the following. 
Conventions may be linked to the dominant musical code(s). A person 
who is in the preconventional stage has no understanding of this code. In 
the conventional stage, the musical code does not merely guide the person 
but defines for him what counts as acceptable music. It is important to stress 
that the conventional stage is not tied to one particular style, for instance, 
pop, folk, or classical music or jazz. Which musical code a person learns 
depends on the (sub)culture he belongs to. The point here is that at the 
conventional stage one is not able to go beyond the types of music one has 
become accustomed to by enculturation. The postconventional stage repre-
sents a different attitude. One distances oneself from musical conventions 
and is receptive to music which is at variance with one's familiar code, such 
as avant-garde music or the music of other cultures. For a person hitherto 
familiar only with pop music, this may be classical music (or vice versa). The 
postconventional composer, moreover, searches for new means of express-
ing himself. In short, one's horizon is widened dramatically in the postcon-
ventional stage. Although this does not mean that all unfamiliar music will 
be automatically appreciated, opportunities for musical experience are en-
larged systematically. A postconventional attitude does not necessarily en-
tail the rejection of the musical code that set one's musical standard in the 
conventional stage, but it does imply that this code no longer determines the 
types of music one is capable of appreciating. 
The relation between the preconventional and the conventional stages is 
best described as one of inclusion. Although stage 2 embodies a totally 
different way of dealing with music, the knowledge of the symbolic medium 
acquired in stage 1 is preserved. Similarly, the postconventional stage in-
cludes its predecessor, the conventional stage. Conventions, though now 
having a different status, continue to play an important role. 
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3.4 Swanwick and Tillman's theory of musical development 
Horizontal Reconstruction 
The most substantial stage model of musical development currently avail-
able is the one put forward by the British music educators Keith Swanwick 
and June Tillman (Swanwick & Tillman 1986; Swanwick 1988). Since their 
theory is restricted to music, their domain is smaller than Gardner's. At first 
glance, the developmental dimension seems to pose problems. The reconstruc-
tion of the stages marked by Swanwick and Tillman reveals a discrepancy 
between the first three stages and the last: the first three are about musical 
production, but the fourth bears on reflection about musical experience. This 
division is present in the theory's grounding, for while the first three stages 
have been confirmed by an analysis of children's improvisations, the last 
stage is founded solely on observations by theorists. Swanwick and Till-
man's model thus seems to confuse two dimensions. Swanwick claims, how-
ever, that the model has implications for musical understanding.3 The stages 
represent aspects relevant to all ways of relating to music, whether they be 
composing, performing, listening, or criticizing. The reason for basing stages 
1 to 3 on compositions is that their analysis is the easiest way to gain insight 
into children's approaches to music. It goes without saying that other ways 
of dealing with music should also be examined in an effort to substantiate 
the claim that the stages of the model are about the overarching dimension 
of musical understanding. It is also clear that the first three stages should be 
redefined, as their focus is not on musical understanding but on composi-
tion. 
Vertical Reconstruction 
Swanwick and Tillman's developmental model can be schematized as fol-
lows: 
Stage 1 (0-4 years) Mastery Materials 
modes: sensory 
manipulative 
Stage 2 (4-9 years) Imitation Expression 
modes: personal 
vernacular 
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Stage 3 (10-15 years) Imaginative Play Fonti 
modes: speculative 
idiomatic 
Stage 4 (15+) Metacognition Value 
modes: symbolic 
systematic 
Swanwick and Tillman discriminate four stages, each of which is goes under 
two names. The first designation is general in character (mastery, imitation, 
imaginative play, metacognition); the second indicates how these general 
notions should be conceived in the area of music (materials, expression, 
form, value). The concepts of mastery, imitation, and imaginative play 
are borrowed from Piaget's theory of play, which Swanwick and identify 
as a theoretical basis for their own ideas of musical development (1986, 
pp. 306-308). But the relation between the two theories is not a strong one. 
The authors connect mastery with the mastery of musical materials, imitation 
with musical expression, and imaginative play with structural transforma-
tions. These connections, however, are not as compelling as they suggest, for 
other combinations seem just as theoretically possible. For example, it is not 
clear why the concepts of mastery and imitation could not also be linked to 
musical structure, or why imaginative play could not be connected with 
musical materials. Since Piaget's categories are not sufficiently specific, there 
is no justification for linking them to one particular aspect of music. Piaget's 
theory may have dubious relevance to Swanwick and Tillman's model of 
musical development, but the value of their theory is independent on any 
relation to Piaget's notions on play. The crucial question is whether the the-
ory accords with the various ways individuals relate to music during succes-
sive periods of their lives. Therefore, in discussing stages 1 to 3 I shall not 
refer to the Piagetian concepts in the left column of the table; instead, I shall 
concentrate on the musical descriptions in the right column. 
Within each stage, Swanwick and Tillman distinguish two modes. These 
modes represent two different ways of relating to the aspects of music that 
dominate the respective stages. 
1. The first stage proposed by Swanwick and Tillman is dominated by an 
interest in musical materials, (a) In the sensory mode the child pays attention 
mainly to the phenomenon of sound, being fascinated especially by timbre 
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and dynamic levels. The sound sequences produced by the child lack struc-
tural organization, (b) The manipulative mode is characterized by a concern 
for getting control of the sound materials. The child discovers technical de-
vices that enable him to achieve greater mastery in handling instruments. 
Compositions tend to be long and rambling, but the child now organizes a 
steady pulse. 
2. In stage 2 the child's attention shirts toward the expressive properties 
of music, (a) In the personal mode changes in tempo and dynamic levels are 
used for expressive purposes. Expression has a personal and direct charac-
ter. Although there are signs of elementary phrases, there is little structu-
ral control; one musical invention follows another without coordination, 
(b) This situation changes in the vernacular mode. Compositions are now 
shorter and begin to meet general musical conventions. Rhythmic and 
melodic patterns emerge, phrases begin to conform to standard two-, four-, 
and eight-bar units, compositional techniques like ostinati and sequences 
become common. Compositions in this phase are often very predictable and 
absorb musical ideas from existing melodies. 
3. In the third stage the emphasis is on musical form, (a) The speculative 
mode is characterized by an experimental stance. The child now tries to de-
viate from regular patterns established in the vernacular mode. Imaginative 
deviations, however, are not always fully in accordance with the style and 
structure of the piece as a whole. While control of pulse and phrase tends to 
decline, contrast, variation, and other structural possibilities are explored, 
(b) In the idiomatic mode original inventions are integrated into a homoge-
neous style. Technical, expressive, and structural control is regained and 
strengthened. Children at this age try to imitate specific styles, frequently 
popular ones. 
4. In stage 4 yet another aspect of musical experience comes to the fore: 
metacognition. The individual becomes conscious of his thoughts and feel-
ings with respect to music, (a) In the symbolic mode the adolescent increasing-
ly becomes aware of the subjective value of music. The adolescent strongly 
identifies with certain musicians and certain pieces. Besides featuring this 
affective relationship with music, the symbolic mode is distinguished by the 
individual's capacity to reflect upon musical experience. Not everyone will 
reach this advanced mode of musical response, (b) The systematic mode is 
open to even fewer people. Preoccupation with subjective experiences now 
gives way to an intellectual approach to music. This leads to systematic 
expansion of the universe of musical discourse. Composers explore new 
compositional systems and novel organizing principles. In addition to com-
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posing, there is much talking and writing about music. Reflection upon and 
discussion of musical experience can lead to many new insights. 
An important characteristic of the developmental model is its spiral 
form. In the developmental sequence two types of movement can be distin-
guished: vertical movement, indicating the development to higher stages, 
and a recurrent movement from left to right and vice versa, indicating a 
polarity in development. A combination of these two types of movement can 
be represented as a spiral.4 
The polarity between the modes to the left (sensory, personal, specula-
tive, and symbolic) and those to the right (manipulative, vernacular, idiom-
atic, and systematic) is characterized by Swanwick and Tillman as the op-
position between egocentric and experimental modes on the one hand, and 
less original, convention-dominated modes on the other (Swanwick & Till-
man 1986, p. 334). The first three stages fit this description, but stage 4 does 
not: the systematic mode is not conventional at all and is open to new ideas 
and experimentation. It would be better to characterize the left pole as sub-
jective and the right as objective or intersubjective. The subjective pole re-
presents self-directedness, its opposite represents a dialogical relation with 
the external world. 
Contrary to Gardner, Swanwick does address the issue of the relations 
between the various stages. Swanwick states that "each one of these 'stages' 
or perhaps better transformations, is swept up into the succeeding devel-
opmental thrust. We do not merely pass through one of these modes but 
cany them forward with us into the next" (Swanwick 1988, pp. 63-64). Ear-
lier stages, then, are in a sense preserved in later ones, making the relation 
between successive stages one of inclusion (though Swanwick himself uses 
the term cumulation in this context). The quoted passage makes clear that 
the modes as well as stages display a relation of inclusion. Later stage pre-
serve not only the various aspects of musical experience that dominated 
previous stages but also the subjective and objective ways of dealing these 
aspects. 
3.5 A comparison of the three theories 
An examination of the relations among the stage models discussed above 
only makes sense if the domain and dimensions of the three theories can be 
brought into alignment. This is simple for the domain, as all three models 
deal with music. The fact that Gardner (1973, henceforth Gardner I) and 
Gardner et al. (1990, henceforth Gardner II) cover a broader field is not 
relevant here. 
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But differences are evident in the dimensions. Gardner I is about three 
systems (perceiving, acting, and feeling), Gardner II concentrates on crea­
tivity, and Swanwick and Tillman deal with musical understanding. How­
ever, both of Gardner's theories can be reinterpreted in such a way that they 
also relate to musical understanding. 
Gardner I describes musical development almost exclusively in cognitive 
terms and has practically nothing to say about the development of the 
feeling system. Furthermore, even the notions of perceiving and acting sys­
tems do not figure prominently. Gardner is able to deal with musical per­
ception and musical action simultaneously because both activities rest on 
musical understanding. Therefore, we can interpret Gardner's account of 
musical development as dealing with the higher-order dimension of musical 
understanding. 
Similarly, although Gardner II is about the developmental dimension of 
creativity, the terms preconventional, conventional, and postconventional 
have a broader significance. Primarily they have bearing on the kind of un­
derstanding a person has of the domain involved. Whether in the role of 
composer, listener, performer, or critic, a person can take a preconventional, 
a conventional, or a postconventional stance. 
Although all three theories shed light upon the developmental dimen­
sion of musical understanding, they are quite divergent. Each deals with 
different aspects of musical understanding, and this leads to their using dif­
ferent criteria for delineating stages. In Gardner I-a (i.e., the amended ver­
sion of Gardner I proposed in section 3), criteria bear on the extent to which 
musical experience is mediated by implicit or explicit understanding of the 
musical code. In Gardner Π, a person's relation to musical tradition is deci­
sive. The criteria in the developmental model of Swanwick and Tillman are 
quite different. Here the issue is which aspect (sound, expression, form, 
metacognition) is dominant in musical experience. Swanwick and Tillman's 
theory is further differentiated from Gardner I-a and Gardner Π by its em­
phasis on the recurrent alternation between subjective and objective/inter-
subjective modes. Because of these differences, the three models cannot be 
equated. Even so, various stages share constitutive characteristics. In the 
table below the relations between the three stage models are represented. 
Since the scheme is largely self-explanatory, comments on a few points 
may suffice here. Although they resemble each other at first sight, stage ΠΙ 
of Gardner I-a and stage 3 of Gardner II do not represent the same level of 
musical understanding. It is possible for someone to assume a distanced 
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Development of Musical Understanding 
Gardner (1973), amended 
I. free exploration 
II. implicit musical 
understanding 
ΙΠ. distanced relationship, 
reflection 













attitude without thereby taking a postconventional stance. (The status of 
musical conventions is only one of the many musical topics one can reflect 
on.) A postconventional stance presupposes a distanced and reflective atti­
tude to music, but a distanced attitude does not necessarily imply that the 
postconventional stage has been reached. It is for this reason that the post-
conventional stage is placed lower than the third stage of Gardner I-a, iden­
tifying it as a later phase in development. It is not wholly clear from Swan­
wick and Tillman's account of the systematic mode whether this mode pre­
supposes a postconventional attitude. At any rate, their example of Schoen-
berg's new compositional techniques accords with the postconventional 
stage. 
The stage models most discrepant are Gardner Π on the one side and 
Swanwick and Tillman on the other. The conventional stage in Gardner Π 
extends over six modes of Swanwick and Tillman's spiral model. Only three 
of them — lb, 2b, and 3b — have characteristics that correspond to a con­
ventional attitude. Modes 2a, 3a, and 4a by contrast stress personal inven­
tion and subjective experience. Swanwick and Tillman's developmental 
model therefore is not dominated by the internalization of musical conven­
tions to the extent that Gardner II is. 
3.6 Evaluative claims about musical development 
Although all three theories contain implicit or explicit evaluative claims 
about the consecutive stages, none of the authors defines or justifies a cri­
terion for progress. I shall therefore propose a criterion and examine which 
evaluative claims can be made with respect to the three developmental 
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models concerned when this criterion is used. Next, I shall point out how 
these claims relate to those made in the various theories. 
In section 2 I remarked that the aesthetic domain differs from other do-
mains because of its self-sufficiency: aesthetic experience does not serve any 
practical purpose but it is an end in itself. Given this specific character of the 
aesthetic domain, it is not surprising that authoritative evaluative criteria 
used in other domains are not wholly suitable for judging musical dev-
elopment. J. R. Rest (1983, p. 575) gives three lines of argument in defense of 
the superiority of later stages: (1) each stage in the sequence is progressively 
more differentiated and integrated; (2) with development, each new stage 
employs cognitive operations that are more reversible and equilibrated; (3) 
with development, each stage has a more encompassing perspective on 
society. 
Starting with the last argument: this is at variance with the disinterested 
character of musical experience. Although musical development may have 
the effect of a broadening of our perspective on other matters, music is not 
aimed at the acquisition of knowledge about social or physical reality. The 
Piagetian notions of reversibility and equilibration bear on logical opera-
tions. To musical experience, which is characterized by concreteness, these 
abstract operations seem less relevant. On the other hand, while the con-
cepts of differentiation and integration are applicable to musical develop-
ment, they are not sufficient. In cognitive domains differentiation and inte-
gration lead to a more adequate understanding of these domains. In the 
aesthetic domain they constitute only one aspect of what seems to me to be 
the central evaluative criterion, namely, the richness of aesthetic experience. 
This criterion can be linked to musical understanding. As noted earlier, the 
way a person experiences music depends to a large degree on the level of 
musical understanding he has reached. A higher level of musical under-
standing makes possible a richer musical experience. Therefore, the level of 
musical understanding can be taken as a measure in deciding whether a 
stage is an advance on its predecessor. 
What is the consequence of using this criterion for the three develop-
mental models? All stages in all three models include their predecessors 
(unless there is none). This means that all musical understanding acquired 
in a previous stage is present in its successor. Since each new stage involves 
musical understanding of a novel kind, the level of musical understanding is 
higher than in the proceeding stage. This implies that in all three models 
each new stage is to be preferred to its predecessor in terms of richness of 
musical experience. 
3. Stage theories of musical development 65 
Swanwick does not explicitly put forward a criterion for evaluative 
claims, but his ideas seem to be congruent to the ideas set down here. He 
writes: 
The extent to which a person is able to respond to music depends signifi­
cantly on the range of developmental modes that are open to him or her.... It 
is a great limitation to be aware only of the sonorous surface of music... Nor is 
it enough to admire the manipulative fluency of the performers.... Even 
recognition of expressive character is insufficient to help us find music 
cohesive or interesting... Ultimately, music educators are keen that people 
come to value music and this valuing is built, as it must be, on the activity of 
mind across all the other levels. (1988, p. 82) 
According to Swanwick, richness of musical experience depends on the 
range of developmental modes a person has at his disposal. And because 
each new mode of his developmental model includes all preceeding modes 
(as we have seen in section 5), we may conclude that later modes are supe­
rior to earlier ones. 
Gardner (1973) uses the extent to which a person is able to participate in 
the artistic process as an implicit criterion for evaluating development. This 
criterion, however, is insufficient. The artistic process Gardner speaks of 
refers to adult culture. Although it may be the case that the child is unable to 
participate fully in the artistic process as defined by adult standards, the 
child may be totally immersed in music in his own way. A complete argu­
mentation requires reasons for preferring adult musical culture is to the way 
young children deal with sound. 
Gardner advances considerations that may seem incompatible with the 
position taken here, namely, that stage ΠΙ of Gardner I-a is to be preferred to 
its predecessor, for he argues that the distanced, abstracted attitude charac­
teristic of the third stage may have negative effects: 
Formal operations may even at times serve to hinder artistic development 
since the tendency to focus on underlying content, to abstract out meaning, to 
be sensitive to the explicit demands of a task, to proceed in a systematic and 
exhaustive manner, and, above all, to translate problems and questions into 
logical-propositional terms may all militate against the sensitivity to detail 
and nuance and the faithfulness to the particular properties of object and 
medium that are so vital for the artist. (1973, p. 308) 
It should be noted that Gardner expresses himself cautiously, using "may". 
It is not the case that formal operations or other actions resulting from a 
distanced attitude are necessarily damaging. Problems arise only if a person 
66 Keynotes in music education 
has been rendered unable to experience music in a direct manner. Metacog-
nition is not, of course, a substitute for direct musical experience; it merely 
contributes to musical experience as a whole. If difficulties arise, these are 
not attributable to the new kind of musical understanding typical of the 
third stage but to the way one deals with this new knowledge. The position 
taken is not that the new stage guarantees the person a richer musical 
experience in every instance but that this later stage offers a richer potential 
for musical experience. I think Gardner's argument does not affect this posi-
tion. 
By exposing negative as well as positive aspects of the three stages they 
. define, Gardner et al. (1990) suggest that these stages are not equally prefer-
able. Since these positive and negative points are not, however, concerned 
with matters central to the preconventional, conventional and postconven-
tional stages, they will not be taken into account here. 
The conclusion of this section is that evaluative claims can be substanti-
ated with respect to all three stage models. Each stage is an improvement on 
its predecessor in the sense that it offers the possibility for richer musical 
experience. 
3.7 Musical development and music education 
Theories of musical development can be of great benefit to music education 
because they open up opportunities for systematic curriculum construction. 
A developmental model offers a sequence of stages that represent qualitati-
vely different ways of relating to music. If one succeeds in linking these 
different approaches to music to specific chronological ages — a job belong-
ing to the dynamic part of developmental theory — one obtains a coherent 
picture of the musical capabilities one may expect at various periods of 
childhood. Such an overview makes it possible to decide which curriculum 
materials are suitable for a particular age. 
Two types of suitable curriculum materials can be dinstinguished: mate-
rials that correspond to the individual's current stage of development and 
materials that anticipate the next stage (Van Haaften et al., 1986, p. 191). 
Curriculum materials corresponding to the child's current stage are intend-
ed to reinforce the kind of musical understanding the child possesses at the 
moment. We may, for example, acquaint a child who acts in accordance with 
the second stage of Swanwick and Tillman's model with all sorts of expres-
sive opportunities available in the musical medium. This is quantitative 
learning; it leads to an augmentation of musical understanding of the type 
characteristic of the child's current stage. 
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Curriculum materials that anticipate the next stage are actually just 
beyond the child's scope and serve the purpose of directing the child's at-
tention toward a new type of musical understanding. To take Swanwick and 
Tillman's second stage once more as an example, children who focus pri-
marily on the expressive opportunities of sound materials may be intro-
duced to formal principles of music like phrasing, thematic recurrences, and 
so on. The objective is gradually to make children sensitive to the contribu-
tion such properties make to the effectiveness of a composition and to let 
them realize that they can use these properties in their own compositions. 
These anticipatory curriculum materials aim at qualitative learning: the kind 
of musical understanding intended is qualitatively different from what the 
child has acquired so far. 
An educator whose teaching anticipates the forthcoming stage exercises 
a stimulating influence on the students' musical development. The preced-
ing section showed that in all three developmental models each new stage 
offers the possibility of richer musical experience. This means that stimula-
tion of musical development can be justified. But it is another question how 
far stimulation should go. Assuming that accelleration of the pace of devel-
opment is feasible, is it also desirable? I do not wish to condem any degree 
of acceleration, no matter how modest. However, an approach directed 
toward maximum acceleration must be decidedly rejected for two reasons. 
Firstly, if we require children constantly to operate at the limit of their 
capabilities, we risk causing them to loose their enthusiasm for music. If 
they are barely able, or unable, to cope with the tasks assigned them, they 
may come to think of music as something very difficult that yields only 
small satisfaction. As a result, children may begin to avoid musical activities. 
Secondly, maximum accellaration of musical development would occur at 
the expense of quantitative learning processes. There is little point in passing 
on to a new stage if the sort of musical understanding typical of the one 
preceding it has not been thoroughly mastered. A child in Swanwick's sec-
ond stage, for example, who has acquired sufficient insight into the expres-
sive properties of the music can in the third stage learn to employ the 
principles of form in such a way as to enhance the expressive effect of a com-
position. The situation is different for a child who has had scant opportunity 
to explore the expressive opportunities offered by sound. Such a child may 
be taught to obey formal principles but forms will remain empty, that is, 
without musical impact. 
Music education should contribute to the stabilization and reinforcement 
of the various kinds of musical understanding. Efforts to speed up the dev-
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elopmental can subvert this aim. Stimulating musical development therefore 
can best be understood as an attempt to ensure (a) the avoidance of stag-
nation and the facilitation of students' progress to the later stages in which 
they will be better off than in their current ones; (b) the students' acquiring 
new types of musical development as smoothly as possible by introducing 
them gradually to curriculum materials designed to promote learning in the 
next stage of development. 
Notes 
1. For a review of the work of these researchers, see Hargreaves (1986) and Har-
greaves & Zimmerman (1992). 
2. The fourth stage of Swanwick and Tillman's theory is an exception in this respect. 
It must be doubted whether an individual reaching this stage has to have passed 
through all previous stages. The theory therefore does not seem to satisfy the fifth 
condition. 
3. I owe this insight to personal communication with professor Swanwick. 
4. Swanwick and Tillman's representation of the model differs from ours in that lat-
er stages are placed higher instead of lower. This results in a rising spiral. 
4. Aims in music education: a conceptual study 
In music education we find many statements about aims. Naturally so. If 
music education is to be a rational practice, those in charge of it should have 
at least a global idea of its intended results. Curricular frameworks, curri-
culum guides, methods, text books about music teaching, policy statements 
of associations of music educators, et cetera cannot keep silent about the 
goals of music education. 
Until the present, almost all writing about the aims of music education 
has been prescriptive. Generally, those considering the issue of aims are con-
cerned with the question what music education should strive for. This is not 
only the case with practical literature but also with writings in the philos-
ophy of music education. What has virtually been absent up to now is inves-
tigations into the concept of aims in music education.1 
In this article I take up this subject matter. The first section offers an ori-
entation on the concept of educational aims. I will present the views of two 
leading philosophers of education on the issue: Wolfgang Brezinka and 
Richard S. Peters. Two distinctions emerge from this discussion: (1) between 
internal and external aims of education; and (2) between empirical means-
ends connections and logical connections between various aspects of aims. 
In the second section I will analyze the conceptions of aims expressed in the 
philosophies of Bennett Reimer and David Elliott. I will point out that each 
of these philosophies features internal as well as external aims but that the 
relationship between these two notions of aims remains obscure in both of 
them. In the next sections I will discuss empirical and logical aspects of 
aims, starting from a survey of basic "musical behaviors" as Reimer defines 
them in A Philosophy of Music Education. I will illustrate how empirical and 
logical questions can easily run together and how this leads to misunder-
standings. Besides, I will try to clarify the conceptual relations between 
various musical behaviors. I conclude by making some brief remarks about 
the relevance of conceptual inquiry for music education. 
4.1 The concept of aims in education 
Brezinka 
The most systematic treatment of the concept of aims in education has been 
presented by the German author Wolfgang Brezinka (1993, pp. 161-186, 
218-258; 1994, pp. 101-163). After a thorough analysis of the concept he ar-
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rives at the following definition.· "An educational aim is a norm, describing 
the psychic dispositions (or a dispositional structure) set as an ideal for 
educands; it calls on educators to so act that as far as possible educands are 
enabled to realize this ideal" (1994, p. 163). This definition brings together 
the following characteristics: 
1. An educational aim is a norm set by some norm setter or norm au-
thority for specific persons. 
2. This norm has a double content, that is, it consists of a combination 
of two norms for two different persons: (a) an ideal for the educand; 
(b) a prescription for the educator. 
Brezinka emphasizes that educational aims always refer to norms that 
relate to psychological dispositions. Behaviors or experiences are, in his 
view, often erroneously viewed as aims of education. What the educator 
really aims at are dispositions to behave or to have experiences, rather than 
behaviors and experiences themselves (1994, pp. 118-122). 
According to Brezinka, aims can only be meaningfully approached by 
thinking in terms of means and ends. The means-ends framework is an 
indispensable pattern of thinking in practical life. It enables the individual to 
get a grip on the complexity of reality by simplifying it. It allows us to con-
centrate our perception, thinking, volition, and action on those parts of the 
world that we consider to be important to realizing what we desire. Using 
the concept of an end we can focus on one particular goal that prevails at the 
moment. This concept also serves as a guideline for discovering means. With 
the concept of a means we can delimit from the host of operative causal 
relations precisely those, which appear to be vital to the attainment of the 
end we have envisaged (1993, pp. 227-228). In Brezinka's view, the means-
ends framework presupposes causality; the end we want to attain is seen as 
an effect, and in defining our means, we look for the causes by which this 
end can be achieved (1993, pp. 223,228). 
As Brezinka sees it, in practical life we cannot help complying with the 
means-ends framework. This holds both for our own actions and for our 
understanding the actions of others. In grasping the concept of action, we 
grasp at the same time both the concepts of end and means. Education being 
a form of action, no theory of education can be imagined that would 
dispense with the categories of ends and means (1993, p. 256). 
Peters 
R. S. Peters' concept of aims in education is fundamentally different from 
Brezinka's. He uses the term aim only reluctantly. In contrast to other au-
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thors, Peters distinguishes the concept aim from related concepts like purpose 
and ideal.2 He makes the following points about the concept of an aim: 
1. We tend to ask about aims in contexts where we think it important 
to get people to specify more precisely what they are trying to do. 
2. Aims suggest the concentration on and the direction of effort 
towards an objective that is not too palpable or close to hand. 
3. Aims suggest the possibility of failure or falling short. (1973a, p. 14) 
It is the second characteristic that accounts for Peters' reservations against 
using the term aims in education, because it is not compatible with his view 
of education. If education is the initiation of people into a worthwhile form 
of life, he asks, "how could there ever be any end of value beyond this 
which it would be possible to bring about?" (1973a, p. 16). Peters opposes to 
positing ends that allegedly are external to education, like self-realization. 
The concept of self-realization, in his view, can be clarified only by reference 
to the worthwhile activities that constitute education (1959, pp. 94-95). 
Value is to be found in the educational activities themselves. 
Hence, Peters criticizes the use in education of conceptions of aims in 
terms of premeditated ends to be attained via means (1959, pp. 85-87). A 
means-ends conception is apposite in cases where people are aiming at 
something concrete, which can be attained in a clearly defined way, but it is 
not correctly applied to education. In education what is valuable is not 
defined by precise ends; rather, value resides in the activities that constitute 
education. 
How, then, should all discourse about aims be explained? In Peters' 
work we find various answers to this question. First, requests for aims are 
often requests to specify the norms inherent in education. Second, discourse 
about aims concerns the question which aspects of these norms should be 
emphasized at what time (1973a, p. 20). Furthermore, discussions about 
aims can also refer to the principles of procedure education should adopt — 
for example, the use of authority, teaching by example and rational 
explanation, awakening the child's interest (1959, pp. 87, 94-95; 1973a, pp. 
22-23) — as well as to valuations of content — for instance, the merits of the 
arts as distinct from those of science (1959, p. 95). 
Clearly, Peters' and Brezinka's views of the role of aims in education are 
radically different. These views result from their divergent conceptions of 
education. Peters adheres to an evaluative concept of education based on the 
idea of the educated man: education has norms (though indeterminate ones) 
built into it, which generate the aims which educators strive to develop 
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(1973a, p. 17). Education does not pick out particular activities or processes 
but lays down criteria to which a family of activities such as instructing, 
teaching, and training must conform (1966, pp. 24-25,40; 1973a, p. 17). 
Whereas Peters thinks that an encompassing definition cannot be given, 
Brezinka comes up with the following one: "By education is understood 
actions through which people attempt to improve one or more persons' 
psychic dispositional structures in some respect, preserve the components 
viewed as valuable or prevent the development of dispositions judged to be 
bad" (1994, p. 96). Brezinka's concept of education is instrumental: edu-
cation is a means to the end of furthering desirable dispositions of human 
beings. Whereas Peters holds that education picks out criteria for activities, 
according to Brezinka education is constituted by these very activities. 
It is not the purpose of this article to elaborate the differences between 
Brezinka's and Peters' views of aims in education. I will focus here on two 
major issues that can be related to the work of leading philosophers of music 
education. These issues concern the distinction between internal and exter-
nal views of aims and the distinction between empirical and logical aspects 
of aims. 
4.2 Internal and external aims of music education 
One of the most salient differences between Brezinka's and Peters' con-
ception of aims concerns the relation between aims and educational activi-
ties. In Brezinka's view, aims are external to educational processes; edu-
cation is not an end in itself but a means to improving the psychic dis-
positions of human beings. Peters, on the other hand, holds that education 
has no external aims. Education involves the initiation of others into worth-
while activities (1966, p. 144). Although he is aware that the term worthwhile 
is often used to raise questions of extrinsic value (1973b, p. 247), Peters takes 
worthwhile activities to mean intrinsically valuable activities. Becoming 
initiated into activities like science, mathematics, history, and art is, in his 
view, an end in itself. The educational processes through which people are 
being initiated have, therefore, no external goals; instead, the aims of 
education are internal to it. How should the aims of music education be 
viewed in this context? Are the aims of music education to be seen as pri-
marily internal or external? In other words, is becoming a musically edu-
cated person to be viewed as an end in itself or as serving some further end? 
The way music education theorists generally formulate aims seems to be 
most in accordance with Peters' position; primary aims of music education 
are usually stated in terms of enhancing musical competence: perceptivity, 
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sensitivity, performance skills, musicianship, et cetera. The aims of music 
education, then, appear to be primarily internal to it. However, if we look at 
the philosophies of Bennett Reimer and David Elliott, we see that neither 
author takes such a straightforward view. At first glance, the position 
Reimer takes completely fits in with Peters' conception of aims. According 
to Reimer (1989), the overall aim of music education is to develop, to the 
fullest extent possible, every student's capacity to experience and create 
what he calls intrinsically expressive qualities of sounds. An alternative way 
of stating this is that music education should help students to develop their 
aesthetic sensitivity (pp. 153, 185). Reimer sees musical experience as a 
subspecies of aesthetic experience and its value as deriving from this aes­
thetic nature. He refers to this value as intrinsicality. The value of aesthetic 
experience derives from its own self-sufficient nature. Instead of being a 
means toward some non-aesthetic experience or serving some utilitarian 
purpose, it is experience for the sake of the experience in and of itself. It is 
free from practical concerns and is to be enjoyed for itself (1989, p. 103). 
Elliott (1995) opposes to this view, holding that engaging in music does 
serve a practical purpose: achieving self-growth, self-understanding, and 
enjoyment (p. 124). In Elliott's view we can achieve the values of self-
growth, self-understanding, and enjoyment by engaging in musical practices 
that offer progressive cognitive challenges. Rather than as aesthetic ex­
perience, Elliott sees music as the activity of knowing-in-action and under-
standing-in-action. He relates this viewpoint to Csikszentmihalyi's theory of 
self-growth and optimal experience. According to Csikszentmihalyi, human 
beings have a fundamental drive to order and strengthen the self, to gain 
self-knowledge. How can this be attained? By taking up challenges that 
match and extend our powers of consciousness. When we deal successfully 
with cognitive challenges, information we receive from outside is congruent 
with our self-goals and this leads to an experience of intense enjoyment. 
Csikszentmihalyi calls such experience optimal experience от flow (Elliott, 
1995, pp. 113-114). According to Elliott, music is a unique and major way of 
achieving the values of self-growth, self-understanding, and the concomitant 
values of optimal experience (enjoyment) and self-esteem. Dynamic musical 
practices offer us the two necessary conditions for achieving continuous self-
growth: multidimensional musical challenges of increasing complexity and 
the possibility of increasing levels of musicianship required to meet these 
challenges (1995, p. 121). Accordingly, Elliott defines the aims of music 
education as follows: 
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The aims of music education, and the primary goals of every music teaching-
learning situation, are to enable students to achieve self-growth, self-knowl-
edge, and musical enjoyment by educating their musicianship in balanced 
relation to musical challenges within selected musical practices. It follows 
from this that musicianship is also a unique and major source of self-esteem, 
(p. 129) 
At this place I do not intend to evaluate Reimer's and Elliott's (seemingly) 
opposed views of the nature and the particular values of music. My purpose 
here is to assess the notions of aims put forward by Elliott and Reimer. From 
Elliott's definition it would seem that music is not an end in itself. The aims 
he has in mind surpass musical experience: self-growth, self-knowledge, 
ordering consciousness. Indeed, according to Elliott, these values can be 
attained not only by engaging in music but also by pursuing a large class of 
other activities. For Elliott, music education appears to have an external 
rather than an internal aim: rather than self-sufficient activities, music 
making and listening are practical activities for the purpose of self-enhance-
ment. 
However, Elliott does not consistently hold to this line. Actually, he 
wavers between an internal and an external perspective: "In this praxial 
view, music making is inherently valuable. Performing, improvising, 
composing, arranging, conducting — all are worth doing for the doing itself, 
meaning 'for the sake of the self'" (1995, p. 121). 
Elliott suggests that formulations like "doing something for its own 
sake" or "doing something for the doing itself" are equivalent to "doing 
something for the sake of self". But this will not do. If one takes the internal 
perspective — doing something for its own sake —, the value of music is 
assessed in terms of the specific richness of musical activities. If, however, 
one takes the external view — music for the sake of self — music's value is 
assessed in terms of its contribution to some independent goal, that is, some-
thing that has not necessarily to do with music itself: self-growth, self-
understanding, self-esteem. By simply equating internal and external 
perspectives Elliott offers us a hybrid view of musical aims, leaving unex-
plained how the two perspectives are related. 
Another point is that, because Elliott adheres to an internal view, his 
position is much closer to Reimer's than he wants to admit. What is the 
difference between saying that engaging in music is a self-sufficient expe-
rience and saying that we do musical activities for their own sake? Elliott's 
attack on Reimer's view of the intrinsic nature of musical value boils down 
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to an unfriendly interpretation of Reimer's statement that aesthetic expe-
rience serves no practical purpose. 
Moreover, not only do Reimer and Elliott agree on the view that we 
engage in music for its own sake, but they also concur in that they both 
combine such an internal view of musical aims with an external one. For on 
closer reading of Reimer's philosophy it turns out that he does not consis-
tently adhere to the view that musical experience is self-sufficient either. He 
also appeals to a broader interest he takes music to serve — self-under-
standing: "Because experiences of art yield insights into human subjectivity 
the arts may be conceived as a means [italics added] of self-understanding, a 
way by which our sense of our human nature can be explored and clarified 
and grasped" (1989, p. 53). 
We see then that, in contrast to Brezinka's and Peters' relatively clear 
views of the nature of aims in education, the pictures presented by two 
leading philosophers of music education are less univocal. Although Reimer 
and Elliott share Peters' view that music is a worthwhile activity per se, the 
view they take on aims is only partly in keeping with Peters. On the one 
hand, they define aims that are internal to music education. For Reimer, the 
aim of music education is to develop students' capacity to experience music 
aesthetically; for Elliott, it is the development of musicianship. On the other 
hand, they both hold that music education is a major way or means of 
attaining values that go beyond music as such: self-understanding, insight 
into human subjectivity (Reimer); self-growth, self-knowledge (Elliott). 
Neither Reimer, nor Elliott undertakes to relate the internal and the 
external perspectives they take on the aims of music education. It seems, in 
fact, that they do not appreciate that they are taking two qualitatively 
different views on the issue. Nevertheless, there are important questions to 
be asked here. How do the internal and external perspectives of aims 
presented by Elliott and Reimer cohere? Does the difference between the 
two perspectives derive from two ways of describing the same value of 
musical activities, or do they appeal to different values of these? Can the 
hitherto unanalyzed notions of self-growth, self-knowledge, self-under-
standing really be specified independently of specific activities (like musical 
activities) or are such general aims but "high-sounding ways of talking 
about doing some things rather than others and doing them in a certain 
manner" (1959, p. 86)? Aren't external aims like enjoyment, self-growth, and 
self-understanding in fact hypostatized features of musical activities? If 
philosophy of education is really to be a foundational discipline, such 
questions about aims cannot remain unaddressed. 
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4.3 Conceptual and empirical questions 
Besides in their external and internal perspectives of educational aims, the 
theories of Brezinka and Peters also differ in focusing on two different types 
of questions. Brezinka focuses on means-ends relations. These are questions 
of empirical fact. The envisaged means-ends relations are causal connections 
that can in principle be investigated by empirical research. This kind of 
research is very important, because its outcomes can provide a stronger 
basis for designing music curricula. How can the goals of music education 
be furthered most effectively? Up to now, this question is largely left to the 
intuition of music educators. 
Peters frames the issue of aims in education as a conceptual, rather than 
an empirical one. For him, conceptual questions concern the meaning of the 
pivotal terms in the discussion. Major questions in the context of aims are: 
What is it we are talking about, when raising the issue of aims in (music) 
education? What do such aims consist in? How are the various components 
of aims related? Conceptual questions about aims are the domain of philoso-
phers of education. Peters starts from the question: what do we say, when 
we call someone an educated person? In the case of music we could ask: which 
criteria should be met if we are to say that someone has received a good mu-
sic education? 
In educational practice empirical and conceptual questions are inter-
twined. However, when thinking systematically about aims in music edu-
cation we should distinguish them carefully; otherwise, our understanding 
of aims issues is likely to be hampered. An example of how empirical and 
conceptual questions can easily be run together is the survey of "musical 
behaviors" presented by Bennett Reimer (1989, p. 167). Discussing the ob-
jectives of the general music program, Reimer offers the following schema of 
the relations among seven basic musical behaviors:3 
Ends behaviors: Perceiving Reacting [Experiencing] 
Means behaviors: Creating Conceptualizing Analyzing Evaluating 
Outcome behavior Valuing 
Clearly, Reimer adopts the means-ends framework here. In his view the 
"end or goal or point" of interacting with music is to experience it aestheti-
cally, the two components of aesthetic experience being perceiving and 
reacting aesthetically (1989, p. 168). Four other musical behaviors — creat-
ing, conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating — are referred to as means. 
These behaviors should be pursued in order to further musical experience. 
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Thus, the four behaviors on the second line are means to the end of musical 
experience. Finally, there is the behavior of valuing, which is seen as the 
desired outcome of engaging in musical activities. 
Though this survey may appear to yield a plausible and univocal picture 
at first sight, on closer examination it turns out to be ambiguous and mis-
leading. It is ambiguous in that it deals at once with conceptual and em-
pirical aspects of aims, and it is misleading in suggesting that various as-
pects of musical activities can straightforwardly be forced into categories 
like ends, means, or outcomes. 
To begin with, Reimer's schema does not offer a convincing picture of 
the status of the three main ways of dealing with music — listening, per-
forming, and composing. Listening is entirely missing in the schema and 
Reimer does not make clear how it would fit into his classification. On the 
one hand, he suggests that listening can be equated with perceiving: "It 
should go without saying that the primary objective of music should be to 
improve every student's capacity for musical listening, that is [italics added], 
their capacity to perceive all the ways sounds become expressive in contexts 
that encourage feelingful reactions to what is being perceived" (1989, p. 168). 
On the other hand, he suggests that listening is a means to aesthetic ex-
perience when he says that "[t]here are four basic means for achieving 
heightened aesthetic experiences of music in addition to listening to it" (p. 
169). 
Now, to conceptualize listening as a means for perceiving and respond-
ing aesthetically to music raises logical problems. Listening can, according to 
Reimer, only be called truly musical listening if we perceive and react 
aesthetically. In other words, the notions of aesthetic perception and 
aesthetic reaction — that is, the notion of aesthetic experience — are implied 
in the concept of listening to music. But this being the case, perceiving and 
reacting cannot be ends to which listening is a means. Instead, perceiving 
and reacting are at the heart of listening to music musically. 
Reimer's view of the role of performing and composing, which he sub-
sumes in his schema under the term creating can be criticized along the same 
lines. Since the notions of perceiving and reacting aesthetically are incor-
porated in these activities, performing and composing are not correctly seen 
as means to perceiving and reacting. Creating is not a means to perceiving 
and reacting; it means perceiving and reacting. 
These confusions arise from the fact that conceptual relations are pre-
sented as empirical ones. As becomes clear from the rest of his book, Reimer 
intends to argue that aesthetic perception and aesthetic reaction are the core 
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of musical experience. This may be agreed, but from this it does not follow 
that creating and listening can be reduced to "means behaviors". 
The means-ends connection is to be found elsewhere: between musical 
experience and enhanced musical experience. The point Reimer intends to 
make seems to be that we learn music by doing. If we want to enhance our 
musical perception and reaction we should engage in these very activities. 
Creating and listening involve perceiving and reacting to music. We can 
thus analyze the envisaged connections as follows: (1) engaging in creating 
or listening means engaging in perceiving and reacting aesthetically; (2) 
careful and attentive perceiving and reacting effects heightened capacities of 
perceiving and reacting; (3) this in turn may effect enhanced musico-aesthetic 
experience, (4) which means enhanced listening or creating. Note that this 
schema contains conceptual connections (1 and 4) as well as empirical ones 
(2 and 3). There are various ways of formulating this insight more suc-
cinctly: careful aesthetic perception and reaction may lead to enhanced 
musical experience; creating and listening lead to enhanced creating and 
listening; creating and listening lead to enhanced perception and reaction; 
and so on. In the last formulation the conceptual connection between 
perceiving/reacting and creating/listening has become obscured. Reimer 
takes this formulation two steps further. First, by saying that creating is a 
means to enhanced perception. Second, by categorizing creating as a means 
behavior and perceiving and reacting as ends behaviors. It is this last step 
that creates a misleading picture. It is now suggested that these activities 
belong to either the category of means or the category of ends. What has got 
out of sight is that the relationship between creating (and listening) on the 
one hand and perceiving and reacting on the other hand is a conceptual one 
of inclusion, rather than an empirical one of means and ends. Perceiving and 
reacting are included in the notions of creating and listening (connections 1 
and 4). A second insight that has got lost is that the actual means-ends 
connection concerns levels of musical engagement, rather than aspects of 
musical engagement; by seriously involving themselves in musical activities 
educands enhance their musical capacities (connection 2) so that they can 
experience music at a higher level (connection 3). 
Apart from means and ends behaviors Reimer defines the category of 
"outcome behavior", to which valuing belongs. This suggests that valuing is 
of a still different category. To what extent is this correct? To answer this 
question let us look at the relations between valuing and other musical 
behaviors. 
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First, note that valuing can both refer (1) to all valuations (whether 
positive or negative) and (2) to only the positive ones. Reimer uses the term 
in its restrictive meaning: the desired outcome of music education is that 
people come to hold music in positive esteem. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that Reimer makes a distinction between valuing and evaluating. 
While evaluating is a verbal behavior — the making of judgments about the 
quality of musical works and their performance (1989, p. 170) — valuing 
apparently refers to tacitly appreciating music. 
How are valuing and aesthetic experience related? Is there an empirical 
or a logical connection? We can only answer this question, if we further look 
at the notion of aesthetic experience. For this notion can also be used both in 
a neutral and in an exclusively positive sense. In a neutral sense aesthetic 
experience is the experience we have when we sensitively attend to the 
sensuous and structural properties of an art work. If we understand aes-
thetic experience in this way, the relationship between aesthetic experience 
and valuing (in its restrictive, positive sense) is contingent. We may be dis-
appointed as well as delighted, when concentratedly perceiving and react-
ing to a musical work. There is no guarantee that we will like a piece we 
attend to sensitively: the work may just be too bleak or it may not accord to 
our taste. So, whether students value the aesthetic experiences (in the neu-
tral sense) they have, is an empirical question. 
However, if aesthetic experience is taken in its positive sense, it logically 
entails valuing. In this view for an experience to be called aesthetic it is not 
sufficient that we perceive and react to the sensuous and structural qualities 
of an art work. Only if our response has some positive quality — for 
instance, enjoyment, "shared expressiveness" or "experience of the vitality 
of life" (Reimer, 1989, pp. 86,102), "felt freedom" or a feeling of "wholeness" 
(Beardsley, 1982, pp. 288-289) — an experience can truly be called aesthetic. 
This means that only a subset of our experiences with music qualifies as 
being aesthetic. 
Reimer does not make the distinction between the neutral and the evalu-
ative uses, when explaining the notion of aesthetic experience. But for the 
most part he adheres to the evaluative notion. He claims, for example, that 
aesthetic experience is intrinsically valuable; it can be enjoyed for itself 
(1989, p. 103). Furthermore, in his view, experiencing aesthetically is the 
delight of experiencing more fully the potentials of human subjectivity (p. 
115). Given the logical connection between Reimer's (evaluative) use of 
aesthetic experience and valuing, it is surprising that Reimer sets valuing 
apart from other musical behaviors: 
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Teachers cannot require that their students value music as a whole, or this or 
that kind or type or style of music, or this or that musical activity. What 
people choose to value is their own business. Our obligation as music 
educators is not to require or even expect that everyone will value music, or 
value the music we value, or value the kinds of involvements with music we 
think they should value.... We are not directly responsible for peoples' valu-
ing of music. We are directly responsible for representing music authentically 
and teaching it systematically, which means fulfilling our objectives of 
developing the musical behaviors enumerated earlier. (1989, p. 171) 
In Reimer's description valuing appears to be a relatively distant target first 
the other behaviors should be taken care of, and if these are met, the student 
may in the end come to value music intrinsically. On the basis of his aes-
thetic experiences he chooses to value music or not to do so. This view is one-
sided in that it neglects the role valuing plays within the musical activities 
themselves. Valuing is not to be separated from the continuous practice of 
engaging in music. It constitutes an indispensable component of fruitful 
musical practices. It grows directly and continuously in relation to satisfying 
musical experiences. Every musical activity we enjoy contributes to our 
enhanced appreciation of music. And the sum of our positive experiences 
determines how highly we rank certain types of music. 
If we take this perspective, valuing is a direct concern for the teacher. It is 
a fundamental presupposition of music education that every child is in 
principle able to enjoy — and thus to more or less positively value — 
musical experiences and that her valuing can grow. It is hard to see how 
music education could be justified, if it does not to some extent lead to chil-
dren's valuing music. Moreover, it may be questioned whether without 
valuing musical learning can subsist. If, then, a teacher does not manage to 
organize musical experiences which his pupils find valuable, something 
seems to be fundamentally wrong and the question becomes urgent whether 
he practises his profession appropriately. 
In my view, Reimer's classification of four of the seven basic behaviors in 
music — creating, perceiving aesthetically, reacting aesthetically, and valu-
ing — yields a distorted picture of how they cohere. Rather than having a 
different status as means behaviors, ends behaviors, or outcome behaviors, 
they are all aspects of one and the same practice: satisfying engagement in 
musical activities. These activities can in the first place be seen as ends in 
themselves. And so their various aspects can. Creating music or listening to 
music can be said to be an end as much as aesthetic experience or valuing 
can. On the other hand, musical engagement can also be seen as a means: as 
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a means, that is, to a still higher level of musical engagement. Thus, we can 
see not only creating but also aesthetic perception and reaction as means to 
enhanced musical experience; perceiving and reacting aesthetically to com-
plex musical works can lead to an enhanced capacity to have even deeper 
aesthetic experiences. Valuing can also be conceived of as a means, namely, 
as an incentive to ongoing musical experience. 
So we see that thinking about aims is not solely a question of setting off 
means behaviors from ends behaviors (or outcome behaviors). Apart from 
establishing empirical relations, thinking about aims is largely a question of 
elucidating the content of education. This is what we do if we try to establish 
the relationship between creating, listening, perceiving, reacting, and valu-
ing. Creating and listening entail perceiving and reacting. And aesthetic 
experience, in the evaluative sense used by Reimer, in its turn implies valu-
ing. 
4.4 Conceptualizing and music 
Up to now, we have considered only four of Reimer's basic behaviors. I took 
them together, because they constitute various aspects of direct engagement 
in musical works, which are connected to each other by relations of logical 
implication. We now come to the three remaining behaviors: conceptuali-
zing, analyzing, and evaluating. 
These three behaviors are fundamentally different in that they are forms 
of discourse about music. They can proceed independently from direct 
musical experience through singing, performing, listening, or composing. As 
forms of discourse, conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating do not 
constitute a part of direct musical engagement. Because of this different 
status, the question whether these three behaviors are means behaviors in 
relation to the end behavior of aesthetic experience (perceiving and reacting) 
makes more sense than the question whether creating is a means to aesthetic 
experience. 
Indeed, Reimer's view that conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating 
can lead to heightened musical experience belongs, I think, to the common 
sense views of music educators. These activities enhance our understanding 
of the various parameters involved in music, of how sound forms are 
organized, and of what characteristics contribute to the quality of the work. 
And these insights are believed to lead to enhanced experience and valuing 
of musical works. But how? In what follows I will argue that philosophy of 
music education has failed so far to explain the connection between 
conceptualizing and the furthering of musical experience. I will concentrate 
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on the encompassing notion of conceptualizing, instead of dealing separate-
ly with analyzing and evaluating, which — as Reimer remarks — are specif-
ic modes of conceptualizing. 
First, however, I want to make two caveats in relation to the view that 
conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating are means behaviors. My first 
point is that, even if we can show that these behaviors lead to enhanced mu-
sical experience, calling them this way is too exclusive. There are no behav-
iors that can invariantly be called means. Whether an activity is a means, an 
intermediary end, or an end in itself depends on the context. In particular, it 
would be a mistake to view the various kinds of conceptualizing with 
respect to music invariantly as means. There is no doubt that musical dis-
course can be valued as an activity of its own. The fact that numerous people 
take interest in music theory, music history, aesthetics, the psychology of 
music, and ethnomusicology testifies this. To be sure, I agree with the main 
stream view that in general music education our efforts should be primarily 
directed at enhancing direct musical experience. It should be avoided that 
learning music gets the character of a theoretical study. But few would deny 
that educands, especially those at higher levels, should acquire some broad 
understanding of music. An important aim of education is that the pupils 
develop a view of important phenomena in human life. Music being one of 
these, an educated person should be able to engage in serious reflection 
upon and discourse about music, both as a phenomenon of its own and in 
relation to the other arts, society, and human existence as a whole. The 
activity of conceptualizing can be an intellectual pleasure of its own which is 
often of greater value than the insights that result from it. It should be the 
concern of the music teacher to maximize the possibility of his pupils' 
coming to share this pleasure. 
My second remark is that in spite of the wide agreement among music 
educators that conceptualizing is a major means for enhancing musical 
experience, this view is not as uncontroversial as it might seem. We are 
dealing here with an empirical claim which, as so many empirical claims in 
the field, has not been strongly supported by scientific research. Indeed, a 
number of studies Nicholas Cook discusses in his Music, Imagination and 
Culture apparently indicate a negative effect of teaching conceptual abilities 
(Cook, 1990, pp. 173-178). For instance, Steele found that instructional 
activities leading to significant improvement in factual knowledge and 
stylistic identification skills did not yield any attitudinal gains. Similarly, an 
experiment carried out by Flowers showed that students who had been 
taught a basic musical vocabulary of forty-four technical terms did not show 
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greater powers of observation after instruction than before it. However, the 
significance of the outcomes of such experiments can be questioned. In a 
review of Cook's book Kivy (1992) raises serious doubts about the quality of 
the instruction the students received in these experiments. He points out 
that teaching and instruction are normative concepts; when talking about 
teaching music, we mean teaching music at a certain level of excellence. 
According to Kivy, the experiments only measure the effects of "pedantic, 
artificially contrived, unimaginative, spiritless instruction". 
An even more fundamental problem of the research is that these experi-
menters do not seem to have a clear conception of how conceptualizing 
could possibly lead to enhanced musical experience. They simply measure 
the correlation between the possession of a certain body of conceptual 
knowledge or certain cognitive skills and something that is seen as indica-
tive of the quality of someone's musical experience — for example, percep-
tivity or attitude. What is lacking is an understanding of how conceptual-
izing and musical experience might be related. 
However, the same observation applies to philosophy of music educa-
tion. Here, the opposite claims are made about the relevance of conceptu-
alizing to musical experience. In fact, up to now the discipline has done little 
to clarify the relations between the two. Worse still, the way the most promi-
nent author in the field contrasts aesthetic experience with conceptualizing 
is more likely to impede our understanding of these relations than to further 
it. 
Reimer (1989, pp. 80 ff.) emphasizes the fundamental differences between 
"aesthetic perceptual structuring" and conceptualization. Conceptualization 
deals with the general and abstract. A concept, in the view he adopts, is a 
triadic relation between a commonality, a sign, and a stable response. In the 
first place, there is a common feature of a range of events. Concepts always 
apply to something that is manifested more than once, for example fruit, 
round, edible. A singular instance of something cannot be a concept. Partic-
ular things or particular persons (e.g., Ludwig van Beethoven) are not con-
cepts, Reimer says. Second, this common feature is denoted by a sign (alter-
native terms Reimer uses are symbol, signal, marker, and counter). A sign is a 
vehicle for calling attention to the commonality at hand; signs are names 
given to a certain type of phenomenon. Third, the common feature and the 
sign vehicle are wedded to each other by a stable use of the latter to indicate 
the former (p. 81). 
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Aesthetic perceptual structuring, the mode of cognition that, according 
to Reimer, is most prominent in the arts, is of a completely different nature. 
It does not employ sign vehicles, and it deals with the particular, the con-
crete, rather than with the general and abstract. In experiencing an art work 
we grasp its particular structure immediately, without the use of intervening 
symbols (p. 82). 
An important difference between conceptualization and aesthetic percep-
tual structuring is, according to Reimer, captured by the distinction between 
discursive and presentational forms. Language, the most prominent form of 
conceptualization, consists of "strung-out" symbols: meaning accumulates 
as words are combined to sentences and sentences in turn to arguments. 
This feature is called discursiveness. In art, on the contrary, meaning does 
not derive from the addition of discrete, abstract bits of information. Rather, 
it is grasped immediately and totally in the experience of the expressive 
form. Reimer uses the term presentational form to designate this all-at-once 
quality of art. 
In total, Reimer discusses eight points on which conceptualization and 
aesthetic perceptual structuring differ fundamentally. But if, as Reimer sees 
it, the domains of discourse (conceptualization) and musico-aesthetic expe-
rience (aesthetic perceptual structuring) are two opposed modes of cog-
nition, how can conceptualizing ever be useful to musical experience? How 
can what deals with the abstract and the general become relevant for the 
concrete and the particular? How can discourse about music become 
relevant to what must be apprehended immediately in conceptless musical 
experience? 
Reimer's strategy of radically separating the domains of aesthetic percep-
tual structuring and conceptualization is not conducive to our understand-
ing how the latter can lead to enhancing aesthetic experience. It cannot be 
my purpose here to work out a theory of the role of concepts in music, but I 
will make a few points which lead to a different view of how concepts are 
involved in musico-aesthetic experience.4 
A first point is that, in contrast to what Reimer suggests, we do employ 
concepts when experiencing music. For Peter Kivy (1990) there is no ques-
tion about this: "when someone is enjoying music, he or she is...enjoying 
some sonic quality of a piece of music perceived under a certain description 
as doing something the listener enjoys, as doing something beautifully" 
(p. 78). He gives the example of polyphonic music: 
One of the pleasures we take in such imitative contrapuntal music as the 
ricercar and the fugue lies in the search: in the seeking and finding. But, 
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needless to say, in order to seek and to find, the music must be an object of 
cognition for me. I must understand it under the description 'fugue'; I must 
know what the 'theme' is; I must be able to 'perceive that' the theme has 
appeared; and 'perceiving that' is a kind of 'knowing' (or 'believing') that. (p. 
73) 
Kivy's position is radically opposed to Reimer's; whereas in Reimer's 
view musical experience is to be characterized as conceptless aesthetic 
perceptual structuring, according to Kivy, we can understand and appre-
ciate music only to the extent that we subsume it under concepts. Now, even 
though Kivy's position is contestable, his argument makes us aware that 
when listening to music, we do indeed make use of concepts. Of course, we 
do not normally describe the music to ourselves self-consciously — this is 
not the point Kivy intends to make. But we do notice that a theme is 
presented repeatedly, that there is imitation between the parts, that the 
theme is being varied in the middle section, that the pace slows down at the 
end, and so on. And thus we use the concepts of a theme, imitation, a part, 
variation, a middle section, an end, slowing down, et cetera. 
A second point is that concepts are involved in the musical experience of 
any listener, the laymen as well as the expert. It is a misunderstanding to 
believe that in order to employ concepts in music one must have knowledge 
of the terms that are used in music theory. Theories of music education that 
emphasize learning concepts sometimes suggest that pupils can come to 
understand music only if they learn to apply the terms of music theory. 
Wrongly so. For, as Kivy and also Davies (1994, chap. 6) convincingly argue, 
people who have no knowledge of music theory can have a good under-
standing of many aspects of a composition. If asked to give a description of 
the music, they will find this a hard job. Nevertheless, with a enough 
patience and a little help most of them will be able to describe relevant 
aspects of the work. Of course, their descriptions will not exhibit musico-
logical terms. But they have alternative terms for naming relevant concepts. 
For instance, they will use expressions like tune instead of theme, getting 
louder instead of crescendo, jerky movement instead of punctuated rhythm, or 
hasty succession of entries of the melody instead oí fugato.5 The ordinary lan-
guage terms they use testify that they do have concepts enabling them to 
understand the work in many of its aspects. 
Although Kivy's view is valuable because of its illuminating the role 
concepts can play in musical experience, it is extreme. In order to see this, 
we need to make a twofold distinction: (1) between cognition depending on 
verbal concepts and cognition depending on nonverbal concepts; (2) be-
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tween cognitive representations depending on concepts (whether verbal or 
nonverbal) and cognitive representations that do not involve the exercise of 
a conceptual faculty at all. By implying that to cognize something means to 
understand it under a particular description, Kivy suggests that all musical 
cognition depends on verbal concepts. Thus, his position can be contested 
for two reasons: for neglecting the important role nonverbal concepts play in 
musical cognition (see my third point below) and for excluding from the 
outset any musical cognition that is nonconceptual. 
To begin with the latter point, in his Music and Conceptualization Mark 
DeBellis argues that we can mentally represent aspects of music — like ab-
solute pitch locations, specific intervals, specific chords — without using any 
concepts (DeBellis, 1995, chap. 3). For instance, the average listener repre-
sents instances of the pitch f1 in the same way every time they occur but this 
does not entail that these are unified under a single concept. That this is not 
the case is testified by the fact the listener cannot reliably distinguish 
instances of f1 from non-instances; he has no capacity for selective uniform 
action toward all (and only) instances of f1. DeBellis suspects that many 
kinds of mental representations of music are nonconceptual (1995, p. 66). 
Whether DeBellis' arguments hold, is a matter for discussion. But anyhow it 
is important to take into consideration the possibility that besides conceptual 
musical cognitions there may also be nonconceptual ones. 
A third point that needs to be made now is that concepts can be non-
verbal as well as verbal. As Hospers (1967, pp. 108-110) points out, in order 
to have a concept it is not necessary to be acquainted with a word (or some 
other kind of sign). A person may have something in mind for which he has 
as yet no word or for which there is as yet no word in the language. 
According to Hospers, having a concept of X is testified by someone's ability 
to distinguish X's from Y's and Z's. Having a concept of X can then be 
understood as having some criterion-in-mind, that is, a particular mental 
content which allows us to distinguish X's from non-X's. 
Other, more psychologically oriented definitions of concepts have been 
given by DeBellis and Elliott. DeBellis (1995), like Hospers, indicates that 
concepts enable us to pick out particular phenomena: "concepts are general 
abilities to entertain a given mode of presentation and to recognize and 
reidentify things under the latter" (p. 65). Elliott emphatically points out that 
the view that concepts are necessarily linked with words or other kinds of 
signs has been superseded by a much wider notion of the concept. He 
presents a definition underlining that concepts may operate in the context of 
concrete action as well as in abstract thought: "a concept is a cognitive unit 
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that can be manipulated as though it were a mental object, or embodied in 
action" (1991a, p. 56). 
These non-semiotic definitions of concepts allow us to further remove 
the ostensible barrier between musical experience and concepts. Concepts 
do not exclusively belong to the domain of language but also figure in 
wordless action, in imagery, or in other forms of nonverbal representation. 
An example of a nonverbal concept in music is the concept we can have of a 
specific quality of sound. Listening to Elgar's Enigma Variations, we may 
notice at a certain moment that the strings combined with the wood winds 
make up for a particular sound we also find in the orchestral works of 
Brahms. In this case it turns out that I have a nonverbal concept of a par-
ticular sound quality. I have never given a name to this sound quality, but 
nevertheless I am able to recognize it in the works of Brahms, Elgar, as well 
as in the works of other contemporaneous composers. 
Music is an outstanding example of a domain where such nonverbal con-
cepts figure prominently. When listening to a piece of music, we form con-
cepts of numerous aspects of the work: for instance, of various individual 
themes, pregnant rhythms, prominent harmonic sequences, special sound 
effects. After we have attended a couple of times to these themes, rhythms, 
et cetera, a capacity to recognize them, that is, a concept, has emerged. We 
may give a name to these concepts but we need not, and mostly we don't. 
This leads us to the fourth and last point: we can have concepts of the 
most singular and concrete things. Reimer holds that concepts have to do 
with the abstract rather than with the concrete and with the general rather 
than the particular. However these oppositions between the general and the 
particular, between the abstract and the concrete, are misleading. Concepts 
can be formed of entirely individual phenomena (like a particular theme or a 
wonderful modulation), of unique exemplars (e.g., the concept of God), even 
of something that does not exist at all (e.g., the unicorn). But once we have 
formed such a concept, it becomes a type, even if the class to which it 
applies counts only one instance, or no instance at all. Therefore, even if a 
concept itself is abstract and general, it can bear on things of the greatest 
concreteness and particularity. 
We may now acknowledge that musical experience is conceptual 
through and through. When attending to music, people employ general con-
cepts like melody, rhythm, harmony, timbre, motif, dissonance, and 
crescendo, whether or not they know them by terms from music theory. 
They also employ more specific concepts like song theme, strophic form, 
punctuated rhythm, cadence. Even more particularly, when engaging in an 
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individual musical work, they form (mostly nonverbal) concepts of partic-
ular themes, rhythms, chord progressions, timbre combinations, and tex-
tures that feature in it. In following how the work develops, they use the 
concepts of variation, repetition, balance, and contrast. Furthermore, they 
relate what they hear to the concepts they have formed of various types of 
form, particular styles, traditions, and standards of performance. 
This does not mean that music is just another form of thinking in con-
cepts. In fact, I agree with Reimer that what is central to music is the ex-
perience of the uniqueness of musical forms, of the particular constellations 
of sensuous and structural properties. However, before we can appreciate a 
work in its uniqueness, we should get a grasp on the work. And we can get 
a grasp on the work only, it seems, by subsuming its various aspects under 
the musical concepts we have. 
I have tried to demonstrate that the gap between conceptualizing and musi-
cal experience is not so large as Reimer suggests. However, this is only a 
small step forward on the way to clarifying the logical and empirical rela-
tions between conceptualizing and musical experience. Returning to this 
issue, we can conclude two things. First, though the relationship between 
conceptualizing as a form of discourse and musico-aesthetic experience may 
be conceived as one of means and end, there is also a form of conceptua-
lizing that is an intrinsic part of musical experience itself. If we understand 
conceptualizing as the employment of concepts, there can be no doubt that 
this takes place abo in direct musical engagement — albeit in a predomi-
nantly nondiscursive form. 
This point can been illustrated by the distinction Swanwick (1994) makes 
between two types of analysis: 
Primary or intrinsic analysis exists as an essential element of musical com-
prehension, a symbol-making and symbol-sharing activity involving the pro-
cesses of selection, interpretation and reconstitution of intuitive data. Secon-
dary or extrinsic analysis consists of reflective discourse about particular 
music — the more usually understood definition.... Primary analysis is word-
lessly implicit in all musical experience; secondary analysis involves extra-
musical ways of pointing to these insights, (p. 43) 
Swanwick's specific formulation may be questioned in several respects: In 
what sense can music be viewed as a "symbol making and symbol-sharing 
activity"? Can the analytic activity that belongs to musical experience be 
said to be entirely wordless? Is discursive analysis merely a matter of point-
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ing to what is already known through direct experience? Nevertheless, his 
distinction between these two modes of conceptualizing is illuminating. We 
can generalize the distinction between primary and secondary analysis into 
primary and secondary conceptualization: primary conceptualization refers to 
conceptualizing (including primary analysis) taking place in our direct en-
gagement in music; secondary conceptualization occurs in discourse about 
music. 
The second conclusion is that a considerable amount of conceptual anal-
ysis remains to be done before we can make hypotheses about the precise 
nature of the empirical relation between conceptualizing — in the sense of 
secondary conceptualization — and musical experience. First, we should 
have a clear view of what concepts are and the role they play or can play in 
musical experience. Second, we should analyze the relationship between 
secondary conceptualization and primary conceptualization. Third, we 
should investigate how secondary conceptualization can become relevant to 
primary conceptualization and how this might result in enhanced musical 
experience. 
In this way we can arrive at a clearer view of how the means-ends con-
nection between conceptualizing and enhanced musical experience might be 
envisaged. Only then meaningful empirical research becomes possible, 
showing which of the hypothesized connections hold true. A next step 
would be to investigate in which form and under which conditions the 
means serve best their ends. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In the preceding sections I have discussed two major issues with respect to 
the conceptualization of aims in music education. First, I investigated inter-
nal and external conceptions of aims. I argued that Reimer as well as Elliott 
provide both internal and external views of the aims of music education. 
Neither of them clearly distinguishes these two perspectives of aims, let 
alone that they adequately relate them. However, a comprehensive view is 
not only a theoretical desideratum but also a practical one. When building 
music curricula, one should know to what extent our considerations should 
be led by values that are unique to music or by values that transcend 
musical practice as such. Can we merely concentrate on aims internal to 
musical practice and assume that, in pursuing these, external aims are auto-
matically served as well? Or do external aims call for specific constraints on 
the activities and contents featuring in the curricula? Furthermore, it is of 
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vital importance that we can offer a unified picture of what music education 
is to bring about. 
Second, I have discussed conceptual and empirical (means-ends) aspects 
of aims and their interrelations. In order to clarify the conceptual and 
empirical relations between the various components of musical activities 
distinguished by Reimer, I have separated aspects of direct engagement in 
music — creating, listening, perceiving, reacting, valuing — from activities 
relating to discourse about music — conceptualizing, analyzing, evaluating. 
Though I do not object in principle to Reimer's conceiving the latter activi-
ties as means behaviors toward the end of aesthetic experience, I have made 
three caveats with respect to this view. First, dubbing conceptualizing as a 
means behavior is too exclusive, since discourse about music can also be 
viewed as an end. Second, besides secondary conceptualization, there is also a 
primary form of employing concepts that is a component of, rather than a 
means to, musical experience. Third, I noted that we are far from substantia-
ting the empirical claim that conceptualizing leads to enhanced musical 
experience. A good deal of conceptual work remains to be done before we 
can establish how conceptualizing can strengthen musical experience. 
Whereas talking of means behaviors and ends behaviors may be appro-
priate to characterizing the relation between secondary conceptualization 
and aesthetic experience, this kind of classification is not suitable for charac-
terizing the relations between the nondiscursive behaviors of creating, lis-
tening, perceiving, and reacting. Reimer's unfortunate attempt to do so can 
be seen as the result of his failing to distinguish conceptual and means-ends 
questions. Reimer observes that creating and listening can lead to enhanced 
aesthetic experience. By itself this is correct, but it does not render creating 
and listening typical means behaviors and perceiving and reacting aes-
thetically typical ends behaviors. Creating, listening, perceiving, reacting, 
valuing: all are aspects of the point of musical practices: intrinsically valu-
able musical experience. They are connected by logical relations, rather than 
by means-ends relations. Creating and listening are just as much the objec-
tive of musical practices as perceiving, reacting, and valuing. 
However, these musical behaviors — or, better, dimensions of direct 
musical engagement — can in the context of musical growth be seen, not 
only as ends, but also as means toward higher levels of musical experience. 
Musical activities in music education can be viewed under two perspectives: 
(1) as intrinsically valuable ends; (2) as means to the attainment of a higher 
level of musical engagement. Musical activities are both means and ends. 
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Dubbing some aspects of them means and others as ends or outcomes 
obscures this insight. 
In this article I have taken a metatheoretic approach to the issue of aims in 
music education. Rather than arguing for a specific view of aims, I have 
tried to clarify some of the conceptual issues involved in the subject. 
Conceptual clarification of discourse about music education is an important 
task of philosophy of music education. As in other domains, discourse in 
our field is often obscured by conceptual confusions: terms are used in 
different ways by various participants or even by one author, aspects of 
central notions fail to be distinguished, relations between key concepts 
remain unclear, arguments are based on incompatible conceptual frame-
works. Philosophers of education can point out the nature of such concep-
tual confusions and how these may be resolved. By elucidating key concepts 
that figure in educational theory and practice and the relations between 
these they can provide a basis for a better understanding of the field. 
Furthermore, besides clarifying conceptual frameworks philosophers of 
music education can also question their adequacy. Conceptual frameworks 
are constitutive of the way we experience the world and the way we think 
about it. On the one hand they create and open up the possible space of our 
experience and thinking, whereas on the other hand they structure and 
restrict these. Philosophers of music education can point out the limitations 
of conceptual frameworks and the way they direct or even hinder our 
understanding. Going one step further, they can make suggestions for en-
riching conceptual frameworks or even radically modifying them. 
Thus, though a metatheoretical, conceptual approach may appear to be 
somewhat aloof from educational practice at first sight, it can make a vital 
contribution to them. It can bring about a clearer and deeper understanding, 
leading to more adequate action; it can even lead to a new conceptualization 
and hence to a new design of educational practice. 
Notes 
1. This assessment does not apply to the situation in Germany where Sigrid Abel-
Struth's impressive overview of the field appeared already two decades ago 
(Abel-Struth, 1978). 
2. A variety of terms is used to address the issue of aims: gods, objectives, purposes, 
ends, (intended) outcomes, tasks, ideals, et cetera. Garforth (1985, pp. 33-34) and Bar-
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row and Milbum (1990, p. 18) doubt the utility of carefully distinguishing these 
terms, arguing that in ordinary usage these various terms are largely used inter-
changeably. In this article I use aim as an overarching term, encompassing the 
whole spectrum of objectives in education. 
3. One might question Reimer's use of the term behavior in this context, but this is 
not really an important point. Reimer makes it clear that he conceives the notion 
of behavior in a broad, non-behavioristic sense. The seven behaviors refer to the 
major aspects of human functioning in the aesthetic realm (Reimer, 1971, pp. 70-
76). My purpose is to examine how these aspects of musical activities are related. 
4. Some of the following points, notably the first and the third ones, also emerge 
from Elliott's critique of Reimer's view of concepts (Elliott 1991a, pp. 55-57). 
5. With respect to the concepts used by laymen Kivy's example of hearing a fugue is 
not illuminating. For to hear something under the concept of a fugue one must 
indeed have a certain amount of knowledge of music theory. It requires that one 
knows about the components of a fugue — like dux and comes, divertimento, re-
exposition, stretto — as well as the way they are combined into the whole we call 
a fugue. 
5. Music education: aesthetic or praxial? 
Since a couple of years we have witnessed a flowering of the philosophy of 
music education. The number of publications in this discipline is growing 
steadily and there is even a periodical entirely devoted to it — the Philosophy 
of Music Education Review. More important than this quantitative growth of 
the discipline is the fact that traditional views have been challenged by new 
ones. For a long time the philosophy of music education has been com-
pletely dominated by the aesthetic approach. The exponent of this approach 
of music and music education is Bennett Reimer, whose A Philosophy of 
Music Education (1970,1989) was the only systematic treatment of the dis-
cipline for some 25 years. In recent years the aesthetic view of music and 
music education has faced severe criticisms by authors like Elliott (1991a, 
1991b), Bowman (1991a), and Alperson (1991). The opposition to traditional 
views of music education has culminated in the publication of a completely 
new philosophy of music education, David Elliott's Music Matters (1995). 
Elliott presents a novel conceptual framework for understanding music, 
which centers around the notion of music as a practice. 
In this article I will examine the differences between the aesthetic ap-
proach and Elliott's alternative conception. To what extent is Elliott's criti-
cism of music education as aesthetic education justified? How convincing is his 
own perspective, and should it lead us to abandon an aesthetic approach to 
music education? These are the main questions addressed in this article. In 
the first two sections I will give a broad outline of Elliott's objections to the 
aesthetic approach to music eduation and the alternative view of music 
education he defends. Next, I will discuss two main issues that emerge from 
Elliott's attack on the aesthetic approach to music education (sections 5.3 
and 5.4). Finally, I will argue for an intermediate position which retains both 
the idea of music as aesthetic and that of music as a practice. 
5.1 Elliott's objections against MEAE 
Elliott raises a large number of objections against what he calls music educa-
tion as aesthetic education (hence MEAE). Three major clusters of objections in-
dicated by Elliott in Chapter 2 of Music Matters concern: the conception of 
music as an object, the concept of musical perception, and the concept of 
musical experience. 
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Music as object 
According to Elliott, MEAE onesidedly focuses on musical works, that is on 
autonomous objects that exist independent of concrete performances. He op-
poses this view, arguing that an explanation of musical works is not likely to 
yield a comprehensive understanding of the nature and value of music. 
Concentrating on the concept of the musical work as object leads to a narrow 
and implausible concept of music and, consequently, a narrow and im-
plausible philosophy of music education (Elliott, 1995, p. 30). 
Related to Elliott's critique on the narrowness of the view of music as 
object is his complaint that by focusing on musical works MEAE has failed to 
offer a critically reasoned account of the nature of music making in general 
and performing in particular and that it has tended to neglect the process 
dimension of music (p. 30). A third objection is that MEAE'S emphasis on 
musical works results in a curriculum that strongly emphasizes listening at 
the cost of music making. 
Musical perception 
Elliott holds that by focusing on aesthetic perception the aesthetic concept of 
music tends to narrow our musical understanding and experiences. The aes-
thetic doctrine urges us to concentrate exclusively on the design of musical 
works (p. 33). In his book Elliott argues that musical works have at least 
four, but often as many as six dimensions, only one of which is their design. 
He summarizes his view in the following formula: A musical work is (1) a 
performance-interpretation of (2) a musical design that evinces: (3) stan-
dards and traditions of practice, (4) expressions of emotion, (5) musical 
representations, (6) cultural-ideological information (p. 199). 
Elliott's criticizes MEAE for being narrow, not only because it neglects 
several dimensions of musical works, but also because it fails to take into 
account that music can have functions other than enjoying works as such. 
People around the world have various purposes and motivations to engage 
in one of many different musical practices: social, political, religious, moral, 
and so forth. Elliott says that teaching pupils to perceive and respond aes-
thetically amounts to imposing on them an ethnocentric ideology that, more-
over, belongs to the past, MEAE leads to homogenizing the great diversity of 
musical activities and musical products around the world because first, it 
imputes a single purpose to all of them, second, it postulates a single mode 
of response for all their listeners, and third it ascribes a single motivation to 
all participants in musical practices everywhere (p. 33). 
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Musical experience 
At various places in his book Elliott criticizes the notion of aesthetic expe­
rience. This criticism runs along several lines. In the first place, he attacks 
the explanation of aesthetic experience provided by prominent philosophers 
of music education, notably Reimer and Leonhard (pp. 36-38). These edu­
cators adopt the view, developed by Susanne К. Langer, that music — like 
other fine arts — is the source of a special kind of knowledge. According to 
Langer (1953,1957a), music is a unique kind of unconsummated symbol that 
yields insight into the forms of feeling. Elliott launches a twofold attack on 
this view. First, he points out that Langer's theory is in contradiction with 
another central tenet of aesthetics, namely that aesthetic experience is self-
sufficient, disinterested, and impractical. 
Second, he casts doubt on the special value of getting insight into the 
forms of feeling. According to Langer, music represents the morphology of 
feeling only and not their complete nature. It seems, however, that these 
general forms have nothing that distinguish them from patterns exhibited 
by other natural and artificial phenomena. 
Elliott further argues that Leonhard and Reimer are confused about the 
relationship between music and feeling. On the one hand, they endorse the 
view of Langer who denies that music arouses affect; rather music symbolizes 
feeling. On the other hand, they hold to L. B. Meyer's theory, which tries to 
explain how musical sound patterns actually do arouse affect in listeners. 
5.2 Elliott's alternative philosophy of music education 
Two types of criticism can be distinguished in Elliott's objections to MEAE. 
First, he thinks that the aesthetic approach to music education is too narrow: 
the core notions of MEAE, those of the musical work, aesthetic perception and 
aesthetic experience, are too limited as to offer an encompassing view of the 
musical domain. Second, and more seriously, Elliott questions the aesthetic 
concept of music itself. Particularly, he opposes to the notion of aesthetic 
experience; he finds the account given by Reimer cum suis unconvincing. 
Therefore, according to Elliott, not only is MEAE'S conception too limited, it is 
also mistaken about what constitutes the core of musical experience. 
As a way out of these problems Elliott puts forward an entirely new view 
of music and music education. In the first place, he proposes to conceptu­
alize music as a practice. Referring to authors like Dahinaus, Sparshott, and 
Wolterstorff he holds that music is, at root, a human activity (1995, p. 39). 
Several dimensions are involved in this activity. To begin with, Elliott inter-
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prêts music as a four-dimensional concept involving (1) a doer — a musicer, 
(2) some kind of doing — musicing, (3) something done — music (in the sense 
of audible musical achievements), and (4) the complete context in which 
musicers operate. Each one of these four aspects can in turn be approached 
from four viewpoints: (1) head-on, as the outcome of systematic action on its 
own; (2) in back, in terms of motivated action; (3) in front, as goal-directed 
action; and (4) around, as action in a context of similar actions (pp. 40-41). 
The activity of musicing is complemented by that of listening which also 
has four dimensions: listeners, listening, listenables (i.e., "sounds to listen 
for"), and the context of listening. Naturally, these four dimensions can also 
be considered from the four viewpoints mentioned (head-on, in back, in 
front, and around). Elliott's analysis thus results in a view of music as a 
multidimensional phenomenon involving two interlocking forms of human 
activity: music making and music listening. The domain constituted by this 
interlocking relationship he names musical practice (p. 42). Although the 
concept of a practice takes a central position in Elliott's account, he does not 
offer an exact definition of it. All he says is the following: 
A human practice is something a group of people organizes toward some 
kind of practical end. Human practices pivot on shared ways of thinking and 
shared traditions and standards of effort. A human practice, says Sparshott, is 
'something that people do, and know they do, and are known to do', (pp. 42-
43) 
Besides practice Elliott often uses the terms praxis en praxial. (Elliott dubs his 
philosophy of music education praxial.) These are used in a somewhat more 
specific sense than practice, though it is not clear whether Elliott intends 
them to have a distinctive meaning. Basing himself on Aristotle, Elliott de-
scribes praxis as "informed and deliberative 'doing-action' in which doers 
(as ethical practitioners) are not merely concerned with completing tasks 
correctly (techne), but with 'right action': enlightened, critical, and 'situated' 
action. Praxis means action committed to achieving goals (telos) in relation to 
standards, traditions, images, and purposes (eidos) viewed as Ideals that are 
themselves open to renewal, reformulations, and improvement" (p. 69). 
Elliott admits that, in fact, his analysis of musicing and listening is not a 
substantial theory of music in itself but a conceptual framework for devel-
oping a comprehensive view of music (p. 40). According to him, musical 
practices should be conceived as essentially cognitive. Musicianship, for ex-
ample, he describes as a multipartite form of working understanding (p. 70). 
In Elliott's view, both musicing and listening are essentially forms of think-
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ing-in-action and knowing-in-action, a crucial difference between the two 
being that in musicing the thinking-in-action is overt, whereas in listening it 
is covert. 
This emphasis on music as cognition is reflected by Elliott's account of 
the values of music and hence of music education (chap. 5). According to 
Elliott, music is a unique and major source of self-growth, self-knowledge, 
and enjoyment. Following Csikszentmihalyi, he holds that these values are 
attained if we manage to meet significant cognitive challenges; successful 
engagement in demanding activities results in the extension of our powers 
of consciousness and experiences of buoyant satisfaction called optimal ex-
perience, autotelic experience, or flow. Such self-strengthening pursuits also 
provide self-knowledge. Dynamic musical practices offer excellent oppor-
tunities to attain these values of self-growth, enjoyment, and self-knowledge 
because they involve the progressive matching of increasingly complex 
musical challenges (p. 121). Elliott summarizes his view as follows: 
MUSIC is the diverse human practice of overtly and covertly constructing 
aural-temporal patterns for the primary (but not necessarily the exclusive) 
values of enjoyment, self-growth, and self-knowledge. These values arise 
when musicianship is sufficient to balance or match the cognitive challenges 
involved in making and/or listening for aural patterns regarded significantly, 
but never exclusively, as audible designs, (p. 128) 
Elliott's view of music as a praxis leads him to the conception of the music 
curriculum-as-practicum. Though musical practicums at school are not the 
same as real-life musical practices, their purpose is to incorporate the latter's 
essential characteristics. In Elliott's view this can be achieved by simulating 
the ways musicing and listening are carried out by artistic musical practi-
tioners (p. 270). This praxial view of music education focuses on music mak-
ing, especially performing. Music listening is not viewed as an end in itself 
but is taught and learned in conjunction with artistic music making. 
5.3 Aesthetic and cognitive conceptions of music 
Now I will discuss two main issues with regard to the disagreement be-
tween MEAE and Elliott's philosophy of music education: (1) what concepts 
are most suited to describe the nature of music? and (2) what range should a 
philosophy of music education have? I will now examine these issues, the 
former in this section, the latter in the following. 
Proponents of MEAE and Elliott have different conceptions of what is most 
fundamental to music. Proponents of MEAE consider aesthetic experience to 
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be the heart of music, whereas, according to Elliott, music should primarily 
be viewed as a cognitive activity resulting inflow or optimal experience. 
In section 2 we saw Elliott's objections against the aesthetic-experience 
view held by leading proponents of MEAE like Leonhard and Reimer. Central 
to this view is the idea that musico-aesthetic experience reveals and gives 
insight into the life of feeling. Elliott's criticism on this Langerian idea of 
musico-aesthetic experience may be accepted. He rightly points out that it is 
incompatible both with the aesthetic notion of self-sufficiency and with 
Meyer's arousal theory of musical emotion. By themselves these points do 
not demonstrate the implausibility of a Langerian view of musical expe-
rience. Reimer and Leonhard could save their position by giving up the idea 
that musical experience is self-sufficient and by dropping Meyer's theory 
of emotion in music. However, more serious objections have been raised 
against Langerian views of aesthetic experience. First, there is the argument 
borrowed by Elliott from Budd (1985b, p. 114), questioning whether Lan-
ger's position can possibly account for the special nature of music. For it 
would seem that the general forms of feeling "revealed" by music are not 
crucially different from patterns exhibited by other natural and artificial 
phenomena. Furthermore, a number of other authors (e.g., Alperson, 1991; 
Davies, 1994; Koopman, 1996) have called attention to serious weaknesses, 
three of which I will mention here. First, Langer's very notion of form has 
been criticized for being elusive or even incoherent. For example, Langer 
does not explain to what extent and at which level musical forms can be said 
to correspond to the forms of feeling. Second, Langer unwarrantedly moves 
from the idea that the forms of music and the forms of feeling are iso-
morphous to the conclusion that the former yield deeper insight into the 
latter. She provides no arguments whatsoever for this conclusion. Third, the 
status of the knowledge of the forms of feeling one is believed to attain is not 
clear. Alperson, for example, wonders whether claims of truth and falseness 
can be usefully applied to this kind of nonconceptual knowledge and how, 
in view of the asserted ineffability of this knowledge, we would be able to 
support such claims (1991, p. 229). 
I think it is justified to conclude from these objections that Langer's 
aesthetic theory is a dubious basis for building a philosophy of music edu-
cation. However, in rejecting Langer's idea of aesthetic experience we need 
not go so far as to reject the concept of aesthetic experience altogether. A 
major shortcoming of Elliott's attack on the aesthetic concept of music is that 
he views aesthetic theory as one coherent body of theory that, in spite of 
"countless variations", has "remained largely intact" since the eighteenth 
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century (1995, p. 26). This one-sided view leads him to make unwarranted 
generalizations. Elliott questions the idea of the musical work as an ideal 
aesthetic object, but this idea is absent from most contemporaneous aes­
thetics (see section 4). Likewise, he tries to discredit the concept of aesthetic 
experience by showing the dubiousness of the epistemologica! claim that 
underlies MEAE. However, the claim that aesthetic experience provides uni­
que insight into the life of feeling is an idiosyncrasy of only one particular 
aesthetic theory: Langer's. It does not underlie the work of prominent 
aestheticians like John Dewey (1934/1980), Louis Arnaud Reid (1969), or 
Monroe С Beardsley (1981,1982). 
Beardsley (1982) proposes a set of five criteria for aesthetic experience: 
(1) object directedness, (2) felt freedom, (3) detached affect, (4) active dis­
covery, and (5) wholeness (pp. 288-289). According to him, these criteria are 
to be applied as a family except for the first one, which is necessary. An 
experience has aesthetic character if it has the first and at least three of the 
other features. There are remarkable correspondences between Beardsley's 
idea of aesthetic experience and Csikszentmihalyi's concept of optimal 
experience, which Elliott introduces as an alternative explanation of musical 
experience. Features like felt freedom (i.e., lift of spirit, absence of distracting 
thoughts and feelings), actively exercising constructive powers of mind, 
integration and strengthening of the self, enjoyment, and intrinsic value are 
common to both concepts. In view of these shared characteristics between 
flow and aesthetic experience one wonders why Elliott should be so negative 
about the latter concept. These characteristics are present (explicitly or im­
plicitly) in many writings about aesthetic experience and several of them can 
also be found in Reimer's account of aesthetic experience. 
On the other hand, these correspondences between the notions of 
aesthetic experience and flow should not divert our attention from crucial 
differences between Elliott's account of musical experience and aesthetic 
ones. Although Elliott's view opens new perspectives on music, as a view 
about the nature of music it has important disadvantages as compared to an 
aesthetic concept. First, the idea oí flow is a very general one; it applies to 
countless activities, such as mountain climbing, dancing, sailing, playing 
chess, and so on. Thus the concept of optimal experience cannot explain 
what distinguishes music from all these other activities. What is so special 
about cognitively constructing musical patterns? Elliott's account is too 
general to provide insight into the distinctness of the musical domain. This 
lack of specificity is not only problematic in defining music externally, that 
is, in distinguishing music from other disciplines, but also in defining it 
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internally. What activities are most central to music? In Elliott's view, all 
cognitive operations related to music seem to be equally important in prin-
ciple. The only decisive question is whether they provide challenges to the 
musicer or listener. For example, memorizing a complex composition and 
enjoying a beautiful performance appear to be equally important if only they 
are equally challenging. 
An aesthetic concept of music, on the other hand, is much more specific. 
Central to aesthetics is the idea that concentration on the properties of a 
perceptual field leads to a kind of experience of that is significantly different 
from rewarding experiences involved in other activities. This central idea 
can be fruitfully applied to music. The aesthetic concept of music focuses 
exactly on what is most important in music: the inner happening that we 
undergo when we attend to the sensuous and structural properties of sound 
forms. This is the core experience of music; all other cognitive activities — 
sight reading, coordination of the hands, mastering technical difficulties, 
learning musical concepts, acquiring information about the social, historical 
and cultural context of music, and so on — are secondary to it. They may be 
vital or indispensable for music making or listening, but in themselves they 
do not constitute the heart of music. The core experience of music is that of 
dwelling in an alternative world, that is, the world of structured sound. 
Sparshott (1987) puts it as follows: 
The world of music is more clearly separate from the everyday world, and 
more internally coherent, than painting or literature. It may be thought of as 
our only true alternative reality. If that is a fact, it is perhaps the most 
important fact about music, (p. 71) 
Besides its lack of specificity, a second problematic aspect of Elliott's expla-
nation of music is its dependence on the notion of cognitive challenges. The 
relationship Elliott establishes between musical enjoyment and cognitive 
challenges is highly dubious. There is no reason to believe that the enjoy-
ment one derives from musical activities is exclusively a function of the 
magnitude of the cognitive challenge they involve. We may, for example, be 
utterly delighted when listening to a work that we have already listened to 
many times before. Or a choir may enjoy repeating a well-known canon time 
and again. The cognitive tasks involved in these activities are relatively 
modest. It appears, then, that the presence of significant cognitive challenges 
is not a necessary condition for enjoying music making or listening. At any 
rate there is no evidence for there being a proportional relation between the 
cognitive demands of musical activities and the enjoyment they give us. To 
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make the best of some mediocre work in a difficult idiom may present a 
musician with a formidable challenge, but is there any guarantee that a 
successful performance of it will give him more satisfaction than a new 
rendition of an absolute masterpiece he has had on his repertoire for many 
years? The delight that a musical work gives us is determined by the appeal 
of its sensuous and structural properties. This appeal cannot be explained 
exclusively in terms of cognitive challenges. Other aspects of the work are 
also constitutive of the interest we take in it, for example its sensuous attrac-
tiveness, Gestalt qualities of musical ideas, good proportions, and nuances of 
feeling. 
This last feature leads us to a third drawback of Elliott's cognitive ac-
count of music, namely that he fails to do justice to the role of feeling in 
musical experience. L.A. Reid (1969,1980) describes aesthetic experience as 
an unified response in which cognition and feeling cannot be separated: 
Although in looking at a picture or listening to music with great care, atten-
tion and discrimination, we are perceiving a complexity of formed content, 
up to a point (but never completely) describable in factual terms — yet we are 
perceiving it in a feelingful way. We are cognising it with intense feelingful 
interest; we are apprehending it with what can fairly be called 'cognitive 
feeling'. We are cognitively feeling, or feeling cognitively, the art as yielding 
valuable meaning. (1980, p. 11) 
According to Reid, aesthetic experience is a holistic response in which cog-
nition and feeling are completely intertwined. While cognition and feeling 
can be conceptually be distinguished they are fused in actual experience. 
This view, according to which feeling is as vital to our engagement with 
music as cognition, strongly contrasts with Elliott's account of musical expe-
rience. Elliott takes musicing and listening to be essentially cognitive acti-
vities, that is thinking-in-action or knowledge-in-action. Feeling is in his view 
only a secondary response, that results from the primary action of musical 
cognition. Moreover, in this view the range of feeling in music is reduced to 
a general feeling of enjoyment, because this feeling is the invariant outcome 
of successful musical cognition. Elliott has no explanation for the endless 
many shades of feeling we experience when attending to the development of 
a musical work. If we follow Reid's aesthetic view of musical experience on 
the other hand, we can easily account for the rich variety of feeling in music: 
every part of the musical work is felt as much as cognized. 
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My conclusion is that Elliott's fails to establish the superiority of his cog-
nitive account of music to an aesthetic concept of musical experience. Elliott 
does succeed in questioning the fundamental presupposition underlying the 
Langerian conception of aesthetic experience dominant in MEAE, namely the 
presupposition that aesthetic experience yields unique insight into the life of 
feeling. However, he is too soon in abandoning the notion of aesthetic expe-
rience altogether. Moreover, his alternative view of the nature of music has 
limitations not found in aesthetic accounts of musical experience: it lacks 
specificity, thereby failing to indicate what aspect of involvement in music it 
is precisely that makes musical experience so special; it incorrectly assumes 
that musical enjoyment can be explained completely in terms of cognitive 
challenges; it discounts the role of feeling in musical experience. 
However, these shortcomings do not alter the fact that Elliott's cognitive 
conception has important merits as well. In his book Elliott analyzes various 
forms of thinking and knowing in music. Thereby his approach has a focus 
that differs from the one taken by MEAE. While MEAE tends to concentrate on a 
phenomenological explanation of musical experience, Elliott focuses on the 
cognitive operations that underlie musical experience. Both approaches are 
valid and they should be viewed as supplementing, rather than con-
tradicting each other. 
5.4 The range of the conception of music 
Elliott's objections to MEAE are not limited to the aesthetic concept of music 
itself. Even if he had to give up his claim that the aesthetic concept of mu-
sic as such is inadequate, Elliott would maintain that an aesthetic approach 
leads to an undue restriction of the scope of what is involved in music in 
general and music education in particular. In this section we will deal with 
this second strand of critique. As we have seen in section 2, Elliott holds that 
the aesthetic concept of music (1) onesidedly focuses on musical works as 
objects and (2) leaves no room for other uses of music than the contem-
plation of musical design. 
The first point misses the mark. His criticism is inspired by Lydia 
Goehr's analysis of traditional aesthetic views of music that focus their at-
tention on musical works as fixed objects (1995, pp. 24-25,34-35). However, 
this criticism cannot be transferred simply to MEAE for MEAE builds on the-
ories — notably those of Dewey and Langer — that focus on an explanation 
of aesthetic experience rather than of aesthetic objects. Actually, the very 
reason for Dewey to put the idea of aesthetic experience in the heart of his 
theory was to provide an alternative for approaches that focus on the 
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museum concept of art (cf. Shusterman, 1992, p. 26). Likewise, the notion of 
the musical work plays a peripheral role in Reimer's philosophy of music 
education. Although Elliott 1995, p. 28) suggests that his theory strongly 
depends on it, Reimer is not at all concerned with analyzing what musical 
works are; instead, he concentrates on elucidating musical experience. 
Elliott's criticism that MEAE inevitably results in a curriculum in which 
listening is strongly favored over music making cannot be substantiated 
either. First, theoretically there is nothing wrong with the idea of a 
curriculum that is both aesthetically oriented and focused on music making. 
An emphasis on making music rather than listening can, for example, be 
justified by arguing that aesthetic experience is usually more intense in 
music making than in listening. Second, the curriculum actually outlined by 
Reimer, the most prominent representative of MEAE, cannot be said to be 
dominated by listening activities; there is ample room for making music. 
However, another objection Elliott makes in this context is more to the 
point, namely the objection that MEAE has failed to provide critically 
reasoned explanations of the nature of making music. Elliott touches on a 
significant problem of MEAE here; the concepts provided by an aesthetic 
approach appear to be too limited to provide a satisfactory explanation of 
musical activities like composing, improvising, performing, and even listen-
ing. Surely aesthetic theory yields important insights in a number of prin-
ciples of music making and listening. But many of the thinking processes 
constitutive of music making and listening cannot be clarified by drawing 
on these concepts. Aesthetic concepts are suitable for elucidating the pheno-
menological side of musical experience, but they were not designed for 
analyzing the intelligent actions that underlie music making and listening. 
Elliott's philosophy must be credited for offering a new understanding of 
the nature of musical action. 
Elliott's second point was that by concentrating exclusively on aesthetic per-
ception, that is, the perception of music's design, the aesthetic concept of 
music overlooks alternative dimensions of musical works and other func-
tions of engaging in music. He argues that music education should pay at-
tention also to the aspects of performance-interpretation, the standards and 
traditions of practice, expression, musical representation, and cultural-ideo-
logical information. Basically, his objection here is sound. Indeed, the as-
pects mentioned have been neglected by MEAE. And as they seem to embody 
interesting ways of approaching musical works, there is no reason to see 
why they should not constitute serious additional points of attention in mu-
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sic education. However, Elliott tends to overstate his point. First, his concep-
tion of aesthetic perception, as concerning the design only, is apt to mislead 
us. The term design may suggest that aesthetic perception is concerned 
merely with structures at a global level. However, even if narrowly con-
ceived, aesthetic evaluation involves all sensuous and structural properties 
of a work of art at all levels (Kivy, 1980, pp. 115-116). Thus, the aesthetic 
approach has a broader scope than is suggested by Elliott's formulation that 
it concentrates exclusively on the musical design. In the following I will use 
the more familiar term form rather than design, meaning thereby the whole of 
a musical work's sensuous and structural properties. 
Second, speaking of five alternative dimensions, Elliott suggests that these 
aspects of the musical work are all of the same order and the same impor-
tance as musical form. However, this is not the case. The aesthetic concept of 
music education may be too narrow, but the proponents of MEAE are right in 
emphasizing the centrality of musical form. It is by attending to the sen-
suous and structural properties of musical works that musico-aesthetic expe-
rience can be achieved. Thus, sensuous form is directly related to the core 
experience of music. 
The aspect of performance-interpretation is also closely connected with 
musico-aesthetic experience. The aesthetic approach is concerned with form 
as concretely lived through, not with abstract structural relations that can be 
read-off from a score. It is only through interpretation that musico-aesthetic 
experience comes to life. The quality of musical performances determines 
how we can experience musical forms. Moreover, in improvisations musical 
form comes into being only via performances. Therefore, though Elliott 
rightly observes that performance as such does not figure prominently in the 
aesthetic approach, the suggestion that performance-interpretation is enti-
rely absent from it is not correct; this aspect is implicitly included in the 
conception of musical experience. 
The four other so-called dimensions — standards and traditions of prac-
tice, expression, musical representation, and cultural-ideological information 
— can be said to be secondary to the experience of musical form in two 
senses. First, these dimensions depend on the appreciation of musical form; 
and second, the value involved in dealing with these dimensions are less 
prominent than the value of attending to musical form as such. The first 
point does not seem to be controversial. The dependence of the other four 
dimensions is clearly indicated by Elliott himself, when he states that mu-
sical design (i.e., musical form) evinces standards of traditions of practice, 
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expressions of emotion, musical representations, and cultural-ideological 
information. 
It is also clear that the value of studying standards of performance and 
practice and cultural-ideological information are of secondary importance. 
These two dimensions can yield a lot of interesting information and mean-
ings, as Elliott calls them, but what they offer cannot compare to the de-
light of experience of musical form as such. Moreover, they are derivative: 
acquiring knowledge about aspects of musical performance, standards of 
practice, and cultural-ideological context is only rewarding if the practice at 
hand features powerful musical forms. 
The dimensions of musical representation and expression have received 
a great deal of attention in musical aesthetics. Therefore, though particular 
versions of MEAE have largely neglected these aspects, it is not correct to say 
that any aesthetic conception of music education cannot adequately deal 
with them. Alperson (1991) clarifies this point by distinguishing a strict 
version and an enhanced version of the aesthetic concept of music; the for-
mer version concentrates only on the properties of musical form, the latter 
also takes into consideration expressive and representative meaning (pp. 
220-225). We cannot at this place review the extensive debates about musical 
representation and musical expression. But there is a wide agreement that 
the value of representation in music is secondary to that the experience of 
musical form as such. Splendid representation in itself is not decisive for a 
musical work's success. Likewise, though it plays an important part in many 
musical achievements, musical expression is subordinate to musical form. 
Expressive properties can be effective, only if they contribute to a satisfac-
tory musical form. Kivy (1990), whose account of musical expression is 
endorsed by Elliott, puts it as follows: 
Some expressive properties serve to highlight musical structure, as color 
might be used by the painter to emphasize contour or mass. Other expressive 
properties serve as structural properties in their own right....Of course, a 
composition may possess expressive properties for which there seem to be no 
real musical functions — properties that obtrude but seem to lack for a 
musical reason. However, these are cases not of musical meaning, but of 
musical failure, (p. 196) 
In sum, while Elliott rightly emphasizes the importance of expression and 
several other aspects of musical works this should not lead us to abandon 
musical form (or design) as a central notion in the philosophy of music 
education. Contrary to what Elliott suggests, form is not just one of a series 
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of aspects of the musical work, but it is the central feature on which the 
other dimensions build. 
So far, we have considered musical works regardless of their function in 
society. Implicit in this treatment was that music is valuable as such. How-
ever, one of Elliott's objections is that the aesthetic concept of music ignores 
the many alternative functions music may have besides aesthetic experience 
for its own sake. On the one hand, this complaint is justified. While it has 
been clearly established in the past decades that music serves many func-
tions, not only in other cultures but also in Western society, there has been 
little reflection on this fact in MEAE. It has, perhaps, too easily been assumed 
that there are no alternatives to the aesthetic purpose of music. If we want to 
build a strong philosophy of music education, we should seriously take into 
account the multifunctional status of music. 
On the other hand, the fact that besides aesthetic experience for its own 
sake there are many other purposes music can serve, should not lead us to 
dispense with aesthetic concepts as key notions in the philosophy of music 
education. In the first place, the ideas of the aesthetic approach are also 
relevant to "nonaesthetic" functions of music; basic characteristics of aes-
thetic experience (e.g., object directedness, wholeness, enjoyment, rapture) 
are present in many situations in which music is not appreciated for its own 
sake. As an example we may take its religious function; it is the rapturous 
quality of aesthetic experience that enables music to play such an important 
part in religious ceremonies. A second example is the social function of 
music. Music can strengthen group identity just because of the fact that 
group members share the joyful and integrating experience of attending to 
and responding to the sensuous and structural qualities of musical works. 
Analogous points can be made for other functions of music like political, 
moral, and therapeutic ones; these functions do not exist independently 
from musico-aesthetìc experience, but they build on it. 
In the second place, we should distinguish between two tasks of a phil-
osophy of music education: reflection on the nature of music and reflection 
on general guidelines for music curricula. When considering the nature of 
music, the philosopher should take into account all functions music can 
possibly have. However, when it comes to formulating guidelines for music 
curricula, he takes a selective stance; he has to decide which ones of the 
many possible uses qualify for being included in the music curriculum and 
what the relative importance of the various uses selected is. Whatever the 
precise outcomes of such a selective procedure may be, it is clear that the 
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development of aesthetic sensitivity will remain a central goal in music 
education. First, the aesthetic use of music is very important in Western 
society. People sing, play instruments, go to concerts, and listen to records 
because they love to be immersed in music. Even when nonaesthetic func-
tions prevail, the aesthetic enjoyment is seldom absent or irrelevant. Second, 
whereas the aesthetic function fits the school context well, it is by no means 
clear how many other functions should be incorporated into the music 
curriculum. When taught in a classroom situation, music is isolated from its 
real-life context. For an aesthetic approach to music this is no problem; 
concentrating on the sensuous and structural qualities of musical sound can 
be done in the classroom as well as in many other places. However, other 
functions like social and religious ones cannot be separated from their 
original contexts. Religious music can only have its original function in 
religious ceremonies. Likewise, party music fails to serve its intended 
purpose, if it is played in the classroom (without having a party). 
These facts also point to an apparent inconsistency of Elliott's philos-
ophy, namely that his conception of music curriculum is at odds with his 
views about the contextual nature of music. Though Elliott's praxial view 
entails that musical practices cannot be understood apart from their specific 
context, he promotes a curriculum in which music is separated from its 
social and (sub)cultural context. The classroom practicums he has in mind 
are not only divorced from real-world practices but do not even intend to 
approximate these as closely as possible. His argument for decontextua-
lizing music is that the purpose of music education is not to educate all 
pupils for careers as professional musicians (1995, p. 270). However, only a 
limited number of musical practices are carried out by professional musi-
cians. It turns out that Elliott bases his view of music education on a narrow 
idea of musical practices. By recommending musical practicums in the 
classroom, Elliott implicitly adopts an autonomous view of music; music can 
be isolated from its real-life context, while retaining its essence. Indeed, this 
is a honorable view but it is not in line with Elliott's basic assumption that 
musical practices can be appreciated only in their total context; it is a view 
that belongs to aesthetic theory, rather than to a praxial approach. If Elliott's 
idea of music as a context-dependent practice is consistently pursued this 
can, I suspect, only lead to the conclusion that music should be expelled 
from the curriculum. Music should in such a view be learned in or near to 
the context of real-life practices, rather than in surrogate classroom practi-
cums. 
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Clearly, much more reflection is needed on the several functions of music 
and the question which ones can and should play a significant role in the 
music curriculum. However, I think that we can conclude from the above 
considerations that, granted even the perspective of the many functions 
music can perform, the aesthetic concept of music stands up as central. First, 
basic features of aesthetic experience are also characteristic of "nonaesthetic" 
functions of music; second, the aesthetic use of music (i.e., aesthetic expe-
rience for its own sake) is dominant in Western society; third, as yet it is not 
clear which alternative functions music in the classroom should focus on. 
5.5 Conclusion. Music education: aesthetic and praxial 
Throughout his book Elliott suggests that an aesthetic approach to music 
education and his own praxial philosophy constitute diametrically opposed 
positions, the former being mistaken and obsolete, the latter attractive and 
up to date. I hope to have demonstrated that this view cannot be uphold. 
Although Elliott rightly casts doubt on the Langerian theory of aesthetic 
experience dominant in MEAE, he is too quick in completely dismissing aes-
thetic theory. The aesthetic concept of music is useful for philosophy of 
music education, because it focuses on the heart of music: the experience of 
attending and responding to the properties of structured sound. An aes-
thetic approach to music has several advantages over Elliott's cognitive view 
of music: it more specifically indicates what is central to music, and what is 
less important; it does not try to explain the value of music completely in 
terms of mastering cognitive challenges; it allows a more comprehensive 
view in which the role of feeling in musical experience is given its full due. 
More successful is Elliott's attempt to show that the aesthetic concept of 
music is too narrow. Elliott makes three important points: First, many as-
pects of the complex activity of music making and listening are not ac-
counted for by the aesthetic concept of music. Second, by concentrating 
exclusively on form it pays too little attention to various alternative aspects 
of musical works. Third, it fails to seriously take into account the many 
nonaesthetic uses of music. At the same time, I have argued that the need for 
broadening the concept of music does not mean that aesthetic experience 
should be given up as a central notion in the philosophy of music education. 
Basic features of aesthetic experience are involved in almost every musical 
activity, and the intrinsic value of aesthetic experience constitutes the most 
prominent value of music in Western society. 
We can now see that an aesthetic approach to music education and El-
liott's conception of music as a practice are compatible rather than mutually 
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exclusive. Central to Elliott's conception is the idea that a philosophy of mu-
sic education needs a view of musical reality in which the various types of 
knowledge constitutive of musical activities and their social and historical 
contexts are accounted for. With a praxial approach we can develop a very 
broad view of music. It seems that every aspect of the musical domain can 
be assigned a place within the conceptual framework of a practice. How-
ever, it does not establish the relative importance of the many activities, 
products, and experiences belonging to musical practices. It is with regard to 
these issues that aesthetics makes its indispensable contribution to a theory 
of music. Musical aesthetics offers the core concepts with which an adequate 
account can be given of what is central to and most valuable in most musical 
practices: the wonderful experience we have, when we concentrate on the 
sensuous and structural properties of sound. 
I suggest that we stop polarizing into praxial views of music and music 
education and aesthetic ones. Both types of view can offer useful insights 
into the nature of music. While praxial views can increase our understanding 
of the many dimensions that are relevant to musical activities, aesthetic 
views can enhance our insight into what underlies all musical activities: the 
special kind of inner experience that comes over us when we attend to the 
properties of sound forms. The relationship between practice and aesthesis 
can be summarized as follows: musico-aesthetic experience constitutes the 
core of musical practices; and musical practices are the social realities in 
which musico-aesthetic experience can come to life. We can conclude, there-
fore, that we are not forced to make a choice between an aesthetic or a praxial 
view of music education. Music education should be inspired by the best 
ideas that originate from both. 

Epilogue: Agenda for the philosophy of music edu-
cation 
In the preceding studies I have discussed a number of basic issues in the 
philosophy of music education. Some four years separate the beginning of 
the earliest article — the one about musical development — from the latest 
one — about aims. Naturally, as a result of my ongoing explorations of the 
field during these years, my views on a number of issues have changed. The 
most important change is that I have become aware of the limitations of the 
aesthetic view of music. Under the influence of Reimer's views, in my article 
on development I tend to equate musical experience with aesthetic expe-
rience. The writings of Alperson, Bowman, Elliott, and others have made it 
clear to me that a situation in which the aesthetic view of music monopolizes 
the philosophy of music education is undesirable. Nevertheless, I am still 
convinced that aesthetic theories (in the narrow sense) are a powerful source 
of insight into the way we experience music. 
Though my views on the various subjects I have dealt with have evolved, 
I think that the main points made in the earlier studies are still valid. There-
fore, rather than enumerating various minor points on which I have come to 
think differently, I want to conclude this book with indicating and situating 
a number of what seem to me the most important lines of investigation in 
the philosophy of music education. 
Issues from the philosophy of music 
Questions about the nature of music constitute one of the principal areas of 
study, also for philosophers of music education. In fact, philosophy of music 
education has been philosophy of music to a large extent up to now. This is 
not surprising given the fact that the philosophy of music (musical aes-
thetics) — just as philosophy of music education — is an underdeveloped 
discipline. Until recently, philosophy of music was the concern of isolated 
scholars separated from each other by time, place, subject matter, back-
ground, and approach. Interesting publications were scarce and many years 
could pass by before a new book on musico-philosophical issues would 
appear. It is only since two or three decades that philosophy of music has 
become a field in which a considerable number of authors operate and lively 
discussions are going on. 
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1. Basic views of music 
A first issue in the philosophy of music concerns the nature and the merits 
of the various basic approaches that can be taken to the phenomenon of 
music. As I described in the introduction and in chapter 5, Reimer takes a 
specific aesthetic view of music, which he calls absolute expressionism. In-
stead of seriously discussing the alternative views of formalism and referen-
tialism, he puts up straw-man versions. Presenting caricatures of alternative 
views of music is common practice in Elliott's Music Matters. He does not 
distinguish between formalism and absolute expressionism. Indeed, he even 
goes so far as to suggest that the aesthetic theory is one homogeneous body 
of ideas that has not undergone any important changes since the eighteenth 
century. In my view, our understanding of music is better served with seri-
ously studying the strengths and weaknesses of the various views of music, 
than with extolling the virtues of one view and simply putting the others 
aside. An excellent article in this respect is Wayne Bowman's study "The 
Values of Musical 'Formalism'" (Bowman, 1991b). Even Reimer has recently 
become more willing to acknowledge the contribution formalism and refer-
entialism can make to our understanding of music (Reimer, 1996). He argues 
that four positions on the nature and value of music need to be included in a 
universal philosophy of music education: formalism, praxialism, referenti-
alism, and contextualism. After having briefly discussed the strong points 
and the limitations of these views, he discusses the position that, according 
to him, gives us the deepest insight into the nature and value of music. 
In this view, defended by the anthropologist Robert Plant Armstrong, art 
works are forms that incarnate human affect. Art works capture the ways 
cultures allow people to experience and feel. Adapting this view to music, 
Reimer propounds the thesis that music is sonic form incarnating feeling. 
With this view Reimer seems in fact to hold on to his old position, because 
this view is essentially the same as the absolute expressionism he has de-
fended the last 30 years or so. The most important difference seems to be 
that the anthropologist Armstrong has replaced Langer as the most impor-
tant source of inspiration, which lends the philosophy more credibility as a 
universal, rather than a typical Western, philosophy. However, this cannot 
be more than a tentative judgment of Reimer's new position, which has not 
yet been further elaborated. 
We should investigate the diverse views of the nature and value of mu-
sic much more deeply and try to establish how they relate to each other — 
for instance, whether they are compatible and, if so, whether they can be 
combined into a more encompassing view. Philosophy of music education 
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should be cautious not to be led astray by general categories like formalism, 
expressionism, contextualism, and praxialism. Up to now theorists in the 
field have been too much concerned with pigeonholing; they have tended to 
assimilate theories to one of these categories. We need to overcome the sim­
ple oppositions they suggest. It may be expected that the more interesting 
positions do not neatly fit into one single category. 
2. Musical cognition 
A second major field of study in the philosophy of music education is musi­
cal cognition. Basic notions in this field are knowledge, understanding, 
concepts, and meaning. 
2.a. Musical knowledge 
Three leading philosophers of education have taken up the issue of knowl­
edge in music: Reimer, Swanwick, and Elliott. Each has come up with his 
own classification. Reimer (1992) distinguishes four kinds of knowledge (or 
knowing) in music and the other arts: (1) knowing of от knowing within; (2) 
knowing how; (3) knowing about or knowing that; (4) knowing why. Although 
Reimer does not refer to it, he seems to be inspired by three kinds of knowl­
edge commonly distinguished in epistemology, namely, knowledge that, 
knowledge how and knowledge by acquaintance (or knowledge of). This leaves one 
wondering, however, what the status of knowing why is, which, according 
to Reimer, concerns "general understanding about art as a cultural psycho­
logical phenomenon" (1992, p. 44). It would appear that this is just another 
kind of knowledge that, though relating to another subject than what Reimer 
has in mind with this category: the analytical knowledge of the form, the 
content, and the historical and cultural contexts of musical works. 
In his Musical Knowledge: Intuition, Analysis, and Music Education (1994) 
Swanwick also departs from the three-part division of knowledge that, 
knowledge how, and acquaintance knowledge, but he defines an additional 
category: attitudinal knowledge (pp. 14 ff.). This fourth kind of knowledge, 
which he also calls "knowledge of what's what", is not satisfactorily ex­
plained. Swanwick relates it to commitment, valuing, and feeling. I wonder 
whether what he aims at isn't in fact either (1) knowledge of one's attitudes, 
feelings, et cetera; or (2) knowledge about these; or (3) attitudes, feelings 
themselves, which are not knowledge at all. Anyhow, it may be questioned 
whether Swanwick is justified in positing this fourth kind of knowledge. 
Swanwick goes on to introduce another distinction: between analytical 
knowledge and intuitive knowledge. The polarity between these two kinds 
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of knowledge — which he does not relate to the earlier fourfold distinction 
— is the main theme of his book. He links up a number of "key concepts" 





Individual things Relationships 
"Romande" "Classical" 
Subjective Objective 
Appearance Underlying form 
Integration Separation 
Creation Tradition 
However, interesting as these relations may be, they are based on associa-
tion, rather than on thorough conceptual analysis. 
Elliott is a third theorist who categorizes various kinds of knowledge in 
music (1995, pp. 53 ff., pp. 96 ff.). In his view, musical knowledge is essen-
tially procedural knowledge. Besides this, he describes four other kinds of 
knowledge which "contribute to the procedural essence" of music making 
and listening (1995, p. 53): (1) formal knowledge, that is, knowledge that; (2) 
informal knowledge — the savvy or practical common sense developed by 
people who know "how to do things well in specific domains of practice"; 
(3) impressionistic knowledge — a kind of intuitional knowledge of what 
counts in a particular musical situation; and (4) supervisory knowledge — 
metaknowledge that allows us to regulate our musical thinking. It appears 
that in Elliott's classification two things run together; a distinction between 
basic forms of knowledge like procedural knowledge (knowledge how) ver-
sus formal knowledge (knowledge that) and an explanation of various im-
portant subclasses of knowledge belonging to one or more of the basic forms 
of knowledge. Informal knowledge and supervisory knowledge seem to be 
two subclasses of knowledge how and impressionistic knowledge seems to 
be largely knowledge of. 
It is clear that, rather than being accepted uncritically, the classifications 
proposed by Reimer, Swanwick, and Elliott — or other authors — should be 
critically examined. First of all, the various forms of knowledge should be 
further analyzed. Which ones are most basic? By what criteria are they dis-
tinguished from other forms of knowledge, and how are they related? 
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An important question also to be addressed is what role the various 
kinds of knowledge play in different musical activities. Reimer, Swanwick, 
and Elliott agree that knowledge that occupies only a subordinate place in 
music. Reimer (1992, p. 42) holds that knowing of and knowing how are 
ends of aesthetic education, whereas knowing that is only a means. Swan-
wick takes knowledge by acquaintance (knowledge of) to be the core of mu-
sical cognition. And for Elliott musical knowledge is essentially procedural 
knowledge. Surprisingly, the views of philosophers of music like Kivy and 
Davies run counter to those of these leading theorists of music education. 
Kivy (1990, p. 73, pp. 77-78) stresses that knowledge that is essential to 
appreciating a musical work; we are only able to enjoy a work to the extent 
that we perceive that — and hence know that — many things are happening 
in it. Davies (1994, pp. 337-338) argues explicitly against the view that a 
person who understands music has knowledge how, rather than knowledge 
that. He agrees with Kivy that the u l t imate test of someone's musical 
knowledge is his ability to describe relevant features of the work. 
Thus we see that many divergent claims are made about the nature of 
musical knowledge as well as about the classification of various forms of 
musical knowledge and their relations. Clearly, musical knowledge is one of 
the hot issues not only in the philosophy of music but also in the philosophy 
of music education. 
2.b. Musical understanding 
Up to now, only a limited number of short studies have been devoted to the 
subject of musical understanding (notably Scruton, 1983, chap. 8; Tanner, 
1985; Budd, 1985a; Davies, 1994, chap. 7). They present valuable investiga-
tions into various interesting aspects of the "nebulous and polymorphous 
concept of understanding music" (Budd, 1985a, p . 233); but, again, the issues 
they explore call for further elaboration and many other questions await to 
be tackled. 
First, how can musical understanding be defined and how precisely does 
it relate to musical knowledge? Tanner posits that to understand music is to 
grasp why it is as it is (1985, p. 227). But wha t is this question taken to mean? 
Many why-questions can be asked about musical compositions. Further-
more, it seems that we can understand a good deal of a work, or of some 
part of a work, without knowing w h y it is composed as it is. I may not 
understand why Bartók incorporates a Tchaikovsky-like tune in the fourth 
movement of his Concerto for Orchestra, b u t I can clearly understand what he 
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is doing, and how this relates to his own musical idiom and to that of 
Tchaikovsky. 
Clearly, there are m a n y sides to understanding music. Budd distin-
guishes four different dimensions: deepness, accuracy, extensiveness, and 
subtlety (1985a, pp . 233-234). Elliott also defines dimensions of what he calls 
listening intelligently, bu t clearly he has different aspects of musical works 
in mind: performance/interpretation, design, standards, and traditions of 
practice, representation, expression, and cultural-ideological information 
(1995, pp. 198-199). Tanner , in turn, defines three levels with respect to 
understanding musical form (1985, pp. 227-231). Analyzing, ordering, and 
relating these various aspects of musical understanding is, in my view, an 
important job for philosophers of music education. 
We should clearly dist inguish theoretical understanding of music and 
implicit musical unders tanding. The first refers to the propositional under-
standing one may have of disciplines like music theory, analysis, musical 
aesthetics, and psychology of music. By the second category I mean the tacit 
knowledge we employ w h e n we experience music with musical under-
standing. How are these two kinds of understanding related? Which types 
of theoretical musical unders tanding can become relevant to direct musical 
experience? The music education profession would well be served by more 
insight into the question to wha t extent various types of theoretical under-
standing can enhance our direct "experiential" understanding. 
I.e. Concepts 
To what extent is musical understanding conceptual? This question is unde-
cidable at all, unless w e have made clear what we mean by concepts. In my 
article on aims in music education I observed that, though many theorists 
suppose that learning to apply verbal concepts to music plays an important 
role in music education, philosophy of music education has developed only 
little insight into how conceptualizing might strengthen musical experience. 
More particularly, I have argued that Reimer's view that direct aesthetic ex-
perience is in sharp contrast with cognition based on concepts is unhelpful 
and partly even incorrect. Understanding music does to a large extent rely 
on employing concepts, both verbal and nonverbal ones. I made a number of 
distinctions between types of concepts that can be employed in music: be-
tween concepts of music theory and concepts belonging to ordinary lan-
guage; between verbal concepts and nonverbal concepts; between concepts 
of particulars and concepts of general things. It is only when such distinc-
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tíons are taken into account that we can develop a nuanced view of the role 
the various types of concepts in musical understanding and experience. 
2.d. Musical meaning 
A last key term in relation to musical cognition is that of musical meaning. 
The purpose of my second article was to clarify this notion by making the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic meaning. Distinguishing these 
two types of meaning is, in my view, necessary to avoid at least some of the 
confusions that are so common in discourse about musical meaning. How-
ever, the distinction relates to a fundamental level; it does not differentiate 
between various kinds of extrinsic and intrinsic meaning. Tracing and eluci-
dating these various kinds of meaning and explaining their role in musical 
experience and music education is another important subject of investi-
gation in the philosophy of music education. 
3. Feeling and emotion in music 
The role of feeling, that other side of musical experience, stands in need of 
clarification just as much as musical cognition. Few will deny that somehow 
feeling is central to our engagement in music. However, the nature of feeling 
in music and the various functions it can perform have been insufficiently 
understood up to now. 
The issue that has been studied most deeply is that of musical expression 
or musical expressiveness. A number of authors have contributed to a high-
ly sophisticated debate about what we mean by saying that a piece of music 
is expressive of, say, sadness (Kivy, 1980; Davies, 1994, chaps. 4-6; Levinson, 
1990, chaps. 13-14,1996, chap. 6). However, although this is an intriguing 
problem, studying it yields little insight into the role of feeling in music. 
First, it seems that many compositions do not express specific emotions. 
Second, music can be expressive of only a limited number of emotions, the 
so-called "garden-variety emotions", to which, for example, anger, grief, and 
joy belong (cf. Kivy, 1990, p. 175). Moreover, feeling responses to music tend 
to be played down in writings on expressiveness. For instance, they are 
considered irrelevant (Kivy, 1989, p. 34) or as merely ingredients of emotion 
(Levinson, 1996, pp. 112-115). Levinson speaks of "subemotional respons-
es", and "microfeelings", reactions that do not amount to a full experiential 
component of standard emotions. 
A completely opposed view that does much more justice to the centrality 
of feeling in music is taken by Reimer (1989, pp. 45 ff.; 1992, p. 36) and 
McMurray (1991, pp. 50-53). For these authors, feeling is the key term, while 
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emotion is viewed either as a category term (Reimer) or as relevant only to a 
limited class of feeling situations in music (McMurray). In his schematic 
outline of feeling Reimer highlights characteristics that have hardly been 
taken up in the literature about the subject. He emphasizes the endless vari-
ety of feelings, the enormous range in breadth, depth, and intensity. He is 
also one of the few who take a dynamic view of feeling. Feelings change, 
they develop, they wax and wane, they continuously move towards new 
climaxes. Reimer's sketch deserves to be worked out further, because these 
dynamics of musical feeling, these ever-changing subjective responses, seem 
to account largely for the excitement of musical experience. 
Whereas in the past feeling has been considered as a passive aspect of 
consciousness, more recently the insight has gained ground that, particu-
larly in the arts, feeling plays an active role. This is another issue that should 
be further elucidated. In my articles on justification and intrinsic meaning I 
have referred to the work of L. A. Reid (1969,1980,1986). He opposes to the 
artificial division between feeling, cognition and volition. The term cognitive-
ly feeling is introduced by him in order to emphasize that feeling and cogni-
tion are fused in apprehending music. Stokes (1994) points to the views of 
various theorists who try to overcome the dichotomy between feeling or 
emotion on the one side and cognition on the other. She argues that (at least) 
eleven cognitive processes operate in art on the basis of feeling. 
Stokes's article is very valuable for giving a survey of various approaches 
to the issue of feeling in music. However, it is also evident from her contri-
bution that we are only at the beginning of uncovering the complex field of 
feeling and emotion in music. First, the concepts of feeling and emotion 
should be defined more clearly. Various authors use feeling and emotion in 
different senses, and some do not even consistently distinguish between the 
two terms. Second, we should examine the diverse claims that have been 
made about the relation between music and feeling (or emotion), for in-
stance, music as expressing concrete emotions, music as expressing "the 
forms of feeling" (Langer, 1953, 1957a; Reimer, 1989), music as painting or 
representing feelings/emotions, music as evoking feeling/emotion, feeling 
as contributing to musical cognition, feeling as being fused or united with 
musical cognition, et cetera. We should thoroughly analyze these diverse 
claims and assess the relevance of the alleged functions of feeling to music. 
4. Modes of musical engagement 
Another interesting area of research is constituted by the various modes of 
engaging in music: listening, singing, performing on instruments, conduct-
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ing, composing, improvising, arranging, reflecting. The common view is that 
listening, performing and composing are the most important ways of deal-
ing with music and that in music education our attention should be evenly 
spread over these three activities. Elliott (1995) attacks this view vigorously. 
In his view, listening is not to be seen as an independent aim of music 
education. Rather than being an end in itself, it should be taught and learned 
in conjunction with artistic music making in general, and performing in 
particular. Furthering listening as an independent goal leads to the edu-
cande becoming passive and distanced consumers of musical objects (1995, 
p. 99, p. 102). According to Elliott, music is essentially a performing art 
(p. 57, p. 102). However, Elliott's view is open to several objections. First, the 
belief that listening as an independent activity inevitably leads to passive 
and distanced engagement in music is unwarranted. Second, the idea that 
there is an essence to all musical practices and that this essence is music 
making, rather than listening, is not argued for. Third, Elliott neglects the 
advantages of "mere" listening to music. As listeners of music we have a 
much wider scope than as performers: we can deal with musical works that 
we will never be able to play; in complex music with many parts (e.g., 
symphonies) we can enjoy the piece as a whole, whereas as performers we 
would have to concentrate on a single part; we can come to appreciate a 
wide range of styles and traditions, whereas we can become competent 
performers in only a small number of musical traditions. 
Nevertheless, Elliott's attack on listening as an independent activity is 
interesting, because it challenges us to reflect on the relative merits of the 
various ways of dealing with music. It turns out that little work has been 
done in investigating the differences and relations between these various 
activities. The reason for this is, I think, the dominance of the aesthetic view 
of music. In this view, because listening, composition, and performing are 
alternative ways of having aesthetic experience, they are fundamentally 
equal. All of them share the characteristic of concentrating on and respond-
ing to the sensuous and structural properties of musical forms. This is an 
important insight, of course, but it should not divert our attention from the 
large differences between these and other modes of engaging in music. 
What are the idiosyncrasies of performing, composing, improvising, listen-
ing, and so on? Morever, can we content ourselves with speaking about 
performing in general? Leading philosophers of music education have ne-
glected the specific status of singing. Neither Reimer, nor Elliott, nor Swan-
wick has very much to say about singing; in fact, they tend to make no 
distinction at all between vocal and instrumental forms of performance. In 
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this respect philosophy of music education can better tum to more practi-
cally oriented music educators like Zoltán Kodály (1974, 1983) who have 
pointed out the virtues of singing, especially with respect to establishing 
basic musical abilities. 
Besides taking account of the differences between various modes of per-
forming, we also have to distinguish between different kinds of listening: 
between listening as an independent behavior, listening as a part of per-
forming, listening as a part of composing, et cetera. Elliott (1995) suggests 
that engaging in listening as an independent activity is unnecessary because 
it can be exercised in conjunction with music making. But listening while 
performing is very different from listening to music performed by others. In 
pure listening we can completely devote ourselves to what the music offers 
us. In performing, on the contrary, listening is not a self-sufficient activity. In 
this case, listening has a controlling as well as a propelling function. It gives 
us feed-back about the quality of what we have just performed and provides 
us with cues as to how to go on. In performance listening is not an indepen-
dent component but it is intricately related to a number of other subactiv-
ities. 
Analyzing the specific characteristics and merits of the various modes of 
dealing with music is a major task for the philosophy of music education. 
Only when we have a clear conception of the relative merits of these various 
forms of musical activity, both as such and with respect to their educational 
potential, it will be possible to create well-balanced music curricula. 
Educational issues 
Up to now, philosophers of music education have been concerned mainly 
with explaining music. However, it is only when insights in music are relat-
ed to insights in education that philosophy of music education can be rightly 
called a distinct discipline. Besides philosophy of music, philosophy of 
education is the second pillar of philosophy of music education. However, 
since philosophers of music education — myself included — generally have 
a musical background, rather than a background in the philosophy of edu-
cation, they have relatively little engaged in issues that typically feature in 
the educational context so far. 
1. Education 
To begin with, philosophy of music education ought to reflect on the notion 
of education itself. It seems that philosophers of music education use the 
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term education in a very broad sense, broader than, for instance, the British 
philosopher R. S. Peters for whom, at least in his earlier work, education 
mainly concerned the acquisition of propositional knowledge and under-
standing for its own sake, or the German philosopher of education Wolf-
gang Brezinka who adheres to a purely instrumental concept of education 
(see chapter 4). The notion of education as it functions in the philosophy of 
music education is not restricted in advance to either internal and external 
aims, nor is it restricted to one specific domain (e.g., the cognitive domain), 
nor does it pick out particular kinds or procedures of teaching and learning. 
On the other hand, there is a sense in which education tends to be used in 
a restrictive way. When talking about education philosophers of music edu-
cation often have in mind only institutionalized music education, that is, 
situations in which educands are entrusted to the care of professional teach-
ers. But, of course, educational practices are not restricted to music lessons. 
It seems that parents and other people involved in the upbringing of child-
ren can do a lot to further the musical growth of their children. But the na-
ture and potential of informal music education has hardly been clarified up 
to now. What kinds of non-institutionalized music education are there and 
how do they differ from institutionalized education? 
Another important area to be investigated concerns the conceptual rela-
tions between education and notions like training, teaching, instructing, and 
drilling in music education. Though studies of the relations between these 
key concepts by philosophers of education (e.g., Kleinig, 1982; Barrow & 
Milburn, 1990) constitute important sources, their results should not un-
critically be applied to music education. For instance, Peters (1966, pp. 33-
34) makes a strict distinction between education and training. Whereas edu-
cation refers to the development of a broad cognitive perspective, training 
applies to the acquisition of limited skills in relation to a specific end or 
function. In music education this distinction does not seem to be very 
helpful. It would suggest that music is to be viewed either as a domain of 
propositional knowledge about music or as a skill. Neither qualification does 
justice to the nature of music as explained by Elliott (1995, pp. 53 ff.). 
Engagement in music, Elliott convincingly argues, is a matter knowledge-in-
action. Listening and music making are highly intelligent activities but the 
knowledge employed in them differs from knowledge that. The knowledge is 
in our actions, it cannot be separated from the activity itself. But if the 
distinction Peters makes between education and training is not suitable for 
music education, how then should we conceive the difference between the 
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notions of education and training? To what extent is music education a mat-
ter of training? 
2. Learning and teaching 
Two important notions philosophers of music education need to elaborate 
are those of learning and teaching. First, we need more insight into the vari-
ous forms of teaching and learning. Which types of teaching and learning 
can be distinguished in music education and which are most typical? Which 
methods are appropriate for which type of musical learning? 
Another question is about the sphere of power of the music educator. 
What precisely can the music educator teach and what is beyond his reach? 
For example, to what extent can one teach children to become sensitive 
listeners? Isn't the degree of refinement a child will be able to reach largely a 
matter of talent? Perhaps the most important abilities cannot be taught but 
can be stimulated only indirectly by creating favorable conditions. But this is 
something that should be investigated rather than left to common-sense be-
lief. To be sure, only the conceptual aspects of such questions about teaching 
and learning music can be meaningfully addressed by philosophical inves-
tigation. Philosophers of music education should be cautious not to address 
empirical questions that are beyond their competence. 
3. Indoctrination 
What should teachers try to influence and what should they leave to the 
pupils themselves? Reimer (1989) holds that music educators should con-
centrate on the objective part of aesthetic experience, that is, perception; 
they should not try to influence the subjective realm of aesthetic reaction 
(pp. 109-110). Can such a strict division be defended? Can it really be main-
tained that any talk suggestive of reactions that might be appropriate to a 
certain piece of music is objectionable? Isn't it possible to expand the pos-
sible range of pupils's reactions to music without forcing these into a specific 
direction? These questions call for an examination of the concept of indoc-
trination in relation to music education. (For an introduction into the con-
cept of indoctrination see: Kleinig, 1982, pp. 54-68; and Barrow & Milburn, 
1990, pp. 148-151.) Which kinds of interferences by the music educator must 
count as indoctrinatory and which ones are, on the contrary, desirable or 
even necessary in order to stimulate musical growth? 
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4. The curriculum 
This is also a major area of investigation. Which model of the curriculum is 
most suitable for teaching and learning music? Elliott has made a beginning 
with investigating this question. He opposes to adopting the structure-of-
the-discipline approach in music education (1995, pp. 243 ff.). According to 
Elliott, this approach reduces disciplines to complexes of conceptual rela-
tions. It results in a conception of music as a domain of conceptual knowl-
edge about music instead of a conception which centers on musical prac-
tices. The approach Elliott opts for is that of the curriculum-as-practicum 
(1995, pp. 269 ff.). The practicum is set up as an approximation of authentic 
music cultures. It tries to simulate the ways in which listening and making 
music are carried out by artistic musical practitioners. In this way, Elliott 
holds, learning is contextualized and situated. The curriculum-as-practice is 
modelled on the mentor-apprentice model of teaching and learning. 
Aspin (1996, pp. 53-54) criticizes this conception. He objects that the 
transactions and interactions involved in teaching are much more complex 
that those accounted for by the trade-craft model implied by the apprentice-
ship model. According to him, the trade-craft model relates to a set of relati-
vely closed skills and envisages a finite terminus ad quern, whereas in edu-
cation and schooling the way forward is much less constrained and endings 
hardly ever are so relatively closed. Aspin believes that approaches like 
learning how to learn, learning how to research and collaborative learning 
are alternatives for Elliott's apprenticeship model, but he does not elaborate 
on this. This beginning of a debate about conceptions of music curricula 
deserves to be continued, expanded, and refined. The specific characteristics 
of the various models of the music curriculum need to be elucidated and 
their pros and cons evaluated. 
5. 77K musically educated person 
Perhaps, the pivotal question to be asked in the philosophy of music educa-
tion is: What is it to be a musically educated person? However, this question 
has not occupied a place as central as one might expect in the discipline. The 
philosophies of Reimer (1989) and Elliott (1995) do not directly address it. 
Departing from the question what music is, both of them try to explain what 
they see as full engagement in music. For Reimer full engagement means 
aesthetic experience, for Elliott it means being a "reflective practitioner". 
Music education in their view should enhance the quality of this engage-
ment. However, it seems that being a musically educated person entails 
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more than being capable of having musico-aesthetic experiences or being a 
competent practitioner in one ox more musical practices, however crucial 
these features may be. Other dimensions include being able to judge openly 
and critically various musical achievements, having a keen eye for the uses 
and misuses of music in our society, having developed a personal view of 
music and having integrated this in a broader view of the arts, society, and 
human life as a whole. Thus, the various characteristics of the musically edu-
cated person is a further topic of inquiry. 
6. Aims 
The subject of the educated person naturally leads us the question of aims in 
music education. Much clarification remains to be done in this field. Dis-
course about aims often lacks transparency because of the differences in 
terminology used and the absence of distinctions between various kinds of 
aims — intermediary goals (e.g., reading skills and solfeggio) and final goals 
(musicianship, listenership), global and more specific aims, internal and 
external aims. By analyzing and categorizing aims philosophers of music 
education can do much to elucidate discussions about this subject. Further-
more, they can point out tensions and conflicts between various aims set in 
educational practices and discourse. At a deeper level, uncovering the fun-
damental presuppositions underlying aims statements is also typically a 
task for the philosopher of music education. For instance, he can analyze 
and evaluate the conceptions of the good involved. 
7. Justification 
Issues of justification are closely related to those of aims; answers to both 
types of questions presuppose a view of the value of music. In my article on 
the justification of a place for music in general education I could not possibly 
discuss all the arguments that have been given in favour of music education. 
Much further work with respect to tracing, clarifying, and evaluating the 
strengths and weaknesses of the many arguments can be done. In view of 
the poor quality of much argumentation I doubt, though, whether treating 
this subject matter exhaustively is worthwhile. Concentrating on the most 
promising arguments seems to be the most efficient way to deal with this 
area. 
The more fundamental philosophical questions concern the nature of the 
considerations that can possibly qualify as reasons and what arguments can 
qualify as sufficient justification for including music education in the school 
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curriculum. If we look at the various attempts to justify music education, it 
becomes clear that authors conceive their tasks in different ways. Some 
theorists try to give as many reasons as possible. They come up with hetero-
geneous lists of values furthered by music education, many of which are by 
no means specifically related to music (e.g., social skills, self-esteem, relaxa-
tion). Another group of theorists concentrates on what they see as the es-
sence of engaging in music. For them, the value of musical engagement is to 
be found here, and other, minor reasons seem to be irrelevant. But within 
this group there are also large differences in what authors set out to do. 
Some go rather long ways to demonstrate that music has the envisaged 
value. Thus, for instance, Reimer (1989) argues that music yields a special 
kind of insight. Others content themselves with pointing out that music is in 
accordance with general goals in life like happiness or self-realization. Still 
others simply refer to the intrinsic value of musical experience. Thus, the 
question to be asked here is what criteria should be met for an argumen-
tation to be a sufficient justification. 
8. Development 
Besides educational aims and justification, development is a third topic from 
the philosophy of education I have dealt with in my dissertation. I have 
concentrated on development in its more specific sense of qualitative (rather 
than quantitative) development. This type of musical development, which is 
most markedly addressed by stage theories, calls for much more investi-
gation. The theories I have discussed give a limited understanding of musi-
cal development. They cover only a few aspects and do not offer insights 
into the differences between various dimensions, like singing, listening, 
composing, and judging. Can further developmental patterns be recon-
structed offering novel insights into the complex phenomenon of musical 
development? 
Another question is whether musical development constitutes improve-
ment. Can the transition from earlier to later stages as delineated in develop-
mental theories be said to constitute progress in an evaluative sense? In 
chapter 3 I have argued that the development of musical understanding as 
envisaged by the three theories under discussion is favorable in that it 
makes possible richer (in the sense of more profound) experience. However, 
as Gardner et al. (1990, pp. 89-93) point out, there are also developments 
that are not to be judged positively. For example, when children proceed 
from a preconventional to a conventional level of understanding much of 
the charm, the originality and the flair children display in their musical com-
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positions gets lost. And when they go over to the postconventional stage 
they become self-critical, which can lead to their stopping to compose or 
improvise altogether. Some of such developments, for instance, the loss of 
spontaneity, may appear inevitable and beyond the control of educators. 
Other developments, such as an over-critical stance towards one's own 
musical products, may be countered, however. Music education, then, is not 
merely a matter of following and conforming to — let alone, simply further-
ing — the course of musical development. Some developments should be 
stimulated and enhanced, but other ones should be curbed or even blocked. 
Studying the positive and negative characteristics of developments in the 
musical domains and reflecting on the ways music educators can deal with 
these are another important area of investigation for philosophers of music 
education. 
A further interesting issue concerns the relation between musical devel-
opment and developments in other domains. Are there, for instance, dev-
elopments in the cognitive domain that also determine the course of musical 
development? In the sixties and the seventies a number of studies were 
carried out in order to find out whether the pre-operational and the con-
crete-operational stages defined by Jean Piaget could also be traced in the 
musical domain. Marilyn Pflederer and others designed tasks which they 
held to be musical equivalents of the Piagetian conservation tasks and ex-
amined how children of various ages performed on them. (For a review and 
a critical evaluation of this research, see Hargreaves, 1986, pp. 43-48.) More 
interesting than these studies is the comparison David Hargreaves and 
Maurice Galton (1992) have made between drawing, writing, and various 
dimensions of musical engagement. Though their attempt remains sketchy, 
this is an intriguing field of investigation that might be elaborated and 
deepened much more. For example, it would be interesting to inquire 
into the relations between Swanwick's theory of musical development and 
Michael Parsons' theory of development in the arts (Parsons, 1987). Both 
Swanwick and Parsons define stages in which successively sensuous prop-
erties (sound, color), expression, form, and metacognition play a dominant 
role. 
However, a glance at the theories of Swanwick and Parsons suffices to 
see how much more elaborated the letter's work is. Whereas Swanwick's 
descriptions of the characteristics of his stages cover only a few paragraphs, 
Parsons devotes a whole book to elucidating the aesthetic and psychological 
dimensions of the various stages of the development of artistic judgment. 
Musical development and its implications for music education stand in need 
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of much more philosophical reflection, but as long as well-elaborated 
developmental theories are lacking in the musical domain, our opportunities 
for this must remain limited. 
Further issues 
1. Music and the other arts 
Should music be taught as a separate subject at school or in conjunction with 
the other arts? With respect to this question Reimer and Elliott have again 
taken opposed positions. Reimer (1989, pp. 226-240) argues for a multi-arts 
approach. First, in his view, an alliance between music and its sister arts is 
necessary in order to strengthen the position of music education. He holds 
that it cannot be argued that music is more valuable or more appropriate for 
education than the other arts. If the music education profession is to rise 
above a special interest group, it should form a coalition with the other arts. 
As an isolated subject music holds a vulnerable position, but the importance 
of the arts as a whole cannot be neglected. Reimer thinks that there will be 
more time for music when it is taught as a part of a solid multi-arts curricu-
lum than when it tries to survive as a separate curriculum subject. 
Besides giving strategic reasons for organizing music education as a part 
of arts education, Reimer also believes that multi-arts education leads to the 
educand's acquiring a better understanding of music and the other arts. 
It can (1) make each art clearer by showing its uniqueness as contrasted 
with the others, (2) clarify the underlying principles which make all the arts 
members of the same family, and (3) give a broad view of each art as an in-
dividual in a family and of the family of art as one among many. 
However, Reimer does not advocate integrating the arts. On the contrary, 
he emphasizes that each art should be taken as autonomous in relation to 
the others. Educande should become sensitive to the differences between the 
various art forms. Coming to experience the specific nature of the diverse 
arts is for Reimer an indispensable condition for arriving at a deeper under-
standing both of the uniqueness the various arts and of their fundamental 
kinship. 
Elliott (1995, pp. 248-250) criticizes multi-arts education on various 
grounds. In contrast to Reimer he believes it seriously weakens the position 
of music education. Music educators will be replaced by multi-arts edu-
cators and music education will be removed from the program as an inde-
pendent part of the curriculum. 
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Elliott also rejects the philosophical assumptions underlying multi-arts 
approaches. He seriously doubts whether there is any such general capacity 
as aesthetic sensitivity, which is seen as crucial to engagement in all the arts. 
Furthermore, he argues that merely becoming aware of the elements of one 
kind of artistic product does not yield an understanding of other kinds of 
artistic products , let alone an understanding of other artistic practices. The 
reason for this is, according to Elliott, that each art is a specific kind of 
human practice that rests upon an independent form of situated thinking 
and knowing. Hence, each kind of artistic cognition needs to be taught in its 
own context. 
Several questions emerge from these opposed views that call for further 
inquiry. First, there are strategic questions. Is music education viable if 
taught as a separate subject? Does music education have a stronger position 
as a part of arts education than as a separate subject? Next, there are ques-
tions about h o w arts education is most efficiently taught. Is the educand's 
understanding of the various arts best furthered by teaching them in 
combination or as separate subjects? If one takes the first option, should the 
arts be opposed to each other or should they be integrated? Do so-called 
"hybrid" art forms — art forms that combine materials from more than one 
art (e.g., opera) — call for a different approach than pure art forms? 
Underlying these questions are issues belonging to the philosophy of art. 
How do the arts relate? What are — in the context of music education — the 
most significant correspondences and differences? Can our understanding 
of one art further our understanding of other ones and, if so, in what sense? 
How are the various hybrid art forms to be conceptualized: (1) as mixtures 
in which the various components are juxtaposed, (2) as syntheses in which 
the combined arts loose their original identities, or (3) as transformations in 
which one "host art" retains its primary character but the others are modi-
fied (cf. Levinson, 1990, pp. 26-36; Davies, 1994, pp. 114-120; Reimer, 1989, 
p. 231)? 
2. The content of music education 
In my dissertation I have not dealt with questions about the content of music 
education. Which modes of engaging in music (see above) should be domi-
nant in music education? Which musical traditions should feature in it? 
Which genres should be included? Which aspects of musical works should 
be emphasized? All these are important questions that can be approached 
from a philosophical angle. In particular, the question which musical tradi-
tions to include in the curriculum is a difficult one. 
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A few decades ago the question which music to teach at school seemed a 
relatively easy one. When Kodály (1974, pp. 119-125, 141-142, 149) urged 
that children be introduced to good music, there was no doubt what he 
meant: traditional folk music and classical music — including contemporary 
serious music. Like other music educators of his time, he believed popular 
music (in the broad sense of the term) would have a damaging influence on 
the human soul. Today we are less confident in making distinctions between 
good and bad types of music. Jazz and popular genres have been admitted 
to the music curriculum and in many classrooms classical traditions have 
been completely overshadowed by pop music. Bowman suggests that the 
judgement that popular music is inferior is arrived at in an invalid way, 
namely, by assessing its quality in terms of criteria belonging to the domain 
of classical music. "Art music's musical superiority is maintained by declar-
ing its particular values universal and ultimate and by expropriating 'seri-
ous' music's perspective to all musical styles" (Bowman, 1994, pp. 57-58). 
Moreover, Vulliamy (mentioned in Bowman, 1994, pp. 56-57) points out that 
pop music is not one homogeneous field. There are many kinds of pop 
music; some of these may be simple or dictated by commercial principles, 
but others are much more subtle and original. 
The picture, then, would seem to be that there are various types of music, 
each with their own criteria for quality. How is music education to cope 
with this situation? Can music educators do no more than trying to incor-
porate as much of the dominating musical traditions as they can, intuitively 
striking a balance in the attention given to each of them? Or is it possible to 
formulate more or less objective metacriteria (e.g., complexity, durability) 
that allow us to argue that particular traditions should have priority in 
music education? 
3. Multicultural music education 
Questions about the content of music education become even more complex 
from a multicultural perspective. It turns out that the choice to be made 
between musical traditions is much greater than between folk traditions, 
serious music, jazz, and popular music that form the main threads of con-
temporary Western culture. What about the music of minority groups in our 
society? Moreover, what role should the music of peoples from other 
continents play in contemporary music education? 
The issue of multiculturalism goes much deeper than the question which 
kinds of music one should select for teaching. Multicultural music education 
is not a matter of simply including a variety of world musics into the cur-
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riculum. It urges us to rethink the status, the aims, and the design of music 
education in contemporary society. First of all, what perspective of multi-
culturalism in general and multiculturalism in music does one take? What 
position does one choose between the extremes of trying completely to pre-
serve the unicity of various cultural traditions and promoting full integra-
tion of these into a common culture (cf. Schippers, 1996, pp. 19-20)? Should 
every member of a multicultural society thoroughly study other cultural 
groups? Or would it suffice if one learns to respect and be tolerant towards 
other traditions? These issues have important implications for educational 
practice, because they lead to the question whether a general program of 
music education can be uphold any longer in our schools. Why, for instance, 
should someone of Arab origin who is entirely satisfied with the music of 
his own culture participate in a music program in which Western music 
occupies a major place? Shouldn't we allow each cultural group to focus on 
its own musical traditions? 
The question is, in other words: do we mean by multiculturalism that 
each cultural group should be given full opportunity to promote its own 
musical practices or that everyone should study a broad variety of musical 
traditions? Even if one takes the latter view, one cannot help giving prece-
dence to some musical traditions over others. Apart from the fact that it is 
simply impossible to include every tradition in music education, we have to 
face the dilemma between breadth and depth. Although some authors are 
optimistic about "polymusicality", that is, the ability to perform, appreciate, 
and listen intelligently to many types of music (cf. Anderson & Shehan 
Campbell, 1989, p. 4), it seems clear that most people can at best attain a 
deep understanding of only a few musical traditions. Arriving at a deep 
understanding as a performer, a listener, or a composer takes a lot of prac-
tice and experience. Therefore, in order to avoid shallowness, it is desirable 
that educands concentrate on one or a few musical traditions. The ideal of 
polymusicality notwithstanding, choices with regard to the breadth and the 
depth of musical understanding and musical competence cannot be 
avoided. Can we formulate criteria for such choices? For instance, are there 
rational grounds for deciding which musical traditions to include into the 
curriculum and which to leave out? Should we pay less attention to those 
cultural traditions that are not present in our multicultural society? Or 
should we formulate purely musical criteria for deciding which traditions 
deserve most attention? If so, what could these criteria be? 
The answers depend on the view one takes of music as a multicultural 
practice. There seem to be two basic views: According to one, music can be a 
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means of coming to understand and respect people of other cultures. By 
getting acquainted to musics of other cultures we develop an understanding 
of and sensitivity towards peoples from a broad spectrum of ethnic back-
grounds (Anderson & Shehan Campbell , 1989, p. 1). The second view fo-
cusses on the quality of musical activities themselves. According to this 
view, teaching music of other cultures can enhance the pupils' engagement 
with music in several ways. First, it is seen as expanding the pupils' possi-
bilities to have rich musical experiences. Second, multicultural music edu-
cation enhances our understanding of music as a manifold practice; by 
coming to know musics of other cultures we develop "the understanding 
that there are many different bu t equally valid forms of musical and artistic 
expression" (Anderson & Shehan Campbell, 1989, p. 1). Third, teaching 
musics of many traditions is claimed to reinforce our knowledge of the 
musical elements — melody, rhythm, form, and so on (Anderson & Shehan 
Campbell, 1989, p. ix). 
With these distinctions I only mean to give an indication of how philos-
ophers of music education might proceed if they want to disentangle the 
jumble of arguments that have been given for multicultural music edu-
cation. Again, the task of philosophy of music education is to distinguish, 
analyze, and evaluate the different positions taken on the various issues and 
to investigate criteria or procedures that can help decide questions, such as, 
which musical traditions to include into music curricula. We will also have 
to critically examine the foundations, or fundamental presuppositions, un-
derlying the various views. For instance, it may be asked whether views that 
promote multicultural music education as a way of enriching our oppor-
tunities for musical experience aren't in fact guided by an idea that typically 
belongs to Western culture: the idea that the musical domain can be sepa-
rated from other domains of life and that music is to be pursued for its own 
sake? 
Multicultural perspectives of music — as well as historical ones — make 
the philosopher of music education aware of the dangers of making general 
claims. When statements are made about the nature of musical experience or 
the characteristics of musical learning, we should always ask which musical 
practices are meant. For instance, many views of the nature of musical form 
are based upon investigations of classical music. To be sure, we should con-
tinue intensively to study particular traditions. This seems to me to be the 
only way towards acquiring a deep understanding of the phenomenon of 
music. A next step should be, however, to see whether the findings can be 
applied to other musical traditions. Too often this second step is ignored. 
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It is our duty to do justice to the differences between musical traditions, 
but even so the questions which universale there are in music and whether 
these may lead to a universal basis for music education remain intriguing. 
Moreover, they seem crucial in relation to the question raised above — 
whether a general program of music education can be uphold in a multi-
cultural society. Reimer (1996) tries to develop a view of music that is valid 
for all cultures. But even if such a universal view of all musics can be up-
held, this does not automatically provide us with a sufficient basis for a 
multicultural practice of music education; from the (alleged) fact that all 
musics are in some fundamental respects the same it does not follow that we 
should teach a broad variety of them. Additional reasons should be given, if 
we want to justify a music education practice in which children are intro-
duced into various musical cultures, rather than profoundly initiated into 
one. 
In the foregoing I have reviewed a number of major themes in the philos-
ophy of music education. No doubt , this is a personal selection. The survey 
could be extended in many directions, but even so it indicates that philos-
ophy of music education has a large agenda. It is a young discipline in 
which immature or rudimentary views exist with respect to many basic 
issues. However, this disadvantage can also be seen as a plus-point: the field 
offers the philosopher numerous challenging topics for inquiry into which 
many new insights are to be gained. In contrast to other branches of philos-
ophy in which the main issues have been exhaustively discussed, philos-
ophy of music education offers us a large array of captivating questions 




Dit proefschrift behandelt een aantal kernthema's op het nog jonge onder-
zoeksgebied dat in Noord-Amerika wordt aangeduid als philosophy of music 
education. Hoewel deze benaming in principe zowel betrekking kan hebben 
op de filosofie van de muzikale opvoeding als op de filosofie van het mu-
ziekonderwijs, heeft men zich tot nog toe hoofdzakelijk bezig gehouden met 
het laatste. Dat philosophy of music education een zelfstandige discipline is 
geworden, is vooral te danken aan Bennett Reimer. In A Philosophy of Music 
Education (1970) werkt hij een specifieke muziekfilosofische positie uit, wel-
ke hij zelf Absolute Expressionism noemt. Op grond hiervan bepaalt hij ver-
volgens de doelen en opzet van het muziekonderwijs. Terwijl Reimers 
gedachtengoed jarenlang het rijk alleen had, zijn de laatste jaren diverse 
auteurs op de voorgrond getreden die zijn opvattingen bekritiseren en plei-
ten voor alternatieve zienswijzen en benaderingen. Dit culmineerde in 1995 
in het verschijnen van David Elliotts Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Mu-
sic Education. Elliott zet zich radicaal af tegen Reimers esthetische opvatting 
van muziek en muziekonderwijs, en zet er een visie tegenover die uitgaat 
van muziek als praktijk. 
Tot dusver is philosophy of music education vooral opgevat als het ont-
wikkelen van inhoudelijke visies op de aard en waarde van muziek en, van 
hier uit, op de doelen en de inrichting van het muziekonderwijs. In deze dis-
sertatie is daarentegen gekozen voor een analytische benadering. In plaats 
van het uitdragen van een specifieke inhoudelijke visie, streeft deze bena-
dering naar een verheldering van verscheidene facetten van de muziekpeda-
gogiek: diverse praktijken van muzikale opvoeding en muziekonderwijs, 
praktische theorieën dienaangaande, wetenschappelijke theorieën en inhou-
delijke filosofische visies. Zo'n verheldering kan op twee niveaus plaats-
vinden: (1) het materiële niveau van concrete opvattingen, claims, argumen-
ten, etcetera, die in pedagogische praktijken en theorieën vigeren; en (2) het 
niveau van de grondslagen, dat betrekking heeft op de conceptuele kaders 
en de fundamentele vooronderstellingen die ten grondslag liggen aan dit 
denken en handelen. Verheldering kan bestaan in (a) het analyseren van, (b) 
het evalueren van, en (c) het aandragen van alternatieven voor de opvat-
tingen, argumenten, conceptualiseringen en fundamentele presupposities in 
kwestie. 
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In de eerste studie komt de rechtvaardiging van muziekonderwijs aan de 
orde. Op welke gronden kan men een plaats voor muziek in het algemene 
onderwijs claimen? Eerst maak ik een onderscheid tussen twee categorieën 
van argumenten. Argumenten behorende tot de eerste categorie baseren 
zich op aspecten die constitutief zijn voor muziek; de waarde van muzikale 
activiteiten is direct verbonden met wat men ziet als de kern van de muziek. 
Argumenten van de tweede categorie richten zich niet op de aard van de 
muziek maar op de positieve externe gevolgen van muziekonderwijs, onder 
meer voor de ontwikkeling van de cognitie, senso-motorische vaardigheden, 
persoonlijkheid, houding en fysieke vaardigheden. Argumenten van deze 
categorie leggen slechts een beperkt gewicht in de schaal. Weinig van de 
vermoede positieve gevolgen zijn aangetoond, en de vraag in hoeverre 
muziek vergeleken met andere bezigheden daadwerkelijk een efficiënt mid-
del is om de beoogde effecten te bereiken is nauwelijks aan de orde geweest. 
Belangrijker nog is het principiële argument dat "niet-muzikale" argumen-
ten niet leiden tot de rechtvaardiging van een muziekcurriculum dat vol-
waardig is vanuit een muzikaal oogpunt. Ze kunnen immers enkel die ac-
tiviteiten rechtvaardigen welke leiden tot het muziekexteme effect in kwes-
tie. 
Vervolgens worden drie typen van argumenten behandeld die tot de 
eerste categorie behoren. Het eerste type argument appelleert aan het ide-
aal van de alzijdig ontwikkelde persoon. Muziek wordt opgevat als een 
apart deel van de werkelijkheid. Een opvoeding waarin men geen aandacht 
schenkt aan dit speciale domein laat specifieke capaciteiten van de mens 
onbenut. Een opvoeding die streeft naar een zo volledig mogelijke ontplooi-
ing van het individu dient ook de voor muziek kenmerkende vermogens tot 
ontwikkeling te brengen. Binnen dit type argumentatie zijn een viertal ver-
sies te onderscheiden naar gelang van datgene wat men als constitutief voor 
het muzikale domein beschouwt: een specifieke houding, een unieke vorm 
van cognitie, een speciale cultivering van het gevoel of een specifieke holis-
tische ervaring. Dit eerste type argument schiet tekort: het enkele feit dat een 
domein een aparte plaats inneemt in het menselijk bestaan, kan nooit een 
voldoende reden zijn het te cultiveren. Het is pas wenselijk zo'n domein te 
ontplooien, als het een duidelijke positieve waarde heeft. Het argument is 
onvoldoende, omdat niet wordt aangegeven waarin deze specifieke waarde 
is gelegen. 
Volgens het tweede type argument brengt de omgang met muziek een 
specifiek soort inzicht met zich mee. De meest uitgewerkte en invloedrijke 
positie die deze claim verdedigt, is die van S.K. Langer (1953,1957a, 1957b). 
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Volgens Langer onthult muziek de forms of feeling. Aangezien muzikale 
vormen meer congruent zijn met de structuren van de gevoelens dan die 
van de taal, kan muziek een meer gedetailleerd en waarachtig inzicht geven 
in de aard van gevoelens dan de taal. Deze opvatting levert echter verschil-
lende problemen op: het is niet duidelijk wat precies muziek geacht wordt te 
verhelderen (het gevoelsleven in het algemeen, specifieke gevoelens of be-
paalde principes die eraan ten grondslag liggen); welke aspecten van mu-
zikale vormen zouden kunnen corresponderen met gevoelsvormen wordt 
niet uitgelegd; en het is twijfelachtig of men een dieper inzicht kan krijgen in 
de aard van gevoelens indien men enkel wordt geconfronteerd met hun 
dynamische vormen. Het belangrijkste bezwaar is echter dat Langer uit het 
inzicht dat er een gelijkenis bestaat tussen vormen van muzikale werken en 
gevoelsvormen meent te kunnen afleiden dat de eerste de laatste verhel-
deren. Deze conclusie volgt uiteraard niet en wordt ook verder niet aan-
nemelijk gemaakt. 
Het derde type argument beroept zich op de intrinsieke waarde van de 
muzikale ervaring. Hoewel dit type argument op het eerste gezicht een gro-
te plausibiliteit lijkt te hebben, kent het ook een probleem: men zou aanne-
melijk moeten maken dat de intrinsieke waarde van muziek uitstijgt boven 
die van andere bezigheden. Het blijkt echter principieel onmogelijk dit te 
doen langs discursieve weg. De intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale erva-
ring laat zich niet in woorden vatten maar is slechts gegeven in de ervaring 
zelf. Daarom laat de vraag of de intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale er-
varing voldoende groot is om muziek op te nemen in het curriculum zich 
niet via een sluitende argumentatie beslissen maar slechts via intersubjec-
tieve overeenstemming op basis van onze ervaringen met muziek. Een inter-
essant gegeven in dit verband is dat goed muziekonderwijs bijdraagt aan 
zijn eigen legitimatie: door zorg te dragen voor een verbreding en een ver-
dieping van de muzikale ervaring bewerkstelligt het dat mensen doordron-
gen raken van de intrinsieke waarde van muziek, waardoor ze weer eerder 
de wenselijkheid van muziekonderwijs zullen beamen. 
De conclusie is dat geen van de drie besproken typen argumenten een 
sluitende argumentatie levert voor het belang van muziek, maar dat elk type 
om een verschillende reden faalt. Het eerste type schiet tekort omdat men 
verzuimt de bijzondere waarde van muziek te identificeren en te beargu-
menteren. Het tweede type blijft in gebreke daar men er niet in slaagt de 
claim dat muziek een dieper inzicht in ons bestaan bewerkstelligt, aanne-
melijk te maken. Het derde type argument slaagt daarentegen niet, omdat 
de intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale ervaring zich principieel niet laat 
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beredeneren. In dit laatste geval is in tegenstelling tot de eerste twee typen 
argumenten geen sprake van onzorgvuldig argumenteren. Daarom is het 
verdedigbaar als we de kwestie of de intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale 
ervaring van een zodanige aard is dat muziek in aanmerking zou moeten 
komen voor een plaats in het curriculum, laten afhangen van intersubjec-
tieve consensus. 
De tweede studie handelt over betekenis in de muziek. Muzikale betekenis 
wordt in de literatuur vrijwel altijd gekenmerkt aan de hand van het model 
van betekenis dat typerend is voor taal. Kenmerkend voor dit type beteke-
nis, hier aangeduid met de term extrinsieke betekenis, is dat (1) de betekenis 
tot stand komt doordat de betekenisdrager de aandacht vestigt op iets 
buiten zichzelf en (2) de betekenis niet afhangt van de precieze vorm van de 
betekenisdrager. De betekenisvorm die het meest karakteristiek is voor 
muziek is echter van een geheel andere aard: deze zogenaamde intrinsieke 
betekenis (1) is inherent aan de betekenisdrager en (2) hangt op cruciale wijze 
af van de specifieke vorm ervan. Muziek heeft primair betekenis in zichzelf; 
de muzikale vorm in al zijn aspecten en details is constitutief voor de be-
tekenis die een muzikaal werk voor ons heeft. Naast deze intrinsieke 
betekenis kan muziek ook extrinsieke betekenis hebben, maar deze is secun-
dair. 
Intrinsieke betekenis kan nader worden verhelderd via het werk van 
L.A. Reid (1969,1980), wiens notie van meaning-embodied op belangrijke pun-
ten overeenkomt met die van intrinsieke betekenis. Hij licht kenmerken toe 
als onmiddellijkheid, het uniek verbonden zijn van de betekenis met de 
vorm, en de gebrekkige verwoordbaarheid. Belangrijker nog is dat Reid dui-
delijk maakt dat feeling een cruciale factor is in het vatten van de muzikale 
betekenis. In aansluiting op Reid kan worden gesteld dat de intrinsieke 
betekenis van een muzikaal werk bepaald wordt door de wijze waarop we 
de zijn vorm cognitief en gevoelsmatig kunnen beleven. 
Theoretici als Coker (1972), Meyer (1956) en Nattiez (1990) erkennen ook 
het bestaan van betekenis die verbonden is met de specifieke vorm van de 
muziek, maar houden daarbij vast aan het extrinsieke model van betekenis. 
Hun concepties van deze vormgebonden betekenis zijn echter geen ade-
quaat alternatief voor de idee van intrinsieke betekenis, aangezien ze onvol-
doende duidelijk aspecten van de muzikale vorm onderscheiden van aspec-
ten van muzikale betekenis en ze cruciale aspecten van de muzikale bete-
kenis negeren. 
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Hoewel intrinsieke muzikale betekenis nauw verbonden is met de mu-
zikale beleving, dient zij zorgvuldig te worden onderscheiden van de psy-
chologische processen die zich in ons voordoen bij de omgang met muziek. 
Betekenis en psychologische processen behoren tot verschillende catego-
rieën, en kunnen derhalve niet worden gelijkgesteld. Evenmin kan uit de 
verbondenheid tussen muzikale betekenis en muzikale ervaring worden ge-
concludeerd dat muzikale betekenis louter subjectief is. De specifieke muzi-
kale vorm van een werk in combinatie met het bestaan van gedeelde syste-
men van normen voor het interpreteren ervan waarborgt een aanzienlijke 
mate van collectief gedeelde betekenis, waarover discussie op grond van 
intersubjectieve criteria mogelijk is. 
Een laatste kenmerk van intrinsieke muzikale betekenis is dat zij inhou-
delijk grotendeels onzegbaar is. Dit kan echter geen reden zijn deze vorm 
van betekenis te negeren. Een consequentie van de ineffability van intrinsieke 
muzikale betekenis is dat de directe muzikale ervaring (en niet het spreken 
over muziek) centraal moet staan in het muziekonderwijs. Alleen op deze 
wijze kan de opvoedeling de volle rijkdom van deze betekenis deelachtig 
worden. Verder kan vormanalyse indirect bijdragen aan het ontdekken van 
intrinsieke betekenis. 
De derde studie behandelt stadiumtheorieën over muzikale ontwikkeling. 
Allereerst zet ik, mij baserend op het werk van Van Haaften e.a. (1986,1997), 
een theoretisch kader uiteen voor de verheldering van ontwikkelingstheo-
rieën. Het ontwikkelingsbegrip en de verschillende aspecten van theorievor-
ming over ontwikkeling worden aldus uiteengezet. 
Vervolgens analyseer ik drie theorieën die verschillende stadia onder-
scheiden in de muzikale ontwikkeling. Gardner (1973) onderscheidt twee 
stadia in de ontwikkeling van de making, perceiving en feeling systems in de 
kunsten: een "pre-symbolisch" een "symbolisch" stadium. Aangezien in de 
door Gardner geschetste muzikale ontwikkeling geen sprake is van een sym-
bolische functie kunnen de stadia beter worden geherformuleerd als 
gekenmerkt door respectievelijk (1) vrije exploratie van het medium; (2) in-
temalisatie van het muzikale systeem. Voorts geven Gardners beschrijvin-
gen aanleiding tot het definiëren van een derde stadium: na het ongereflec-
teerde internaliseren van het muzikale systeem volgt een periode van be-
wustwording en het aannemen van een meer afstandelijke, abstraherende 
houding. 
Het tweede ontwikkelingsmodel, naar voren gebracht door Gardner, 
Phelps en Wolf (1990), kent eveneens drie stadia. Deze drie stadia betreffen 
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de ontwikkeling van de creativiteit in "symbolische domeinen", waartoe ook 
het muzikale domein wordt gerekend. De stadiumopeenvolging bestaat uit 
een preconventioneel, een conventioneel en een postconventioneel stadium. 
De derde ontwikkelingstheorie richt zich uitsluitend op het muzikale 
domein. Swanwick en Tillman (1986,1988) onderscheiden vier stadia in de 
ontwikkeling van het muzikaal begrip, waarin achtereenvolgens het muzi-
kale materiaal, de expressie, de vorm en metacognitie centraal staan. Elk 
stadium kent twee modi, die respectievelijk voor een meer subjectieve en 
een meer objectieve (of intersubjectieve) benadering staan. Aldus vatten 
Swanwick en Tillman de ontwikkeling op als een spiraalbeweging die een 
verticale beweging naar hogere stadia combineert met een horizontale pen-
delbeweging tussen subjectieve en objectieve modi. 
Alle drie de stadiumtheorieën kunnen worden opgevat als handelend 
over de ontwikkeling van het muzikaal begrip, maar dit betekent niet dat ze 
eenvoudigweg naast elkaar kunnen worden gelegd. Elke theorie behandelt 
een ander aspect van het muzikaal begrip. Niettemin vertonen de drie theo-
rieën interessante overeenkomsten die schematisch kunnen worden weer-
gegeven. 
Evaluatieve claims — claims dat latere stadia een verbetering inhouden 
ten opzichte van hun voorgangers — kunnen met betrekking tot alle drie de 
ontwikkelingsmodellen worden verdedigd. Voor alle drie de modellen geldt 
dat een later stadium een hoger niveau van muzikaal begrip vertegenwoor-
digt dan zijn voorganger, hetgeen een rijkere muzikale ervaring mogelijk 
maakt. 
Theorieën over muzikale ontwikkeling zijn van groot belang voor het 
muziekonderwijs, omdat men eruit kan afleiden welke leerstof geschikt is 
voor de opeenvolgende leeftijdscategorieën. Twee typen van geschikte leer-
stof kunnen worden onderscheiden: leerstof die overeenkomt met het actu-
ele ontwikkelingsstadium waarin de leerling zich bevindt en leerstof die 
anticipeert op het eerstvolgende ontwikkelingsstadium. Het eerste type is 
gericht op een kwantitatieve toename van het muzikaal begrip, het tweede 
type beoogt de verwerving van muzikaal begrip dat kwalitatief verschilt van 
het begrip dat tot dusver verworven is. Het stimuleren van de muzikale 
ontwikkeling dient niet zozeer te worden opgevat als het trachten te ver-
snellen van de ontwikkeling maar veeleer als het waarborgen van de voort-
gang van de muzikale ontwikkeling en van een zo soepel mogelijke verwer-
ving van nieuwe vormen van muzikaal begrip. 
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In de vierde studie staat het doelbegrip in de muzikale opvoeding en het 
muziekonderwijs centraal. Ter oriëntatie op het doelbegrip worden de radi-
caal verschillende visies van de wijsgerig pedagogen W. Brezinka (1993, 
1994) en R. S. Peters (1959,1966,1973a) beschreven. Uit de tegenoverstelling 
komen twee kwesties naar voren die vervolgens worden getraceerd in het 
werk van vooraanstaande philosophers of music education. 
De eerste kwestie betreft het onderscheid tussen interne en externe doel-
opvattingen. In eerste instantie lijken Reimer (1989) en Elliott (1995) ver-
schillende perspectieven te kiezen. Reimer verdedigt een interne kijk, wan-
neer hij stelt dat het doel van muziekonderwijs gelegen is in het tot ont-
wikkeling brengen van het vermogen muziek te ervaren en te creëren. Elliott 
valt deze positie aan door te argumenteren dat muziek een praktisch (en dus 
extern) doel heeft: het bereiken van zelfgroei, zelfbegrip en vreugde. Bij 
nader inzien blijken de zaken echter ingewikkelder te liggen. Elliott komt tot 
een interne doelbepaling, als hij beweert dat muzikale activiteiten ''all are 
worth doing for the doing itself". Reimer op zijn beurt refereert aan een 
extern doel door te stellen dat muziek een middel is om tot zelfbegrip te 
komen. Voor beide auteurs geldt dat ze zowel interne als externe doelcon-
cepties hanteren zonder deze duidelijk aan elkaar te relateren. 
De tweede kwestie betreft het verschil tussen empirische en conceptuele 
kwesties. In het overzicht dat Reimer (1989) geeft van de relaties tussen 
muzikale activiteiten worden de beiden soorten kwesties onvoldoende uit 
elkaar gehouden, hetgeen tot verwarringen leidt. Reimer komt tot de vol-
gende indeling: (1) ends behaviors: perceiving en reacting; (2) means behaviors: 
creating, conceptualizing, analyzing en evaluating; en (3) outcome behavior: valu-
ing. Nadere analyse toont aan dat er tussen creating (en ook listening) ener-
zijds en perceiving en reacting anderzijds geen (empirische) middel-doelrela-
tie bestaat maar een logisch-conceptuele. Ook Reimers opvatting van valuing 
wordt bekritiseerd, omdat zij geen recht doet aan de verbondenheid van 
valuing met perceiving en reacting. Geconcludeerd wordt dat Reimers inde-
ling van perceiving, reacting, creating, listening en valuing in verschillende ca-
tegorieën een vertekend beeld geeft van de relatie tussen deze activiteiten. 
Het betreft hier aspecten van één en dezelfde praktijk die logisch-conceptu-
eel met elkaar verbonden zijn en niet via middel-doelrelaties. 
Reimers middel-doelopvatting ten aanzien van de relatie tussen concep-
tualizing (dat ook analyzing en evaluating omvat) enerzijds en perceiving en 
reacting anderzijds is wel acceptabel, maar ook hier zijn enkele kanttekenin-
gen op hun plaats. Ten eerste kan conceptualizing in bepaalde gevallen ook 
een doel in zichzelf zijn. Ten tweede belemmert de wijze waarop Reimer 
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conceptualizing en aesthetic perceptual structuring met elkaar contrasteert ons 
inzicht in de samenhang tussen concepten en de muzikale ervaring. Als al-
ternatief voor Reimers zienswijze wordt een aantal punten aangedragen die 
bijdragen tot een helderder inzicht in deze samenhang: (1) in de muzikale 
ervaring spelen concepten wel degelijk een centrale rol, (2) het gebruik van 
muzikale concepten veronderstelt niet noodzakelijkerwijs kennis van de 
muziektheorie, (3) de concepten die bij de omgang met muziek worden 
gevormd kunnen nonverbaal zowel als verbaal zijn, (4) concepten kunnen, 
in tegenstelling tot wat Reimer suggereert, betrekking hebben op de meest 
specifieke en concrete zaken. In navolging van Swanwick kan men een on-
derscheid maken tussen secondary conceptualization die betrekking heeft op 
het spreken over muziek en primary conceptualization die een integraal on-
derdeel vormt van de directe muzikale ervaring. Alleen in het eerste geval is 
sprake van een middel-doelrelaüe. 
Tenslotte wordt kort ingegaan op het belang van conceptuele studies 
zoals de onderhavige: ze kunnen een duidelijker en dieper begrip van de 
pedagogische praktijk bewerkstelligen, en aldus een adequater handelen tot 
gevolg hebben. Ze kunnen bovendien leiden tot een nieuwe conceptua-
lisering en een nieuwe inrichting van de pedagogische praktijk. 
De vijfde en laatste studie gaat in op de nieuwe situatie die is ontstaan in de 
philosophy of music education sinds het verschijnen van Elliotts Music Matters 
(1995). Elliott zet zich in zijn boek sterk af tegen de tot dusver dominante 
opvatting, die hij aanduidt als music education as aesthetic education (MEAE). Hij 
presenteert een alternatieve visie op muziek en muziekonderwijs (c.q. de 
muzikale opvoeding). 
Eerst vat ik Elliotts belangrijkste bezwaren tegen MEAE samen: muziek 
wordt ten onrechte opgevat als een object, men concentreert zich enkel op de 
perceptie van de muzikale vorm van het werk en de notie van esthetische 
ervaring die men hanteert is inconsistent en irrelevant. Dan schets ik Elliotts 
alternatieve opvatting. Muziek dient te worden opgevat als een praktijk 
waarin twee activiteiten in elkaar grijpen: muziek maken en muziek beluis-
teren. Deze twee activiteiten zijn in essentie vormen van thinking-in-action. 
De waarde van de omgang met muziek is gelegen in de optimale ervaring, 
zelfgroei, en zelfkennis die het gevolg zijn van het met succes aangaan van 
de cognitive challenges die dynamische muzikale praktijken voortdurend bie-
den. Muziekonderwijs dient te worden ingericht als een practicum dat muzi-
kale praktijken in het echt zo dicht mogelijk benadert. 
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Vervolgens ga ik in op de twee belangrijkste punten waarop MEAE en 
Elliotts filosofìe uiteenlopen. Ten eerste stelt Elliott tegenover een esthetisch 
muziekbegrip een cognitieve conceptie. Hoewel Elliotts kritiek op Langers 
specifieke conceptie van de esthetische ervaring terecht is, gaat hij te ver als 
hij suggereert dat esthetische visies in het algemeen inadequaat zijn. Elliotts 
eigen opvatting kent bovendien tekortkomingen die we niet tegenkomen bij 
de interessantere esthetische visies op muzikale ervaring: (1) ze is niet speci-
fiek genoeg, waardoor onduidelijk blijft waarin muziek zich van andere 
soorten cognitie onderscheidt; (2) ze gaat er ten onrechte van uit dat muziek 
volledig verklaard kan worden in termen van cognitive challenges; (3) ze ba-
gatelliseert het belang van het gevoelsaspect in de muzikale beleving. 
Het tweede twistpunt betreft de reikwijdte van het muziekbegrip. Elliott 
stelt dat het esthetische muziekbegrip, voor zover het al bruikbaar zou zijn, 
te beperkt is. Elliotts verwijt dat MEAE muziek uitsluitend als object opvat is 
echter feitelijk onjuist. Wel lijkt zijn kritiek dat deze benadering weinig 
theoretisch inzicht biedt in de aard van de verschillende muzikale activi-
teiten correct. Belangrijker is Elliotts kritiek dat MEAE door zich te con-
centreren op de vorm andere dimensies van de muziek negeert. Hoewel 
sterk aangezet, is deze kritiek in principe op zijn plaats. Wel kan ter 
verdediging van de esthetische opvatting worden aangevoerd dat de alter-
natieve dimensies die Elliott aanvoert, niets afdoen aan de centrale rol van 
de vorm. Zijn derde bezwaar, dat MEAE geen oog heeft voor de diverse 
functies die muziek kan vervullen naast de esthetische, kan op een soort-
gelijke manier worden beoordeeld. Hoewel op zichzelf juist, doet het voor-
alsnog weinig af aan de centrale rol van de esthetische ervaring. Ten eerste 
liggen bepaalde aspecten van de esthetische ervaring ten grondslag aan vele 
"niet-esthetische" functies, ten tweede overheerst de esthetische functie van 
muziek in onze westerse maatschappij, en ten derde is vooralsnog niet dui-
delijk op welke alternatieve functies het muziekonderwijs zich zou moeten 
richten. 
Het artikel besluit met een correctie van het door Elliott geschetste beeld 
dat esthetische en praxiale benaderingen volstrekte tegenpolen zijn. Beide 
typen benaderingen zijn compatibel: terwijl praxiale zienswijzen ons een 
beeld kunnen geven van de vele dimensies van muzikale de muzikale wer-
kelijkheid, kunnen esthetische visies ons inzicht bieden in de bijzondere 
ervaring die uiteindelijk toch altijd de kern lijkt te vormen van muzikale 
praktijken. De muziekpedagogiek dient zich te laten inspireren door de 
beste ideeën van beide stromingen. 
144 Keynotes in music education 
In de epiloog worden een aantal belangrijke onderzoeksgebieden in de philo-
sophy of music education aangeduid en gesitueerd. Muziekfilosofische thema's 
die aan de orde komen zijn: globale concepties van muziek (zoals forma-
lisme en praxialisme), de verschillende soorten kennis in de muziek, muzi-
kaal begrip, de rol van concepten, muzikale betekenis, gevoelens en emoties, 
en de verschillende vormen van muziekbeoefening (luisteren, uitvoeren, 
componeren, etc). Vervolgens worden enkele wijsgerig-pedagogische kwes-
ties aangestipt: het begrip education, leren (learning zowel als teaching), indoc-
trinatie, het curriculum, de educated person, opvoedings- c.q. onderwijsdoe-
len, rechtvaardiging en ontwikkeling. Tenslotte wordt nog kort ingegaan op 
een drietal onderwerpen: de relatie tussen muziek en de andere kunsten in 
het onderwijs, de inhoud van het muziekonderwijs en multicultureel mu-
ziekonderwijs. 
Muziekfilosofie en philosophy of music education maken de laatste jaren 
een snelle ontwikkeling door, maar er staat nog veel werk te wachten. Beide 
terreinen bieden een grote variëteit aan boeiende onderzoeksthema's die 
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bij het proefschrift 
Keynotes in music education: A philosophical analysis 
van Constantijn Koopman 
1. Muziek geeft een uniek soort ervaring; maar dat is op zichzelf nog geen 
argument ten gunste van het muziekonderwijs. 
2. In de rechtvaardiging van het muziekonderwijs wordt de intrinsieke 
waarde van de muzikale ervaring vaak onderschat. 
3. Zingen, spelen en andere muzikale activiteiten in het muziekonderwijs 
laten zich niet categoriseren in termen van middelen en doelen. 
4. De onkritische toepassing van concepten uit de linguïstiek en de semio-
tiek heeft in veel theoretische bijdragen tot een onjuist begrip van muzi-
kale betekenis geleid. 
5. Het toekennen van veel extrinsieke betekenis aan muziek kan evenzeer 
op een arme als op een rijke muzikale beleving duiden. 
6. Concepten spelen een onmisbare rol in de muzikale ervaring. 
7. Beethovens cadens voor het eerste deel van Mozarts pianoconcert in d 
KV 466 doet afbreuk aan de subtiliteit van Mozarts compositie. 
8. Schubert is een meester van de expositie, Beethoven een meester van de 
doorwerking; daarom is de laatste — althans voor wat betreft de instru-
mentale werken — de grotere componist. 
9. Over smaak valt niet te twisten, maar over kunst kan men redelijk van 
mening verschillen. 
10. Dat kunst nergens voor dient is niet zozeer haar zwakte als wel haar 
kracht. 
11. Het hoorcollege is hard op weg de meest ondergewaardeerde onder-
wijsvorm te worden. 
12. Afdingen door toeristen in derde-wereldlanden is vaak uitbuiting tot 
spel verheven. 



